Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.

Dynamic Anti-Jamming Coalition for Satellite-Enabled Army IoT: A Distributed Game Approach

Abstract: Satellite-enabled army Internet of Things (SaIoT) has drawn increasing attention due to the wide-coverage and large-capacity transmission. However, the smart jamming based on artificial intelligence technologies has seriously degraded SaIoT performance. Thus, this article investigates the distributed dynamic anti-jamming scheme for SaIoT to decrease energy consumption in the jamming environment. First, a hierarchical anti-jamming Stackelberg game (HASG), which consists of the leader subgame for jammers and the follower subgame for SaIoT devices, is proposed to formulate the confrontation interaction between jammers and SaIoT devices. It has been proved that there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium in the proposed HASG. Then, an anti-jamming coalition formation game (CFG) is proposed for the follower subgame to decrease the energy consumption in the jamming environment, and the modified coalition preference order and coalition change principle are put forward to enhance the performance of the proposed anti-jamming CFG. Furthermore, with the help of the exact potential game, we have demonstrated that the proposed anti-jamming CFG could converge to the stable coalition formation and it is able to achieve similar performance to the centralized optimization via a distributed approach. Finally, reinforcement-learning-based algorithms are utilized to obtain the suboptimal anti-jamming policies according to the dynamic and unknown jamming environment, and simulation results validate that the proposed approach achieves better performance than the existing approaches.

A Stackelberg Game Approach for Two-Level Distributed Energy Management in Smart Grids

Abstract: The pursuit of sustainability motivates microgrids that depend on distributed resources to produce more renewable energies. An efficient operation and planning relies on a holistic framework that takes into account the interdependent decision-making of the generators of the existing power grids and the distributed resources of the microgrid in the integrated system. To this end, we use a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework to study the interactions between generators (leaders) and microgrids (followers). Entities on both sides make strategic decisions on the amount of power generation to maximize their payoffs. Our framework not only takes into account the economic factors but also incorporates the stability and efficiency of the smart grid, such as the power flow constraints and voltage angle regulations. We develop three update schemes for both generators and microgrids, respectively, and among which a fully distributed algorithm enabled by phasor measurement units is presented. The distributed algorithm merely requires the information of voltage angles at local buses for updates, and its convergence to the unique equilibrium is shown. We further develop the implementation architectures of the update schemes in the smart grid. Finally, case studies are used to corroborate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.

Profit Sharing Agreements in Decentralized Supply Chains: A Distributionally Robust Approach

Abstract: How should decentralized supply chains set the profit sharing terms using minimal information on demand and selling price? We develop a distributionally robust Stackelberg game model to address this question. Our framework uses only the first and second moments of the price and demand attributes, and thus can be implemented using only a parsimonious set of parameters. More specifically, we derive the relationships among the optimal wholesale price set by the supplier, the order decision of the retailer, and the corresponding profit shares of each supply chain partner, based on the information available. Interestingly, in the distributionally robust setting, the correlation between demand and selling price has no bearing on the order decision of the retailer. This allows us to simplify the solution structure of the profit sharing agreement problem dramatically. Moreover, the result can be used to recover the optimal selling price when the mean demand is a linear function of the selling price (cf. Raza 2014...

Technology license sharing strategy for remanufacturing industries under a closed-loop supply chain management bonding

Abstract: Remanufacturing is getting attention nowadays due to increasing waste and corresponding emissions. One of the important factors of remanufacturing is the quality of the remanufactured products. The collection and distribution of used products require proper management. Based on this situation, this study discusses a hybrid closed-loop supply chain management in cooperation with a hybrid production system. The vendor comes up with the policy of sharing remanufacturing responsibility by sharing the technology license with other supply chain players. The carbon cap restricts emissions from the entire hybrid production system of the vendor. Other factors of this proposed study are service by the retailer and quality, gift policy, and customer awareness by the vendor. This study examines the scenario under random market demand. Classical optimization provides the solution under the Stackelberg game policy where the vendor acts as leader and the retailer & third party act as followers. This paper considers two scenarios: Scenario A for a continuous distribution and Scenario B for no specific distribution. A comparison is drawn between various motivating factors-based policies to control supply chain management.