Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.

Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Stackelberg Games WIth State and Control Delays

Abstract: In this article, we consider a linear-quadratic mean field game between a leader (dominating player) and a group of followers (agents) under the Stackelberg game setting as proposed in [A. Bensoussan, M. Chau, and S. Yam, Appl. Math. Optim., 74 (2016), pp. 91-128], so that the evolution of each individual follower is now also subjected to delay effects from both his/her state and control variables, as well as those of the leader. The overall Stackelberg game is solved by tackling three subproblems hierarchically. Their resolution corresponds to the establishment of the existence and uniqueness of the solutions of three different forward-backward stochastic functional differential equations, which we manage by applying the unified continuation method as first developed in, for example, [Y. Hu and S. Peng, Probab. Theory Related Fields, 103 (1995), pp. 273-283] and [X. Xu, Fully Coupled Forward-Backward Stochastic Functional Differential Equations and Applications to Quadratic Optimal Control, preprint, arX...

Competitive Energy Trading Framework for Demand-side Management in Neighborhood Area Networks

Abstract: This paper, by comparing three potential energy trading systems, studies the feasibility of integrating a community energy storage (CES) device with consumer-owned photovoltaic (PV) systems for demand-side management of a residential neighborhood area network. We consider a fully-competitive CES operator in a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, a benevolent CES operator that has socially favorable regulations with competitive users, and a centralized cooperative CES operator that minimizes the total community energy cost. The former two game-theoretic systems consider that the CES operator first maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with the grid. Then the users with PV panels play a non-cooperative repeated game following the actions of the CES operator to trade energy with the CES device and the grid to minimize energy costs. The centralized CES operator cooperates with the users to minimize the total community energy cost without appropriate incentives. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game with the fully-competitive CES operator has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the CES operator maximizes revenue and users obtain unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium CES energy trading strategies. Extensive simulations show that the fully-competitive CES model gives the best trade-off of operating environment between the CES operator and the users.

Using Stackelberg game to enhance cognitive radio sensor networks security

Abstract: The authors propose a game-theoretic approach using the Stackelberg game for securing cognitive radio sensor network (CRSN) against the spectrum sensing data falsification attack; this attack aims at corrupting the spectrum decisions communicated from the ambient sensor nodes (ASNs) to the fusion centre by imposing interference power. The proposed game approach is developed for two different attack–defence scenarios. In the first scenario, the attacker selects to attack a group of delivered reports of the ASNs that have a protection degree below a specific threshold. In the second scenario, the attacker applies its maximum attack interference power to the delivered reports of the ASNs that have been reported to be least protected in the previous round. Simulation results indicate the improved performance of the proposed protection model as compared with two baseline defence mechanisms, namely, the random and equal-protection defence mechanisms with static signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and variable SNRs. Consequently, Stackelberg game features prove to be beneficial for securing communication over CRSN.