Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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06 Jul 2014
TL;DR: Experimental results indicate that the proposed scheme for demand response management in the context of smart grids can not only benefit the retailers but also the customers.
Abstract: This paper proposes a real-time pricing scheme for demand response management in the context of smart grids. The electricity retailer determines the retail price first and announces the price information to the customers through the smart meter systems. According to the announced price, the customers automatically manage the energy use of appliances in the households by the proposed energy management system with the aim to maximize their own benefits. We model the interactions between the electricity retailer and its customers as a 1-leader, N-follower Stackelberg game. By taking advantage of the two-way communication infrastructure, the sequential equilibrium can be obtained through backward induction. At the followers' side, given the electricity price information, we develop efficient algorithms to maximize customers' satisfaction. At the leader's side, we develop a genetic algorithms based real-time pricing scheme by considering the expected customers' reactions to maximize retailer's profit. Experimental results indicate that the proposed scheme can not only benefit the retailers but also the customers.
52 citations
06 May 2013
TL;DR: A Stackelberg game model of security in which the defender chooses a mitigation strategy that interdicts potential attack actions, and the attacker responds by computing an optimal attack plan that circumvents the deployed mitigations is presented.
Abstract: We present a Stackelberg game model of security in which the defender chooses a mitigation strategy that interdicts potential attack actions, and the attacker responds by computing an optimal attack plan that circumvents the deployed mitigations. First, we offer a general formulation for deterministic plan interdiction as a mixed-integer program, and use constraint generation to compute optimal solutions, leveraging state-of-the-art partial satisfaction planning techniques. We also present a greedy heuristic for this problem, and compare its performance with the optimal MILP-based approach. We then extend our framework to incorporate uncertainty about attacker's capabilities, costs, goals, and action execution uncertainty, and show that these extensions retain the basic structure of the deterministic plan interdiction problem. Introduction of more general models of planning uncertainty require us to model the attacker's problem as a general MDP, and demonstrate that the MDP interdiction problem can still be solved using the basic constraint generation framework.
52 citations
TL;DR: Two stochastic models for centralized channel and decentralized channel are developed to handle new fashion and off-season product sales and closed-form solutions for optimal order and pricing decisions are proposed for new fashion products.
52 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a symmetric duopoly with two production periods is considered, where the first period firms simultaneously choose initial production levels and then additional second period outputs are chosen simultaneously.
52 citations
TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors extended the results in the manufacturer-dominated game model to the case where the manufacturer's marginal profit is not large enough to cover the costs of the entire supply chain under the co-op advertising mode.
Abstract: This note extends the results in the manufacturer-dominated game model of the paper by Li et al. (Omega 30 (2002) 347) to the case where the manufacturer’s marginal profit is not large enough. In such situations, the profit of the entire supply chain under the co-op advertising mode is higher than the one under the Stackelberg game, which is consistent with the results of the original paper. However, the advertising expenditures of the manufacturer and the retailer under the co-op advertising model are not always larger than those under the Stackelberg game, which is different from the results of the original paper. Furthermore, the results are also compared with the simultaneous move game of the paper by Huang and Li (Eur. J. Oper. Res. 135 (2001) 527). The manufacturer always prefers the leader–follower structure rather than the simultaneous move structure, which is consistent with the results of the original paper. However, the retailer always prefers the simultaneous move structure rather than the leader–follower structure, which differs from the results of the original paper. 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
52 citations