Topic
Stochastic game
About: Stochastic game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9493 publications have been published within this topic receiving 202664 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
TL;DR: This paper examined the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show "Deal or No Deal" and related classroom experiments and found that the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game.
Abstract: We examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show “Deal or No Deal” and related classroom experiments Contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory, the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes Our results point to reference-dependent choice theories such as prospect theory, and suggest that path-dependence is relevant, even when the choice problems are simple and well-defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake
331 citations
TL;DR: The goal is to use these behavioral models as a prescriptive control approach in distributed multi-agent systems where the guaranteed limiting behavior would represent a desirable operating condition.
329 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied a general setting for the multi-armed bandit problem in which the strategies form a metric space, and the payoff function satisfies a Lipschitz condition with respect to the metric.
Abstract: In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of trials so as to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. While the performance of bandit algorithms with a small finite strategy set is quite well understood, bandit problems with large strategy sets are still a topic of very active investigation, motivated by practical applications such as online auctions and web advertisement. The goal of such research is to identify broad and natural classes of strategy sets and payoff functions which enable the design of efficient solutions. In this work we study a very general setting for the multi-armed bandit problem in which the strategies form a metric space, and the payoff function satisfies a Lipschitz condition with respect to the metric. We refer to this problem as the "Lipschitz MAB problem". We present a complete solution for the multi-armed problem in this setting. That is, for every metric space (L,X) we define an isometry invariant which bounds from below the performance of Lipschitz MAB algorithms for X, and we present an algorithm which comes arbitrarily close to meeting this bound. Furthermore, our technique gives even better results for benign payoff functions.
329 citations
TL;DR: In the single seller (auction) version, a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the Vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium.
328 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting, and focus on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is sufficiently large.
Abstract: The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is sufficiently large. It is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as 'delta' approaches one. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high 'delta'.
327 citations