Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.

Computing Stackelberg equilibria in discounted stochastic games

Abstract: Stackelberg games increasingly influence security policies deployed in real-world settings. Much of the work to date focuses on devising a fixed randomized strategy for the defender, accounting for an attacker who optimally responds to it. In practice, defense policies are often subject to constraints and vary over time, allowing an attacker to infer characteristics of future policies based on current observations. A defender must therefore account for an attacker's observation capabilities in devising a security policy. We show that this general modeling framework can be captured using stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where a defender commits to a dynamic policy to which the attacker devises an optimal dynamic response. We then offer the following contributions. 1) We show that Markov stationary policies suffice in SSGs, 2) present a finite-time mixedinteger non-linear program for computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in SSGs, and 3) present a mixed-integer linear program to approximate it. 4)We illustrate our algorithms on a simple SSG representing an adversarial patrolling scenario, where we study the impact of attacker patience and risk aversion on optimal defense policies.

Dynamic Spectrum Access Algorithm Based on Game Theory in Cognitive Radio Networks

Abstract: As an enabling technology for dynamic spectrum access (DSA), cognitive radio (CR) is widely regarded as one of the most promising technologies for future the fifth generation (5G) wireless communications Although there have been significant prior researches to combat interference on primary users (PUs), the problem of mitigating mutual interference between secondary users (SUs), -which is tightly coupled with SU's spectrum leasing- is still not understood well This paper proposes a DSA algorithm based on game theory, which jointly performs spectrum leasing and interference mitigation among SUs The problem is modeled as an oligopolistic competition using Stackelberg model We have carefully studied the SU's spectrum utilization behavior with respect to various criteria of the proposed game theoretic model Simulation results shows that, Compared with Cournot game model, the proposed scheme enables SUs to efficiently utilize the licensed spectrum shared with PUs in a dynamic environment while maximizing the spectrum utilization

An MPCC approach for stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot equilibrium

Abstract: In this article, we investigate a Stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Equilibrium problem by reformulating it as a Mathematical Program with Complementarity Constraints (MPCC). The complementarity constraints are further reformulated as a system of nonsmooth equations. We characterize the followers’ Nash–Cournot equilibria by studying the implicit solution of a system of equations. We outline numerical methods for the solution of a stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Equilibrium problem with finite distribution of market demand scenarios and propose a discretization approach based on implicit numerical integration to deal with stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Equilibrium problem with continuous distribution of demand scenarios. Finally, we discuss the two-leader Stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Equilibrium problem.

Modeling for Concurrent Design Using Game Theory Formulations

Abstract: One way to model concurrent decision making is to formulate multi player mathematical games The purpose of this paper is to illus trate a variety of concurrent decision-making models that arise in two simple applications where explicit models can be obtained to represent the typical stages of design and manufacturing in product development Of particular interest are bilevel formulations which have an interpretation of a Stackelberg game between two players such as Design and Manufacturing The solutions in these models show how the final design out come can be predicted based on the different interactions that may occur between the decision makers in concurrent design project