Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.

On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: the Critical Role of the Strategy Space

Abstract: Comparing the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in a differentiated-products model under price and for quantity strategy s paces, it is shown that, whatever the role (leader, follower, Nash co mpetitor), it is always more profitable to be a quantity (price) sett er if the goods are substitutes (complements). However, for the consu mer, price competition is always the best. Concerning total surpluses , the ranking is first the Bertrand equilibrium, then the price Stack elberg, followed by the mixed Nash, the quantity Stackelberg, and the Cournot equilibria for both the complement and substitute cases. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Incentive Design for Cache-Enabled D2D Underlaid Cellular Networks Using Stackelberg Game

Abstract: Caching in wireless device-to-device (D2D) networks can bring contents closer to users and reduce backhaul traffic. However, the major obstacle to realize cache-enabled D2D communications is the selfish nature of users. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism for pricing the contributions of D2D transmitters in cache-enabled D2D-underlaid cellular networks modeled by stochastic geometry. A Stackelberg game is employed to resolve the conflict of interests between the operator and D2D transmitters. The main objective of this game is to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which both the operator and D2D transmitters achieve the maximum profit by designing the optimal incentive price and the optimal caching strategy. We show the existence of the equilibrium and propose a low-complexity algorithm to obtain the near-optimal caching strategy and incentive price. Numerical results verify the existence of the SE and the advantages of the proposed scheme in terms of the utilities for the operator and D2D transmitters over existing caching schemes with fixed incentive.

Secure Transmission in MISOME Wiretap Channel With Multiple Assisting Jammers: Maximum Secrecy Rate and Optimal Power Allocation

Abstract: This paper investigates the secrecy rate maximization problem for the multiple-input-single-output multiple-antenna-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel with multiple randomly located jammers. The multi-antenna base station (BS) transmits information signals along with artificial noise (AN) to disturb the eavesdropper. Moreover, the friendly jammers are properly selected to assist the legitimate link for better secure transmission with some payoffs. With this system model, we first formulate a Stackelberg game between the BS and the assisting jammers with full channel state information. Stackelberg equilibriums, including optimal fraction of transmit power for AN, optimal transmit power, and asking prices of assisting jammers, are first proved to exist and then analytically derived. A policy iterative algorithm is also proposed to obtain the optimal solutions. We then extend the Stackelberg game to the case of MISOME broadcast wiretap channel with channel distribution information of eavesdropper. Numerical results verify the accuracy of the derived results and the efficiency of the proposed algorithm. The results reveal that the proposed jammer-assisted secure transmission can greatly improve the secrecy performance and meanwhile save more energy for information signals, which is significant for future wireless communication.

Three Dynamic Pricing Schemes for Resource Allocation of Edge Computing for IoT Environment

Abstract: With the widespread use of Internet of Things (IoT), edge computing has recently emerged as a promising technology to tackle low-latency and security issues with personal IoT data. In this regard, many works have been concerned with computing resource allocation of the edge computing server, and some studies have conducted to the pricing schemes for resource allocation additionally. However, few works have attempted to address the comparison among various kinds of pricing schemes. In addition, some schemes have their limitations such as fairness issues on differentiated pricing schemes. To tackle these limitations, this article considered three dynamic pricing mechanisms for resource allocation of edge computing for the IoT environment with a comparative analysis: BID-proportional allocation mechanism (BID-PRAM), uniform pricing mechanism (UNI-PRIM), and fairness-seeking differentiated pricing mechanism (FAID-PRIM). BID-PRAM is newly proposed to overcome the limitation of the auction-based pricing scheme; UNI-PRIM is a basic uniform pricing scheme; FAID-PRIM is newly proposed to tackle the fairness issues of the differentiated pricing scheme. BID-PRAM is formulated as a noncooperative game. UNI-PIM and FAID-PRIM are formulated as a single-leader–multiple-followers Stackelberg game. In each mechanism, the Nash equilibrium (NE) or Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) solution is given with the proof of existence and uniqueness. Numerical results validate the proposed theorems and present a comparative analysis of three mechanisms. Through these analyses, the advantages and disadvantages of each model are identified, to give edge computing service providers guidance on various kinds of pricing schemes.