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Stochastic game

About: Stochastic game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9493 publications have been published within this topic receiving 202664 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The general ERC model is described, and it is shown that it predicts many of the key phenomena observed in the experiment, as well as standard game theoretic concepts.

106 citations

Posted ContentDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors characterize the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct externalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information, and show that a unique equilibrium may be selected by conveniently perturbing the information structure.
Abstract: This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct externalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal's payoff. Out-of-equilibrium messages are used by principals to precommit themselves to distort their strategic behavior. We characterize pure-strategy symmetric equilibria arising in such games under complete information and show their multiplicity. We then introduce asymmetric information to refine the set of feasible conjectures. We show that a unique equilibrium may be selected by conveniently perturbing the information structure. Both under complete and asymmetric information, we show that the equilibrium outputs of the intrinsic common agency game are also equilibrium outputs of the delegated common agency game, although the two games differ in terms of the distribution of surplus they involve.

106 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
09 Jun 2003
TL;DR: This work establishes a natural and powerful relationship between the graphical structure of a multiplayer game and a certain Markov network representing distributions over joint actions, which succinctly represents all correlated equilibria of the graphical game up to expected payoff equivalence.
Abstract: We examine correlated equilibria in the recently introduced formalism of graphical games, a succinct representation for multiplayer games. We establish a natural and powerful relationship between the graphical structure of a multiplayer game and a certain Markov network representing distributions over joint actions. Our first main result establishes that this Markov network succinctly represents all correlated equilibria of the graphical game up to expected payoff equivalence. Our second main result provides a general algorithm for computing correlated equilibria in a graphical game based on its associated Markov network. For a special class of graphical games that includes trees, this algorithm runs in time polynomial in the graphical game representation (which is polynomial in the number of players and exponential in the graph degree).

106 citations

Posted Content
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: Fudenberg and Levine as discussed by the authors developed an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time.
Abstract: In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems. In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.

105 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: If the authors assume equilibrium and that players communicate for a long time, then in every equilibrium of every game, each player will get a payoff at least as great as that of his worst Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium.

105 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
2023364
2022738
2021462
2020512
2019460
2018483