Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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TL;DR: To solve the game, a distributed algorithm is proposed, and it is shown to converge to a sub-game perfect Stackelberg equilibrium across all users, giving a Pareto-efficient outcome, while guaranteeing best social welfare and satisfaction across all D2D users.
Abstract: In underlaid device-to-device (D2D) cellular networks, severe radio interference can be typical for cellular and D2D users, which causes each D2D user’s quality-of-experience (QoE) to degrade significantly. Thus, in this paper, a dynamic Stackelberg game is formulated with a single-leader (base station) and multiple-followers (D2D pairs). The leader reduces interference within the network by charging a price to followers, whereas followers react to this price and compete to find optimal transmit power and resource block allocation. To enhance D2D user QoE, D2D users are categorized into one of three application classes with each class mapped to a different utility function. To address this, we propose a crucial innovation where the several different utility functions, available to followers, are solved using a non-scalarized approach, as a scalarized approach to this multi-criteria optimization problem is generally infeasible in real-time D2D cellular communications. To solve the game, a distributed algorithm is proposed, and it is shown to converge to a sub-game perfect Stackelberg equilibrium across all users. Simulation results show that the proposed approach reduces transmit power effectively and increases throughput, giving a Pareto-efficient outcome, while guaranteeing best social welfare and satisfaction across all D2D users.
50 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors experimentally investigate Cournot duopolies with an extended timing game and find that subjects play a timing game more akin to a coordina- tion game with two symmetric equilibria rather than the predicted game with a dominant strategy to produce early.
Abstract: In this paper we experimentally investigate Cournot duopolies with an extended timing game. The timing game has observable delay, that is, firms announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in the first period. With random matching we find that, given the actual experimental behavior in the subgames, subjects play a timing game more akin to a coordina- tion game with two symmetric equilibria rather than the predicted game with a dominant strategy to produce early. As a result, a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.
50 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the interaction between revenue sharing and quality of order fulfillment in an Internet drop-shipping distribution system was analyzed using a Stackelberg game and three possible strategies for the e-tailer to extract more accurate cost information from the supplier.
50 citations
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TL;DR: A two-echelon supply chain in which an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer share the product liability cost caused by quality defects is considered, finding that a shift of the share of the ULQ liability cost from R to M enhances the supply chain efficiency under the RS structure.
49 citations
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TL;DR: The study adds to the existing body of work by incorporating buyers’ expectations into a constrained Stackelberg structure, and by achieving coordination without forcing buyers to explicitly comply with the supplier’s replenishment period in choosing their order quantities.
49 citations