Topic
Stochastic game
About: Stochastic game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9493 publications have been published within this topic receiving 202664 citations.
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TL;DR: This paper introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals, and provides a sufficient condition for the folk theorem when the game is irreducible, thus generalizing the folk theorems of Dutta (1995) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994).
66 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games, including games with strategic substitutes and games with continuous and concave payoff functions.
Abstract: In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. In most of these situations, the behavior of the aggregate is of interest both directly and also indirectly because the comparative statics of the actions of each player can be obtained as a function of the aggregate. In this paper, we provide a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games. We focus on two classes of aggregative games: (1) aggregative of games with strategic substitutes and (2) "nice" aggregative games, where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies. We provide simple sufficient conditions under which "positive shocks" to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate. We show how this framework can be applied to a variety of examples and how this enables more general and stronger comparative static results than typically obtained in the literature.
66 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied repeated games with a finite number of players, a fixed number of actions, discounted payoffs, and perfect recall, and the players' initial expectations were given by a common prior distribution over player types, a type being a discount rate and payoff matrix.
66 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a stochastic model is developed to describe behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals, which leads to the derivation of covariance equations, a measure of the reliability of game dynamical descriptions.
Abstract: A stochastic model is developed to describe behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals. ‘Microscopic’ assumptions on the specific form of the imitative processes lead to a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations, which means that the approximate mean value equations of these equations are the game dynamical equations of evolutionary game theory. The stochastic version of the game dynamical equations allows the derivation of covariance equations. These should always be solved along with the ordinary game dynamical equations. On the one hand, the average behavior is affected by the covariances so that the game dynamical equations must be corrected for increasing covariances; otherwise they may become invalid in the course of time. On the other hand, the covariances are a measure of the reliability of game dynamical descriptions. An increase of the covariances beyond a critical value indicates a phase transition, i.e. a sudden change in the properties of the social system under consideration. The applicability and use of the equations introduced are illustrated by computational results for the social self-organization of behavioral conventions.
65 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a preferential selection mechanism was introduced into a spatial public goods game where players are located on a square lattice and each individual chooses one of its neighbors as a reference with a probability proportional to exp (P y ∗ A ), where P y is the neighbor's payoff and A (≥ 0) is a tunable parameter.
Abstract: We introduce a preferential selection mechanism into a spatial public goods game where players are located on a square lattice. Each individual chooses one of its neighbors as a reference with a probability proportional to exp ( P y ∗ A ) , where P y is the neighbor’s payoff and A (≥0) is a tunable parameter. It is shown that the introduction of such a preferential selection can remarkably promote the emergence of cooperation over a wide range of the multiplication factor. We find that the mean payoffs of cooperators along the boundary are higher than that of defectors and cooperators form larger clusters as A increases. The extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.
65 citations