Topic
Stochastic game
About: Stochastic game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9493 publications have been published within this topic receiving 202664 citations.
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01 Oct 2000
TL;DR: This paper contributes a comprehensive presentation of the relevant techniques for solving stochastic games from both the game theory community and reinforcement learning communities, and examines the assumptions and limitations of these algorithms.
Abstract: : Learning behaviors in a multiagent environment are crucial for developing and adapting multiagent systems. Reinforcement learning techniques have addressed this problem for a single agent acting in a stationary environment, which is modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP). But, multiagent environments are inherently non-stationary since the other agents are free to change their behavior as they also learn and adapt. Stochastic games, first studied in the game theory community, are a natural extension of MDPs to include multiple agents. In this paper we contribute a comprehensive presentation of the relevant techniques for solving stochastic games from both the game theory community and reinforcement learning communities. We examine the assumptions and limitations of these algorithms, and identify similarities between these algorithms, single agent reinforcement learners, and basic game theory techniques.
150 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterize the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process in a finite two-player game played by a population of players.
Abstract: We add a round of pre-play communication to a finite two-player game played by a population of players. Pre-play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs. The paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process. Periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population. Any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability. When there is no conflict of interest between the players, only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics. For general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large. Every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often.
149 citations
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16 Mar 2013TL;DR: The tool is based on the probabilistic model checker PRISM, benefiting from its existing user interface and simulator, whilst adding novel model checking algorithms for stochastic games, as well as functionality to synthesise optimal player strategies.
Abstract: We present PRISM-games, a model checker for stochastic multi-player games, which supports modelling, automated verification and strategy synthesis for probabilistic systems with competitive or cooperative behaviour. Models are described in a probabilistic extension of the Reactive Modules language and properties are expressed using rPATL, which extends the well-known logic ATL with operators to reason about probabilities, various reward-based measures, quantitative properties and precise bounds. The tool is based on the probabilistic model checker PRISM, benefiting from its existing user interface and simulator, whilst adding novel model checking algorithms for stochastic games, as well as functionality to synthesise optimal player strategies, explore or export them, and verify other properties under the specified strategy.
148 citations
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TL;DR: A large class of statistical hypotheses testing procedures are exhibited that solve the problem of whether the players themselves can learn to play equilibrium strategies without assuming that they have prior knowledge of their opponents' strategies and/or payoffs.
148 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the number of players or a parameter in the payoff functions) on the strategies played and payoffs obtained in a Nash equilibrium in the framework of an Aggregative Game (a generalization of the Cournot model).
147 citations