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Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A dynamic durable goods duopoly with a manufacturer and two independent and competing retailers is studied and feedback equilibrium policies for the manufacturer and the retailers are obtained in explicit form for a linear demand formulation.
Abstract: Cooperative advertising is an incentive offered by a manufacturer to influence retailers’ promotional decisions. We study a dynamic durable goods duopoly with a manufacturer and two independent and competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, announces his wholesale prices and his shares of retailers’ advertising costs, and the retailers in response play a Nash differential game in choosing their optimal retail prices and advertising efforts over time. We obtain the feedback equilibrium policies for the manufacturer and the retailers in explicit form for a linear demand formulation. We investigate issues, like channel coordination and antidiscriminatory legislation, and also study a case, when the manufacturer sells through only one retailer and the second retailer sells a competing brand.

46 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Two incentive mechanisms are proposed to coordinate tenant power consumption for demand response under two different scenarios, and an algorithm is proposed to find the Stackelberg equilibria with linear complexity.
Abstract: Demand response programs have been considered critical for power grid reliability and efficiency. Especially, the demand response of datacenters has recently received encouraging efforts due to huge demands and flexible power control knobs of datacenters. However, most current efforts focus on owner-operated datacenters, omitting another critical segment of datacenter business: multitenant colocation. In colocation datacenters, while there exist multiple tenants who manage their own servers, the colocation operator only provides facilities such as cooling, reliable power, and network connectivity. Therefore, colocation has a unique feature that challenges any attempts to design a demand response program: uncoordinated power management among tenants. To tackle this challenge, two incentive mechanisms are proposed to coordinate tenant power consumption for demand response under two different scenarios. First, in the case of economic demand response where the operator can adjust an elastic energy reduction target, we show that there is an interaction between the operator and tenant strategies, where each side maximizes its own benefit. Hence, we apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze this scenario and derive this game’s equilibria. However, computing these equilibria can be intractable with exhaustive search; therefore, we propose an algorithm to find the Stackelberg equilibria with linear complexity. Second, in the case of emergency demand response where a fixed energy reduction target must be fulfilled, we devise two incentive schemes with the distributed algorithms that can achieve the same optimal social cost. While the first algorithm is based on the dual-decomposition method that is suitable for nonstrategic tenants, the second one is designed for strategic tenants to achieve a unique Nash equilibrium of a bidding game. Finally, trace-based simulations are also provided to illustrate the efficacy of our proposed incentive schemes.

46 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of coordinating a vertically separated channel under a consignment contract with revenue sharing was considered, and the decision-making of the two firms was modeled as a Stackelberg game, and an equilibrium analysis was carried out for both the centralized and decentralized regimes of the channel, with and without cooperation.

46 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, where players have asymmetric roles, with one leader and one follower in the context of two- person game, is given.
Abstract: This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential game, where players have asymmetric roles, with one leader and one follower in the context of two-person game. It is required that the information available to the follower is a sub-$\sigma$-algebra of the one of the leader. By maximum principle and optimal filtering, a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is given. A special example is used to elaborate the result.

46 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the reduction of carbon emissions driven by cap-and-trade regulation and consumers' low-carbon preference in a dual-channel supply chain and discuss the pricing strategies and the profits for the supply chain members using the Stackelberg game model.
Abstract: This paper focuses on the reduction of carbon emissions driven by cap-and-trade regulation and consumers’ low-carbon preference in a dual-channel supply chain. Under the low-carbon environment, we also discuss the pricing strategies and the profits for the supply chain members using the Stackelberg game model in two cases. In the first (second) case where the initial proportion of consumers who prefer the online direct channel (traditional retail channel) is “larger”, the direct sale price of low-carbon products could be set higher than (equal to) the wholesale price. And it is shown that in both cases, tighter cap-and-trade regulation and higher low-carbon preference stimulate the manufacturer to cut carbon emissions in its production process. However, improving consumers’ low-carbon preference is more acceptable to the supply chain members. It always benefits the manufacturer and the retailer. In comparison, the firm’s profit increases with carbon price only when the clean production level is relatively high. Our findings can provide useful managerial insights for policy-makers and firms in the development of low-carbon sustainability.

45 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
2023551
20221,041
2021563
2020557
2019582
2018487