Stochastic game

About: Stochastic game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9493 publications have been published within this topic receiving 202664 citations.

The complexity of stochastic games

Abstract: We consider the complexity of stochastic games—simple games of chance played by two players We show that the problem of deciding which player has the greatest chance of winning the game is in the class NP ⌢ co- NP

Two-Moment Decision Models and Expected Utility Maximization

Abstract: Two-moment decision models are consistent with expected utility maximization only if the choice set or the agent's preferences are restricted This paper identifies a restriction which is sufficient to ensure this consistency and confirms that it holds in many economic models The implications for economic analysis are then derived Two different approaches to representing an agent's preferences over strategies yielding random payoffs are in wide use Under the mean-standard deviation (MS) approach, the agent is assumed to rank the alternatives according to the value of some function defined over the first two moments of the random payoff, while the expected utility (EU) criterion assumes that the expected value of some utility function defined over payoffs is used instead The fact that there are these two competing approaches has generated a considerable literature Some authors are concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of each, while others deal with conditions under which the potentially different approaches would yield the same results, or at least approximately so Space does not

Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium

Abstract: Each of n players, in an infinitely repeated game, starts with subjective beliefs about his opponents' strategies. If the individual beliefs are compatible with the true strategies chosen, then Bayesian updating will lead in the long run to accurate prediction of the future play of the game. It follows that individual players, who know their own payoff matrices and choose strategies to maximize their expected utility, must eventually play according to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. An immediate corollary is that, when playing a Harsanyi-Nash equilibrium of a repeated game of incomplete information about opponents' payoff matrices, players will eventually play a Nash equilibrium of the real game, as if they had complete information.

Stochastic games with lossy channels

Abstract: We consider turn-based stochastic games on infinite graphs induced by game probabilistic lossy channel systems (GPLCS), the game version of probabilistic lossy channel systems (PLCS). We study games with Buchi (repeated reachability) objectives and almost-sure winning conditions. These games are pure memoryless determined and, under the assumption that the target set is regular, a symbolic representation of the set of winning states for each player can be effectively constructed. Thus, turn-based stochastic games on GPLCS are decidable. This generalizes the decidability result for PLCS-induced Markov decision processes in [10].