Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions.
Abstract: This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in strategic environments.
38 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the so-called inverse Stackelberg games and their applications in the optimal toll design problem, the energy markets liberalization problem, and in the theory of incentives.
Abstract: This thesis studies the so-called inverse Stackelberg games, that are new in the world of game theory, their properties, and their applications in the optimal toll design problem, the energy markets liberalization problem, and in the theory of incentives.
38 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs is considered, and it is shown that the leader chooses a lower price than the follower, but both get equal payoffs.
38 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the quantum version of the Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information, and investigate how the quantum entanglement affects the first-mover advantage in the classical form.
38 citations
TL;DR: The results demonstrate that under certain conditions on the pricing parameters, the supply chain under the channel member’s fairness concerns can be coordinated through option contract, however, irrespective of the channel members being fairness-concerned, when the channel is coordinated, the supplier cannot realize its optimal pricing policy.
38 citations