Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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01 Jan 2004TL;DR: This paper builds on the model and results of T. Basar and R. Srikant, (2002) and extends them to the case of differentiated prices, again for the single link case and for a many-user regime, and establishes for a general network with multiple links the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium along with a unique Stackelberg solution.
Abstract: This paper builds on the model and results of T. Basar and R. Srikant, (2002) and extends them to the case of differentiated prices, again for the single link case. It introduces a hierarchical network game with one service provider and multiple users of different types, where the service provider is allowed to charge different prices to users of different types. The service provider plays with the users a Stackelberg (leader-follower) game, while among users themselves, they play a Nash game. The paper establishes for a general network with multiple links the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium along with the existence of a unique Stackelberg solution. The economics of providing large capacity and price differentiation is examined especially in the single link case and for a many-user regime. One important result is that optimum price differentiation leads to a more egalitarian distribution of resources at fairer prices and improves the service provider's revenue and network performance. Moreover, the service provider has an incentive to increase the capacity proportionally with the number of additional users admitted.
52 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the incentives of oligopolistic firms to form strategic alliances and the effects of the endogenously derived alliance structure on product market competition in a three-stage game, where the first stage firms decide about forming strategic alliances, the second stage each alliance designs a strategic contract, and the third stage alliance members and outsiders compete in the product market.
52 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, a retailer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain is considered, and the authors obtain equilibrium prices for the retailer's margin contract that can coordinate the dual-Channel supply chain and ensure that both the retailer and the manufacturer will be more profitable.
52 citations
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21 Jun 2014
TL;DR: This work offers a very general model of infinite-horizon discounted adversarial patrolling games, and presents a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) formulation for computing optimal randomized policies for the defender, as well as a Mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) formulation to approximate these, with provable quality guarantees.
Abstract: Stackelberg games form the core of a number of tools deployed for computing optimal patrolling strategies in adversarial domains, such as the US Federal Air Marshall Service and the US Coast Guard. In traditional Stackelberg security game models the attacker knows only the probability that each target is covered by the defender, but is oblivious to the detailed timing of the coverage schedule. In many real-world situations, however, the attacker can observe the current location of the defender and can exploit this knowledge to reason about the defender's future moves. We show that this general modeling framework can be captured using adversarial patrolling games (APGs) in which the defender sequentially moves between targets, with moves constrained by a graph, while the attacker can observe the defender's current location and his (stochastic) policy concerning future moves. We offer a very general model of infinite-horizon discounted adversarial patrolling games. Our first contribution is to show that defender policies that condition only on the previous defense move (i.e., Markov stationary policies) can be arbitrarily sub-optimal for general APGs. We then offer a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) formulation for computing optimal randomized policies for the defender that can condition on history of bounded, but arbitrary, length, as well as a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) formulation to approximate these, with provable quality guarantees. Additionally, we present a non-linear programming (NLP) formulation for solving zero-sum APGs. We show experimentally that MILP significantly outperforms the MINLP formulation, and is, in turn, significantly outperformed by the NLP specialized to zero-sum games.
52 citations
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TL;DR: An experimental test of Bagwell's claim that the first mover advantage vanishes completely if this action is only imperfectly observed by second movers finds some support for the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium emphasised by van Damme and Hurkens (1997).
Abstract: In a seminal paper Bagwell (1995) claims that the first mover advantage, i.e. the strategic benefit of committing oneself to an action before others can do, vanishes completely if this action is only imperfectly observed by second movers. In our paper we report on an experimental test of this prediction. We implement three versions of a game similar to an example^? given by Bagwell, each time varying the quality of the signal which informs the second mover. For experienced players we do not find empirical support for Bagwell's result. Instead, we find some support for the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium emphasised by van Damme and Hurkens (1997).
52 citations