Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.

Quality improvement incentive strategies in a supply chain

Abstract: This paper investigates several incentive mechanisms for collaborative product quality improvement in a buyer-driven supply chain, and the impacts of those mechanisms on supply chain performance. The buyer, the Stackelberg leader, determines the sales price of a product while the supplier is responsible for production and product quality determination. We develop analytical models incorporating two reward schemes to better understand how the buyer can facilitate the supplier’s quality improvement efforts. We offer managerial insights and practical guidelines for implementing quality management in the supply chain, derived from both an analytical comparison and numerical experiments.

Game theory approach to optimal design of shale gas supply chains with consideration of economics and life cycle greenhouse gas emissions

Abstract: This article addresses the optimal design of a non-cooperative shale gas supply chain based on a game theory approach. Instead of assuming a single stakeholder as in centralized models, we consider different stakeholders, including the upstream shale gas producer and the midstream shale gas processor. Following the Stackelberg game, the shale gas producer is identified as the leader, whose objectives include maximizing its net present value (NPV) and minimizing the life cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The shale gas processor is identified as the follower that takes actions after the leader to maximize its own NPV. The resulting problem is a multiobjective mixed-integer bilevel linear programming problem, which cannot be solved directly using any off-the-shelf optimization solvers. Therefore, an efficient projection-based reformulation and decomposition algorithm is further presented. Based on a case study of the Marcellus shale play, the non-cooperative model not only captures the interactions between stakeholders but also provides more realistic solutions. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers AIChE J, 63: 2671–2693, 2017

Competitive Energy Trading Framework for Demand-Side Management in Neighborhood Area Networks

Abstract: This paper, by comparing three potential energy trading systems, studies the feasibility of integrating a community energy storage (CES) device with consumer-owned photovoltaic (PV) systems for demand-side management of a residential neighborhood area network. We consider a fully competitive CES operator in a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, a benevolent CES operator that has socially favorable regulations with competitive users, and a centralized cooperative CES operator that minimizes the total community energy cost. The former two game-theoretic systems consider that the CES operator first maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with the grid. Then the users with PV panels play a non-cooperative repeated game following the actions of the CES operator to trade energy with the CES device and the grid to minimize energy costs. The centralized CES operator cooperates with the users to minimize the total community energy cost without appropriate incentives. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game with the fully competitive CES operator has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the CES operator maximizes revenue and users obtain unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium CES energy trading strategies. Extensive simulations show that the fully competitive CES model gives the best tradeoff of operating environment between the CES operator and the users.