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Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A supplier-retailer supply chain in which demand for the products is displayed stock dependent and the retailer takes the benefit of permissible delay in payments from the supplier to obtain the optimal decisions of the supply chain under three different policies.
Abstract: With the prevalence of network technologies, the world is shrinking and it is observed that the decision policies of the players of the supply chain go hand in hand. Thus the optimal replenishment decisions of retailers cannot be taken in isolation and need to be integrated with that of the supplier. This research work establishes a supplier-retailer supply chain in which demand for the products is displayed stock dependent. Nowadays, trade credit is also seen as prime source of short term financing, thus the retailer takes the benefit of permissible delay in payments from the supplier. The objective of the proposed model is to obtain the optimal decisions of the supply chain under three different policies- centralized, Supplier-led Stackelberg policy and Nash equilibrium solution. In this study, the influence of trade credit offered by the supplier, replenishment decisions and integration among the players of supply chain through different centralized and decentralized policies is analyzed for deteriorating items where retailer faces displayed stock dependent demand with two storage facilities. The model is best suitable for the emerging retail markets or supermarkets with limited shelf space displaying consumable items such as grocery, consumer goods, etc. The results have been validated with the help of a numerical example. Sensitivity analysis has also been performed to study the effect of various parameters on the optimal solution.

40 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
01 Dec 2016
TL;DR: In this article, an incentive proactive cache mechanism in cache-enabled small cell networks is proposed, in order to motivate the content providers (CPs) to participate in the caching procedure, where a network composed of a single mobile network operator (MNO) and multiple CPs is considered.
Abstract: In this paper, an incentive proactive cache mechanism in cache-enabled small cell networks (SCNs) is proposed, in order to motivate the content providers (CPs) to participate in the caching procedure. A network composed of a single mobile network operator (MNO) and multiple CPs is considered. The MNO aims to define the price it charges the CPs to maximize its revenue while the CPs compete to determine the number of files they cache at the MNO's small base stations (SBSs) to improve the quality of service (QoS) of their users. This problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game where a single MNO is considered as the leader and the multiple CPs willing to cache files are the followers. The followers game is modeled as a non-cooperative game and both the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE) are proved. The closed-form expression of the NE which corresponds to the amount of storage each CP requests from the MNO is derived. An optimization problem is formulated at the MNO side to determine the optimal price that the MNO should charge the CPs. Simulation results show that at the equilibrium, the MNO and CPs can all achieve a utility that is up to 50% higher than the cases in which the prices and storage quantities are requested arbitrarily.

40 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
01 Aug 2017
TL;DR: This paper analyzes the tradeoff between strategic secrecy and commitment in security games, and proposes a Disguised-resource Security Game (DSG) where the defender strategically disguises some of her resources.
Abstract: The Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) has drawn extensive attention recently in several security domains. However, the SSE concept neglects the advantage of defender’s strategic revelation of her private information, and overestimates the observation ability of the adversaries. In this paper, we overcome these restrictions and analyze the tradeoff between strategic secrecy and commitment in security games. We propose a Disguised-resource Security Game (DSG) where the defender strategically disguises some of her resources. We compare strategic information revelation with public commitment and formally show that they have different advantages depending the payoff structure. To compute the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), several novel approaches are provided, including a novel algorithm based on support set enumeration, and an approximation algorithm for -PBE. Extensive experimental evaluation shows that both strategic secrecy and Stackelberg commitment are critical measures in security domain, and our approaches can efficiently solve PBEs for realistic-sized problems.

40 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A novel distributed Peer-to-Peer day-ahead trading method under multi-microgrid congestion management in active distribution networks and the impact of end energy consumption characteristics on microgrid economic scheduling and P2P trading is analyzed through a modified IEEE 33-node power distribution system.
Abstract: Developing a reasonable, efficient distributed market transaction mechanism is an important issue in distribution systems. The gaming relation between distributed transaction market entities has yet to be fully elucidated in various trading links, and the impact of distributed transactions on distribution network operations has yet to be comprehensively analyzed. This paper proposes a novel distributed Peer-to-Peer (P2P) day-ahead trading method under multi-microgrid congestion management in active distribution networks. First, a flexible load model for price-based demand response load and an autonomous microgrid economic scheduling model are constructed. Second, under normal operation of the distribution network, a non-cooperative game model and Stackelberg game model are employed to separately and comprehensively analyze gaming relationship among sellers, and between sellers and buyers. Thereafter, a congestion management method based on market capacity is established from the perspective of distribution network control centers. Finally, the impact of end energy consumption characteristics on microgrid economic scheduling and P2P trading is analyzed through a modified IEEE 33-node power distribution system. The economic and technical benefits such as congestion mitigation and network loss reduction that produced by P2P trading to the operation of microgrid systems are analysed with specific indicators.

40 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Wei Wei, Yile Liang1, Feng Liu1, Shengwei Mei, Fang Tian1 
09 Apr 2014-Energies
TL;DR: In this paper, a quantitative and computational method to determine the optimal tax rate among generating units is presented to strike a balance between the reduction of carbon emission and the profit of energy sectors.
Abstract: This paper presents a quantitative and computational method to determine the optimal tax rate among generating units. To strike a balance between the reduction of carbon emission and the profit of energy sectors, the proposed bilevel optimization model can be regarded as a Stackelberg game between the government agency and the generation companies. The upper-level, which represents the government agency, aims to limit total carbon emissions within a certain level by setting optimal tax rates among generators according to their emission performances. The lower-level, which represents decision behaviors of the grid operator, tries to minimize the total production cost under the tax rates set by the government. The bilevel optimization model is finally reformulated into a mixed integer linear program (MILP) which can be solved by off-the-shelf MILP solvers. Case studies on a 10-unit system as well as a provincial power grid in China demonstrate the validity of the proposed method and its capability in practical applications.

39 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
2023551
20221,041
2021563
2020557
2019582
2018487