Topic
Subgame perfect equilibrium
About: Subgame perfect equilibrium is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2722 publications have been published within this topic receiving 58412 citations. The topic is also known as: subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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TL;DR: In this paper, a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model was presented, focusing on a strategic approach adopted for the study and details of the bargaining situation used; discussion on perfect equilibrium.
Abstract: Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco)
5,139 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that although backward induction cannot be applied, and perfect psychological equilibria may not exist, subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium always do exist, and that the payoff to each player depends not only on what every player does but also on what he thinks every player believes, and on what they think they believe others believe.
Abstract: In psychological games the payoff to each player depends not only on what every player does but also on what he thinks every player believes, and on what he thinks they believe others believe, and so on. In equilibrium, beliefs are assumed to correspond to reality. Yet psychological games and psychological equilibria allow one to model belief-dependent emotions such as anger and surprise that are problematic for conventional game theory. We are particularly interested in issues of sequential rationality for psychological games. We show that although backward induction cannot be applied, and “perfect” psychological equilibria may not exist, subgame perfect and sequential equilibria always do exist.
847 citations
Book•
03 Dec 1987
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an informal description of games and game theory, and present a survey of the main concepts of game theory and its application in the context of competitive games.
Abstract: 1 Introduction.- 1.1 Informal Description of Games and Game Theory.- 1.2 Dynamic Programming.- 1.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria.- 1.4 Sequential Equilibria and Perfect Equilibria.- 1.5 Perfect, Proper and Persistent Equilibria.- 1.6 Essential Equilibria and Regular Equilibria.- Notes.- 2 Games in Normal Form.- 2.1 Preliminaries.- 2.2 Perfect Equilibria.- 2.3 Proper Equilibria.- 2.4 Essential Equilibria.- 2.5 Regular Equilibria.- 2.6 An "Almost all" Theorem.- Notes.- 3 Matrix and Bimatrix Games.- 3.1 Preliminaries.- 3.2 Perfect Equilibria.- 3.3 Regular Equilibria.- 3.4 Characterizations of Regular Equilibria.- 3.5 Matrix Games.- Notes.- 4 Control Costs.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 Games with Control Costs.- 4.3 Approachable Equilibria.- 4.4 Proper Equilibria.- 4.5 Perfect Equilibria.- 4.6 Regular Equilibria.- Notes.- 5 Incomplete Information.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 Disturbed Games.- 5.3 Firm Equilibria.- 5.4 Perfect Equilibria.- 5.5 Weakly Proper Equilibria.- 5.6 Strictly Proper Equilibria and Regular Equilibria.- 5.7 Proofs of the Theorems of Sect. 5.5.- Notes.- 6 Extensive Form Games.- 6.1 Definitions.- 6.2 Equilibria and Subgame Perfectness.- 6.3 Sequential Equilibria.- 6.4 Perfect Equilibria.- 6.5 Proper Equilibria.- 6.6 Control Costs.- 6.7 Incomplete Information.- Notes.- 7 Bargaining and Fair Division.- 7.1 Introduction.- 7.2 Divide and Choose.- 7.3 Auction Methods.- 7.4 Bargaining Problems and Bargaining Solutions.- 7.5 The Nash Negotiation Game.- 7.6 The Rubinstein/Binmore Model.- 7.7 The Crawford/Moulin Model.- 7.8 Bargaining Games with Variable Threat Point.- Notes.- 8 Repeated Games.- 8.1 Introduction.- 8.2 Preliminaries.- 8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games Without Discounting.- 8.4 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting: Nash Equilibria.- 8.5 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting: Subgame Perfect Equilibria.- 8.6 Finitely Repeated Games: Nash Equilibria.- 8.7 Finitely Repeated Games: Subgame Perfect Equilibria.- 8.8 Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria.- Notes.- 9 Evolutionary Game Theory.- 9.1 Introduction.- 9.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies.- 9.3 Strategic Stability of ESS.- 9.4 Population Dynamics.- 9.5 Asymmetric Contests: Examples and the Model.- 9.6 Asymmetric Contests: Results.- 9.7 Contests in Extensive Form: Definitions.- 9.8 Contests in Extensive Form: Results.- Notes.- 10 Strategic Stability and Applications.- 10.1 Equivalence of Games.- 10.2 Requirements for Strategic Stability.- 10.3 Stable Equilibria.- 10.4 Signalling Games: Introduction.- 10.5 Signalling Games: Dominance, Intuitive Arguments and Stability.- 10.6 Spence's Job Market Signalling Model.- 10.7 The Chain Store Paradox.- 10.8 Repeated Games.- Notes.- References.- Survey Diagrams.
829 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that although backward induction cannot be applied, and perfect psychological equilibria may not exist, subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium always do exist, and that the payoff to each player depends not only on what every player does but also on what he thinks every player believes, and on what they think they believe others believe.
800 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for "industrial strategy" policies such as R&D or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets.
Abstract: This paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for "industrial strategy" policies such as R&D or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets Domestic net welfare improves by capturing a greater share of the output of rent earning industries, although the subsidy-ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal Behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three-stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium The assumption that government is the first player allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions by the firm
758 citations