Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
TL;DR: In this paper, a peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scheme that can help a centralized power system to reduce the total electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour is proposed.
Abstract: This paper proposes a peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scheme that can help a centralized power system to reduce the total electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour. To do so, a cooperative Stackelberg game is formulated, in which the centralized power system acts as the leader that needs to decide on a price at the peak demand period to incentivize prosumers to not seek any energy from it. The prosumers, on the other hand, act as followers and respond to the leader’s decision by forming suitable coalitions with neighboring prosumers in order to participate in P2P energy trading to meet their energy demand. The properties of the proposed Stackelberg game are studied. It is shown that the game has a unique and stable Stackelberg equilibrium, as a result of the stability of prosumers’ coalitions. At the equilibrium, the leader chooses its strategy using a derived closed-form expression, while the prosumers choose their equilibrium coalition structure. An algorithm is proposed that enables the centralized power system and the prosumers to reach the equilibrium solution. Numerical case studies demonstrate the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.
155 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the Stackelberg problem is completely transformed into a one-level unconstrained problem such that the newly introduced overall augmented objective function is minimized with repect to the leader's and the follower's variables jointly.
Abstract: This note presents a new solution method for the static constrained Stackelberg problem. Through our approach, the Stackelberg problem is completely transformed into a one-level unconstrained problem such that the newly introduced overall augmented objective function is minimized with repect to the leader's and the follower's variables jointly. It can be proved that a sequence of solutions to the transformed problems converges to the solution of the original problem, when the penalty parameters are updated.
155 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a riskaverse retailer is considered, where the market demand is uncertain and the supplier opens an e-channel, thus directly participating in the market.
154 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an incentive-based demand response model from the view of a grid operator is proposed to enable system-level dispatch of demand response resources, where the grid operator first posts an incentive to service providers, who then invoke sub-programs with enrolled customers to negotiate quantities of demand reduction via providing service provider incentives.
154 citations
TL;DR: The bi-level LP is extended to a bi- level system with many decision-makers at the lower level, and a tri-level system with one decision-maker at each level.
Abstract: In decentralized systems, the objectives at the different levels often differ. Each level controls only a subset of the decision variables but is affected by the decisions made at the other levels. Recent methods in bi-level linear programming solve such systems better than decomposition methods. Here, the bi-level LP is extended to a bi-level system with many decision-makers at the lower level, and a tri-level system with one decision-maker at each level. In both of these cases, the higher level acts as the leader and the lower level as the follower in the Stackelberg game. The resulting techniques are illustrated with simple numerical examples.
154 citations