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Stochastic game

About: Stochastic game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9493 publications have been published within this topic receiving 202664 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
01 Feb 2007-EPL
TL;DR: The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions in evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules.
Abstract: Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from randomly chosen neighbors is controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor w characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations ν at the beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of w and ν for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.

399 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that individuals choose between several unordered alternatives, and that the payoff of choosing a field of study is potentially as important as the decision to enroll in college.
Abstract: Why do individuals choose different types of post-secondary education, and what are the labor market consequences of those choices? We show that answering these questions is difficult because individuals choose between several unordered alternatives. Even with a valid instrument for every type of education, instrumental variables estimation of the payoffs require information about individuals' ranking of education types or strong additional assumptions, like constant effects or restrictive preferences. These identification results motivate and guide our empirical analysis of the choice of and payoff to field of study. Our context is Norway's post-secondary education system where a centralized admission process covers almost all universities and colleges. This process creates credible instruments from discontinuities which effectively randomize applicants near unpredictable admission cutoffs into different fields of study. At the same time, it provides us with strategy-proof measures of individuals' ranking of fields. Taken together, this allows us to estimate the payoffs to different fields while correcting for selection bias and keeping the next-best alternatives as measured at the time of application fixed. We find that different fields have widely different payoffs, even after accounting for institutional differences and quality of peer groups. For many fields the payoffs rival the college wage premiums, suggesting the choice of field is potentially as important as the decision to enroll in college. The estimated payoffs are consistent with individuals choosing fields in which they have comparative advantage. We also test and reject assumptions of constant effects or restrictive preferences, suggesting that information on next-best alternatives is essential to identify payoffs to field of study.

396 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce the notion of risk-sensitiity and establish that the value of information is higher in decision problems that are more risk-sensitive, and apply this result to auctions: they show that a first price auction induces more information acquisition than a second price auction.
Abstract: OUR AIM IN THIS PAPER is to study the incentives to acquire information. We consider decision problems where the payoff has the single-crossing property and signals are affiliated with the unknown parameter. We introduce the notion of risk-sensitiity, and establish that the value of information is higher in decision problems that are more risk-sensitive. We apply this result to auctions: we are able to show that a first price auction induces more information acquisition than a second price auction. Consider a decision maker choosing an action a to maximize the expected value of a Ž. payoff function u , a . The decision maker does not observe , which he regards as a random variable V. Instead, he observes the realization of a random variable X ,a signal which conveys information about .W eassume that the decision maker can make X more informative, at a cost. Making X more informative increases the expected payoff. We analyze the returns to making X more informative. Ž. We focus on problems where X and V are affiliated, and u , a has the weak Ž. Ž .

392 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the interactions between an attacker and an administrator were modeled as a two-player stochastic game and a nonlinear program was used to compute Nash equilibria or best-response strategies for the players (attacker and administrator).
Abstract: This paper presents a game-theoretic method for analyzing the security of computer networks. We view the interactions between an attacker and the administrator as a two-player stochastic game and construct a model for the game. Using a nonlinear program, we compute Nash equilibria or best-response strategies for the players (attacker and administrator). We then explain why the strategies are realistic and how administrators can use these results to enhance the security of their network.

388 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated several properties of the minority game and gave an analytical expression of σ 2/N in the N ⪡ 2 M region. But they did not consider the influence of identical players on their gain and on the systems performance.
Abstract: We investigate further several properties of the minority game we have recently introduced. We explain the origin of the phase transition and give an analytical expression of σ2/N in the N ⪡ 2 M region. The ability of the players to learn a given payoff is also analyzed, and we show that the Darwinian evolution process tends to a self-organized state, in particular, the lifetime distribution is a power-law with exponent −2. Furthermore, we study the influence of identical players on their gain and on the systems performance. Finally, we show that large brains always take advantage of small brains.

383 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
2023364
2022738
2021462
2020512
2019460
2018483