Topic
Stochastic game
About: Stochastic game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9493 publications have been published within this topic receiving 202664 citations.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors considered repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed.
120 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model which reflects the tendency of people to simplify the decision problems they face, and showed that such behavior leads to maxmin choices, where the decision maker chooses among alternate strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them.
120 citations
TL;DR: A formal model is created in which the actors develop a mental model of the value of stage-setting actions as a complex problem-solving task is repeated, and partial knowledge, either of particular states in the problem space or inefficient and circuitous routines through the space, is shown to be quite valuable.
Abstract: Many organizational actions need not have any immediate or direct payoff consequence but set the stage for subsequent actions that bring the organization toward some actual payoff. Learning in such settings poses the challenge of credit assignment (Minsky 1961), that is, how to assign credit for the overall outcome of a sequence of actions to each of the antecedent actions. To explore the process of learning in such contexts, we create a formal model in which the actors develop a mental model of the value of stage-setting actions as a complex problem-solving task is repeated. Partial knowledge, either of particular states in the problem space or inefficient and circuitous routines through the space, is shown to be quite valuable. Because of the interdependence of intelligent action when a sequence of actions must be identified, however, organizational knowledge is relatively fragile. As a consequence, while turnover may stimulate search and have largely benign implications in less interdependent task settings, it is very destructive of the organization's near-term performance when the learning problem requires a complementarity among the actors' knowledge.
120 citations
TL;DR: It is shown analytically that these mean exit times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an amazingly simple way under weak selection, i.e. strong stochasticity.
Abstract: In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy A performs better than strategy B, strategy A will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. We show analytically that these times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an amazingly simple way under weak selection, i.e. strong stochasticity: the payoff difference 1 is a linear function of the number of A individuals i, 1 = u i +v. The unconditional mean exit time depends only on the constant term v. Given that a single A mutant takes over the population, the corresponding conditional mean exit time depends only on the density dependent term u. We demonstrate this finding for two commonly applied microscopic evolutionary processes.
120 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the negotiation game can have multiple perfect equilibria, including inefficient ones, provided that players are sufficiently patient, and the length of delay depends only on the payoff structure of the disagreement game and not on the discount factor.
Abstract: Rubinstein's alternating-offers bargaining model is enriched by assuming that players' payoffs in disagreement periods are determined by a normal form game. It is shown that such a model can have multiple perfect equilibria, including inefficient ones, provided that players are sufficiently patient. Delay is possible even though there is perfect information and the players are fully rational. The length of delay depends only on the payoff structure of the disagreement game and not on the discount factor. Not all feasible and individually rational payoffs of the disagreement game can be supported as average disagreement payoffs. Indeed, some negotiation games have a unique perfect equilibrium with immediate agreement.
119 citations