Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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01 Apr 2006
TL;DR: In this article, the authors use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to derive the equilibrium of the emissions game and show that the key results from Barrett's paper go through, and explain why his main conclusion is correct although his analysis can implicitly imply negative emissions.
Abstract: In Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement is shown that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations and also ignoring the fact that emissions must be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values to ensure interior solutions for emissions. We argue that a more appropriate approach is to use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to derive the equilibrium of the emissions game. When this is done we show, analytically, that the key results from Barrett's paper go through. Finally, we explain why his main conclusion is correct although his analysis can implicitly imply negative emissions.
121 citations
TL;DR: The authors compare an m-firm Cournot model with a hierarchical Stackelberg model where m Firms choose outputs sequentially, and find a surprisingly simple relation which determines whether Cournot profit exceeds the Stackekelberg leader's.
120 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, distributed games for large-population multiagent systems with random time-varying parameters are investigated, where the agents are coupled via their individual costs and the structure parameters are a family of independent Markov chains with identical generators.
Abstract: In this paper, distributed games for large-population multiagent systems with random time-varying parameters are investigated, where the agents are coupled via their individual costs and the structure parameters are a family of independent Markov chains with identical generators. The cost function of each agent is a long-run average tracking-type functional with an unknown mean field coupling nonlinear term as “reference signal.” To reduce the computational complexity, the mean field approach is applied to construct distributed strategies. The population statistics effect (PSE) is used to approximate the average effect of all the agents, and the distributed strategies are given through solving a Markov jump tracking problem. Here the PSE is a deterministic quantity and can be obtained by solving the Stackelberg equilibrium of an auxiliary two-player game. It is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable, and the distributed strategies are asymptotically optimal in the sense of Nash equilibrium,...
120 citations
01 Sep 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms, and the welfare maximising leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures.
Abstract: This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximising leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures. Introducing leadership also alters previous public pricing rules resulting in prices that may be either greater than or less than marginal cost depending on the relative number of domestic firms. Furthermore, entry of a foreign firm will increase welfare only when the relative number of domestic firms is small, but that share is shown to be larger than has been indicated without leadership. Unlike previous models, the influence on public profit of a foreign acquisition is ambiguous and is related to the relative number of domestic firms. Finally, the consequences of privatisation are shown, for the first time, to depend on the relative number of domestic firms.
119 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe a von Stackelberg model of pricing behavior by a dominant firm in a market for an exhaustible resource and show that the optimal dominant firm price strategy is independent of its own costs and is determined by the characteristics of the fringe.
Abstract: The paper describes a von Stackelberg model of pricing behavior by a dominant firm in a market for an exhaustible resource. The results obtained differ dramatically from those that characterize a pure monopoly. If the marginal production cost in the competitive fringe is constant, the optimal dominant firm price strategy is independent of its own costs and is determined by the characteristics of the fringe. In contrast, if the production cost of the fringe is constant only up to a capacity constraint, the cartel may maximize profits by acting as a classical limit-pricing firm.
119 citations