Topic
Stochastic game
About: Stochastic game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9493 publications have been published within this topic receiving 202664 citations.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information and show that for any information structure T that is coarser than S, all Nash payoff profiles of (G,S) are dominated by u. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments 'a la Blackwell.
Abstract: We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments `a la Blackwell. More specifically, we consider pairs consisting of a game with incomplete information G and an information structure S such that the extended game (G,S) has a unique Pareto payoff profile u. We prove that u is a Nash payoff profile of (G,S), and that for any information structure T that is coarser than S, all Nash payoff profiles of (G,S) are dominated by u. We then prove that our condition is also necessary in the following sense: Given any convex compact polyhedron of payoff profiles, whose Pareto frontier is not a singleton, there exists an extended game (G,S) with that polyhedron as the convex hull of feasible payoffs, an information structure T coarser than S and a player i who strictly prefers a Nash equilibrium in (G,S) to any Nash equilibrium in (G,S).
71 citations
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25 Aug 2016TL;DR: This paper focuses on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps along their individual payoff gradients and then "mirror" the output back to their action sets, and introduces the notion of variational stability.
Abstract: This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps along their individual payoff gradients and then "mirror" the output back to their action sets. In terms of feedback, we assume that players can only estimate their payoff gradients up to a zero-mean error with bounded variance. To study the convergence of the induced sequence of play, we introduce the notion of variational stability, and we show that stable equilibria are locally attracting with high probability whereas globally stable equilibria are globally attracting with probability 1. We also discuss some applications to mixed-strategy learning in finite games, and we provide explicit estimates of the method's convergence speed.
71 citations
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01 Jan 1987TL;DR: It is proved that the team can obtain the optimal classifier to an arbitrary approximation when posed as a game with common payoff played by a team of mutually cooperating learning automata.
Abstract: The problem of learning correct decision rules to minimize the probability of misclassification is a long-standing problem of supervised learning in pattern recognition. The problem of learning such optimal discriminant functions is considered for the class of problems where the statistical properties of the pattern classes are completely unknown. The problem is posed as a game with common payoff played by a team of mutually cooperating learning automata. This essentially results in a probabilistic search through the space of classifiers. The approach is inherently capable of learning discriminant functions that are nonlinear in their parameters also. A learning algorithm is presented for the team and convergence is established. It is proved that the team can obtain the optimal classifier to an arbitrary approximation. Simulation results with a few examples are presented where the team learns the optimal classifier.
71 citations
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TL;DR: It is proved that any n-player stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff, when the game is positive and recursive, and a stationary correlation equilibrium payoff exists.
71 citations
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TL;DR: It is shown that maximal degree of cooperation is achievable in such a competitive system with cyclic dominance of actions, which may stimulate further theoretical and empirical studies on how to resolve conflicts and enhance cooperation in human societies.
Abstract: In an iterated non-cooperative game, if all the players act to maximize their individual accumulated payoff, the system as a whole usually converges to a Nash equilibrium that poorly benefits any player. Here we show that such an undesirable destiny is avoidable in an iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game involving two rational players, X and Y. Player X has the option of proactively adopting a cooperation-trap strategy, which enforces complete cooperation from the rational player Y and leads to a highly beneficial and maximally fair situation to both players. That maximal degree of cooperation is achievable in such a competitive system with cyclic dominance of actions may stimulate further theoretical and empirical studies on how to resolve conflicts and enhance cooperation in human societies.
70 citations