Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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TL;DR: Dynamic programming algorithms are presented for the solution of discrete time dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with multiple players both for independent followers and for dependent followers.
51 citations
TL;DR: This work considers a four-node cognitive scenario where the secondary receiver is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission and formulate and analyze an important EE Stackelberg game between the two transmitters aiming at maximizing their utilities.
Abstract: We investigate energy-efficient cooperation for secrecy in cognitive radio networks. In particular, we consider a four-node cognitive scenario where the secondary receiver is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission. The cognitive transmitter should ensure that the primary message is not leaked to the secondary user by using cooperative jamming. We investigate the optimal power allocation and power splitting at the secondary transmitter for our cognitive model to maximize the secondary energy efficiency (EE) under secrecy constraints. We formulate and analyze an important EE Stackelberg game between the two transmitters aiming at maximizing their utilities. We illustrate the analytical results through our geometrical model, highlighting the EE performance of the system and the impact of the Stackelberg game.
51 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the impact of supply chain power structure on firms' profitability in an assembly system with one assembler and two suppliers was investigated, and it was shown that when the assembler is the most powerful firm among the three, the systemwide profit is the highest and so is the assemblers' profit.
Abstract: This paper studies the impact of supply chain power structure on firms' profitability in an assembly system with one assembler and two suppliers. Two power regimes are investigated�in a Single Power Regime, a more powerful firm acts as the Stackelberg leader to decide the wholesale price but not the quantity whereas in a Dual Power Regime, both the price and quantity decisions are granted to the more powerful firm. Tallying the power positions of the three firms, for each power regime we study three power structures and investigate the system's as well as the firms' preference of power. We find that when the assembler is the most powerful firm among the three, the system-wide profit is the highest and so is the assembler's profit. The more interesting finding is that, if the assembler is not the most powerful player in the system, more power does not necessarily guarantee her a higher profit. Similarly, a supplier's profit can also decrease with the power he has. These results contrast with the conclusion for serial systems, where a firm always prefers more power. We also find that when both suppliers are more (less) powerful than the assembler, it can be beneficial (indifferent) for everyone if the two suppliers merge into a mega supplier to make decisions jointly. When the assembler is more powerful than one supplier and less so than the other, it is always better for the system to have the two suppliers merge, and for each individual firm, merging is preferred if the firm becomes the more powerful party after merging.
51 citations
TL;DR: A simple theorem that uses agents’ standard one-period reaction functions and the one- period Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set of games with two properties: agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur.
51 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the effect of leadership structure on the value of guarantor financing in a capital-constrained supply chain and the impact of leader structure on finance decisions.
Abstract: This study investigates manufacturer guarantor financing (MG) and third‐party logistics (3PL) guarantor financing (LG) in a four‐party supply chain game that features a manufacturer, a 3PL, a capital‐constrained retailer, and a bank. The manufacturer or 3PL can act as the guarantor for the retailer who borrows bank credit. Two different leadership structures are investigated, namely, Nash game and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer and 3PL decide simultaneously and sequentially, respectively. The supply chain under both leadership structures prefers guarantor financing to traditional bank financing when the supply chain is sufficiently cost‐efficient. In the Nash game, however, firms encounter a free‐rider dilemma when choosing between MG and LG, wherein both potential guarantors prefer the other to be the guarantor. This free‐rider dilemma can be resolved in the Stackelberg game. We also observe the follower–guarantor advantage in the Stackelberg game, wherein all firms favor the follower to provide guarantor financing. Our analysis shows that the supply chain under guarantor financing with a longer decision hierarchy (i.e., the Stackelberg game) can be conditionally more effective than that with a shorter one (i.e., the Nash game). By further analyzing different cost structures, pricing mechanism, and retailer’s initial capital, we find that most of our qualitative results remain accurate under more sophisticated conditions. These findings enhance our understanding of the value of guarantor financing in a capital‐constrained supply chain and the impact of leadership structure on financing decisions.
51 citations