Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a game-theoretically justifiable decision-making procedure for the sellers which may be used to predict and analyze the bids made for energy sale in the market.
95 citations
TL;DR: A novel stochastic game-based shared control framework to model the steering torque interaction between the driver and the intelligent electric power steering (IEPS) system is proposed and two cases of copilot lane change driving scenarios are studied via computer simulation.
Abstract: The challenging issue of “human–machine copilot” opens up a new frontier to enhancing driving safety. However, driver–machine conflicts and uncertain driver/external disturbances are significant problems in cooperative steering systems, which degrade the system's path-tracking ability and reduce driving safety. This paper proposes a novel stochastic game-based shared control framework to model the steering torque interaction between the driver and the intelligent electric power steering (IEPS) system. A six-order driver–vehicle dynamic system, including driver/external uncertainty, is established for path-tracking. Then, the affine linear-quadratic-based path-tracking problem is proposed to model the maneuvers of the driver and IEPS. Particularly, the feedback Nash and Stackelberg frameworks to the affine-quadratic problem are derived by stochastic dynamic programming. Two cases of copilot lane change driving scenarios are studied via computer simulation. The intrinsic relation between the stochastic Nash and Stackelberg strategies is investigated based on the results. And the steering-in-the-loop experiment reveals the potential of the proposed shared control framework in handling driver–IEPS conflicts and uncertain driver/external turbulence. Finally, the copiloting experiments with a human driver further demonstrate the rationality of the game-based pattern between both the agents.
95 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions, and show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibria correspond to the two Stackelberg situations yielding to a coordination problem.
95 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In the presence of output subsidization, the optimal output subsidy is identical and profits, output and social welfare are also identical irrespective of whether a public firm moves simultaneously with n private firms or acts as a Stackelberg leader or all firms, public and private, behave as profit-maximizers as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In the presence of output subsidization, the optimal output subsidy is identical and profits, output and social welfare are also identical irrespective of whether (i)a public firm moves simultaneously with n private firms or (ii) it acts as a Stackelberg leader or (iii) all firms, public and private, behave as profit-maximizers.
94 citations
01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the question of the choice of environmental policy instruments in the context of a model of strategic international trade between countries, and show that there is a preference for the use of standards rather than taxes as policy instruments.
Abstract: In this paper I examine the question of the choice of environmental policy instruments in the context of a model of strategic international trade between countries, and I show that in such a model there is a preference for the use of standards rather than taxes as policy instruments The paper employs a simple model of two countries who are the sole producers of a commodity sold on the world market Production uses an input which is directly related to the emission of a pollutant, and each country has a fixed target for the emissions level it wishes to achieve If trade is modelled as a one—shot Cournot equilibrium, the countries are indifferent about policy choice If trade is modelled as a Stackelberg equilibrium, then both countries are better off (in terms of producer surplus) if the follower uses standards Finally, if trade is modelled as a two— stage Cournot game in capacity and output then the choice of standards by both countries is a Nash equilibrium, and Pareto dominates the choice of taxes by both countries These results arise from the superior commitment properties of standards
94 citations