Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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TL;DR: This article proposes two oligopolistic models for price competition among service providers in a heterogeneous wireless environment consisting of WiMax and WiFi access networks, namely, the Nash and the Stackelberg equilibria.
Abstract: To provide seamless mobility with high-speed wireless connectivity, future generation wireless networks must support heterogeneous wireless access. Pricing schemes adopted by different service providers is crucial and will impact the decisions of users in selecting a network. In this article, we provide a comprehensive survey of the issues related to pricing in heterogeneous wireless networks and possible approaches to the solution of the pricing problem. First, we review the related work on pricing for homogeneous wireless networks in which a single wireless technology is available to the users. Then, we outline the major issues in designing resource allocation and pricing in heterogeneous wireless access networks. To this end, we propose two oligopolistic models for price competition among service providers in a heterogeneous wireless environment consisting of WiMax and WiFi access networks. A non-cooperative game is formulated to obtain the price for the service providers. Two different equilibria, namely, the Nash and the Stackelberg equilibria are considered as the solutions of the simultaneous-play and leader-follower price competitions, respectively.
99 citations
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TL;DR: The derivation of closed-loop Stackelberg (CLS) solutions of a class of continuous-time two-player nonzero-sum differential games characterized by linear state dynamics and quadratic cost functionals is concerned.
99 citations
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TL;DR: A game-theoretical scheme using energy-efficient resource allocation and interference pricing for an interference-limited environment in heterogeneous networks and a backward induction method is used to analyze the proposed game.
Abstract: Heterogeneous wireless networks are considered as promising technologies to improve energy efficiency. In heterogeneous networks, interference management is very important since the interference due to spectrum sharing can significantly degrade overall performance. In the existing work, various resource allocation methods are proposed to either improve energy efficiency or mitigate interference in orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA)-based multicell networks. To the best of our knowledge, no research on resource allocation has jointly considered improving energy efficiency and performing interference control, especially using interference power constraint strategies. Furthermore, most existing work assumes that all of the channel state information (CSI) is known completely, which might not be realistic in heterogeneous networks due to the limited capacity of the backhaul links and varied ownership of network devices. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical scheme using energy-efficient resource allocation and interference pricing for an interference-limited environment in heterogeneous networks. We formulate the problems of resource allocation and interference management as a Stackelberg game with incomplete CSI. A backward induction method is used to analyze the proposed game. A closed-form expression of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is obtained for the proposed game with various interference power constraints. Simulation results are presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
99 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the Stackelberg price leader/price follower model is shown to be asymmetric in terms of the price and location equilibrium in the Hotelling spatial model of competition where none exists under the original specification.
98 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of product bundling on the Stackelberg equilibrium was analyzed in a duopoly market with one firm having monopoly power in one market but competing with another firm a la Cournot in a second market.
98 citations