Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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08 Dec 2014TL;DR: This work designs an algorithm that optimizes the defender's strategy with no prior information, by observing the attacker's responses to randomized deployments of resources and learning his priorities.
Abstract: Game-theoretic algorithms for physical security have made an impressive real-world impact. These algorithms compute an optimal strategy for the defender to commit to in a Stackelberg game, where the attacker observes the defender's strategy and best-responds. In order to build the game model, though, the payoffs of potential attackers for various outcomes must be estimated; inaccurate estimates can lead to significant inefficiencies. We design an algorithm that optimizes the defender's strategy with no prior information, by observing the attacker's responses to randomized deployments of resources and learning his priorities. In contrast to previous work, our algorithm requires a number of queries that is polynomial in the representation of the game.
96 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a method to use the HKSAR Research Grant Council of HKSARS (HKSAR-RGCG) to support the work of this article.
Abstract: National Science Foundation (DMS 1303775); Research Grant Council of the HKSAR, (CityU 500113)
96 citations
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TL;DR: It is argued in the second part of the paper that the various implausible effects revealed here suggest a different but more fundamental conclusion: the assumed non-cooperative games are themselves flawed, because “gaming” is meaningless and logically circular in a deterministic-and-symmetrical-information system.
96 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices, and show that the player with the lowest cost has a positive payoff in any equilibrium.
Abstract: We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ’early’ and a group of players who choose ’late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ’late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.
96 citations
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01 Dec 2008TL;DR: It is shown that for regimes with symmetric users who share the same level of willingness to pay, the optimal revenue is concave and increasing in the number of users in the network.
Abstract: We study the problem of pricing uplink power in wide-band cognitive radio networks under the objective of revenue maximization for the service provider and while ensuring incentive compatibility for the users. User utility is modeled as a concave function of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the base station, and the problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. Namely, the service provider imposes differentiated prices per unit of transmitting power and the users consequently update their power levels to maximize their net utilities. We devise a pricing policy and give conditions for its optimality when all the users are to be accommodated in the network. We show that there exist infinitely many Nash equilibrium points that reward the service provider with the same revenue. The pricing policy charges more from users that have better channel conditions and more willingness to pay for the provided service. We then study properties of the optimal revenue with respect to different parameters in the network. We show that for regimes with symmetric users who share the same level of willingness to pay, the optimal revenue is concave and increasing in the number of users in the network. We analytically obtain achievable SNRs for this special case, and finally present a numerical study in support of our results.
95 citations