Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.

A Noncooperative Game Approach to Autonomous Racing

Abstract: We consider autonomous racing of two cars and present an approach to formulate racing decisions as a noncooperative nonzero-sum game. We design three different games where the players aim to fulfill static track constraints as well as avoid collision with each other; the latter constraint depends on the combined actions of the two players. The difference between the games is the collision constraints and the payoff. In the first game, collision avoidance is only considered by the follower, and each player maximizes their own progress toward the finish line. We show that, thanks to the sequential structure of this game, equilibria can be computed through an efficient sequential maximization approach. Furthermore, we show that these actions, if feasible, are also a Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of our second game where both players consider the collision constraints. The payoff of our third game is designed to promote blocking, by additionally rewarding the cars for staying ahead at the end of the horizon. We show that this changes the Stackelberg equilibrium, but has a minor influence on the Nash equilibria. For online implementation, we propose to play the games in a moving horizon fashion and discuss two methods for guaranteeing feasibility of the resulting coupled repeated games. Finally, we study the performance of the proposed approaches in simulation for a setup that replicates the miniature race car tested at the Automatic Control Laboratory, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. The simulation study shows that the presented games can successfully model different racing behaviors and generate interesting racing situations.

Coordination of dual-channel supply chains under demand disruptions management decisions

Abstract: This paper examines optimal decisions and coordination models for a dual-channel supply chain when the two end competition market demands are simultaneously disrupted Firstly, we developed the pricing and production decisions models without demand disruptions and propose a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain where the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower We derived the conditions under which the maximum profit can be achieved in detailed We compared the profits under normal case and disrupted case and quantified the information value of knowing demand disruptions We proposed an improved revenue sharing contract to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with demand disruptions The results indicate that the adjusting prices and production quantity are the optimal decisions whether the demand disruptions case or normal case We also find that the original revenue sharing contract is a special case of improved revenue sharing contract and

Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium

Abstract: The concept of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is central to noncooperative game theory and the latter's use in macroeconomic theory. This paper considers the creation of this theoretical construct, examining the separate contributions of both Cournot and Nash, and showing how the two were ultimately joined together in the eyes of contemporary economic theorists. Rather than simply showing how Cournot served as a precursor to Nash, the author challenges the traditional approach and emphasizes the shifts in interpretation of their respective contributions. In so doing, he addresses some pertinent questions about the manner in which economic theorists view the evolution of their own discipline. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.