Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that a sufficiently large class of incentive games with perfect or partial dynamic information admits an optimal incentive scheme that is affine in the available information, and explicit expressions for these affine incentive schemes are obtained.
Abstract: Through a geometric approach, it is shown that a sufficiently large class of incentive (Stackelberg) problems with perfect or partial dynamic information admits optimal incentive schemes that are affine in the available information. As a byproduct of the analysis, explicit expressions for these affine incentive schemes are obtained, and the general results are applied to two different classes of Stackelberg game problems with partial dynamic information.
79 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a two-echelon supply chain that has a supplier and two capital constrained retailers and in which the retailers compete in a Cournot fashion, and study the impact of external financing on the players' optimal decisions and supply chain performance.
79 citations
TL;DR: This work investigates the role of forward commitments and option contracts between a seller (supplier) and a buyer (retailer) in the presence of asymmetric information and identifies cases where combinations of the two are dominant.
79 citations
TL;DR: This paper analyzed strategic investment under uncertainty in a new market, where firms face a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility, and predicted asymmetric equilibria under fairly general conditions, even though firms are ex ante identical and have symmetric opportunities to enter the market.
Abstract: In this article I analyze strategic investment under uncertainty in a new market, where firms face a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility. The model predicts asymmetric equilibria under fairly general conditions, even though firms are ex ante identical and have symmetric opportunities to enter the market. In equilibrium, one firm commits to early investment and the other firm follows a wait-and-see strategy. In the ex post outcome, firms end up with asymmetric sizes if the market profitability turns out close to, or lower than, expected; firms end up in symmetric position if the market turns out highly profitable. If uncertainty is small, the model yields (approximately) Stackelberg outcomes.
79 citations
TL;DR: A new low-complexity distributed game-theoretic source selection and power control scheme that enhances the multimedia transmission quality with latency constraints and optimally selects the most beneficial source devices using a Stackelberg game model.
Abstract: In wireless device-to-device (D2D) networks, devices are reluctant to forward packets because of limited energy and possible delays for their own data. The incentive mechanisms that motivate devices to constitute direct communication for wireless multimedia quality optimality in D2D systems have been overlooked in the past. In this paper, we propose a new low-complexity distributed game-theoretic source selection and power control scheme that enhances the multimedia transmission quality with latency constraints. This approach has two major contributions. First, the proposed approach optimally selects the most beneficial source devices by analyzing the interactions between the base station's (BS's) rewarding strategies (denoted by price) and the devices' contributing behaviors (denoted by transmission power) using a Stackelberg game model. Second, optimal transmission power is adjusted for each selected source device in D2D networks by deriving Stackelberg equilibrium, wherein the BS and the device both achieve maximum utility. Computer simulations demonstrate that significant improvement in D2D multimedia transmission quality can be obtained by deploying the proposed scheme.
78 citations