Showing papers on "Supreme Court Decisions published in 1974"

Modeling Jury Verdicts in the American Legal System

Abstract: Jury size, majorities required for acquittal or conviction and correctness of juror decisions in criminal trials are studied. The article draws heavily on ideas presented in a previous article [1] which updated a model suggested by Poisson. Briefly, a model is developed and then examined, employing data from Kalven and Zeisel [2] on the American legal system. Comparisons of the American experience with French data from the early 19th century are made through the use of the model. Recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions in criminal trials regarding jury size and the relaxation of unanimity for decisions in criminal trials make these studies pertinent.

The Role of State Supreme Courts in Judicial Policy Making: Escobedo, Miranda and the Use of Judicial Impact Analysis:

Abstract: SHE RECOGNITION that we need to look beyond the Supreme Court in order to obtain a realistic understanding of the American judicial system is not new. In the 1950s Jack Peltason' and Walter Murphy2 conceptualized this system in terms of a bureaucratic structure in which the Supreme Court, much like any high level decision-maker, faces a problem of achieving acceptance of and compliance with its decisions by lower level officials under its jurisdiction. While this approach has been utilized in research on the lower federal courts,3 it has not been generally applied to state courts. Rather the work on state courts has been limited to individual courts or comparisons of a small number of state courts without regard for their relationship to the Supreme Court.4 Paralleling this development, there has been a growing concern with the analysis of the impact of Supreme Court decisions, a concern with the effect of these decisions on the institutions and the problems to which they are directed. Despite the large number of impact studies that have been produced to date, however, state supreme courts have been largely ignored.5 This omission is particularly unfortunate in the field of criminal procedure, an area in which the Supreme Court has been attempting to institute fundamental changes at the trial court level. State supreme courts are of vital significance in this area for they interpret Supreme Court decisions and apply them within their own states. In this capacity the state supreme courts serve as a mediating force between the Supreme Court and its decisions at the national level and the trial courts, which are subject to local pressures that often run counter to the decisions of the Supreme Court. If changes in criminal procedure are to be meaningful at

The Impact of Argersinger - One Year Later

Abstract: The impact of United States Supreme Court decisions on the administration of criminal justice by police and lower courts in this country has been the subject of extensive research.' A number of empirical studies on the impact of Mapp v. Ohio (1961) (Kuh, 1962; Oaks, 1970), Miranda v. Arizona (1966) (Reiss and Black, 1967; Yale Law Review, 1967), Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) (Blumberg, 1966; Sudnow, 1965) and in re Gault (1967) (Duffee and Siegel, 1971) have indicated that Supreme Court decisions have a much smaller impact upon police and court practices than might be expected and that systemic requirements of criminal justice agencies frequently override and suppress the policy objectives of these decisions. The result is the routinization of due process in a way which prevents its requirements from substantially interfering with the operation of the systems involved and the perversion of these requirements to serve organizational ends rather than the ends of justice. These studies raise substantial questions as to the efficacy of attempting to alter the operations of the criminal justice system through constitutional rule-making by the courts. Ever since the decision of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) it has been assumed that the legal rights of indigent criminal defendants could be protected by the introduction of adversary legal counsel acting as an outsider-watchdog to challenge every attempt to prejudice the rights of his client. Overlooked in this assumption is the fact that the lawyer, even the private lawyer, is as much a part of the system as the policeman and the prosecutor. As a constant participant in the criminal justice system, he is as much subject to the organizational demands of that system as are the other participants (the judge, the prosecutor, police, probation officers, etc.), and his need to "get along" with other members of the system often nullifies his adversary role as champion of the rights of his client (Blumberg, 1966; Sudnow, 1965; Skolnick, 1967).2

A review of three years' experience with legalized abortions in New York City (from inception to six months after the Supreme Court decision).

Abstract: During the 3-year period following legalization of abortion in New York City the number of abortions rose in the first 2 years and declined the third year. The decline occurred after 1973 Supreme Court decisions which made legalized abortion more generally available in other states and cut down on the nonresidents procurring abortions in New York. Out-of-state abortion patients come from states which have not responded as liberally to the Supreme Court rulings. 91 hospitals and 21 free-standing clinics perform abortions in New York City. In 1973 the free-standing clinics accounted for more than 1/2 the abortions performed because more abortions are being done in the first trimester when they can be done outside of hospital facilities. By 1973 the suction with curettage method accounted for almost 80% of all abortions. The proportion of minority group members who obtained abortions continued to increase. Serious complications i.e. perforation of the uterus decline every year. Liberalized abortion has brought about a decline in infant mortality low-birth-weight babies out-of-wedlock babies and the birthrate in general.

The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Religion in the United States

Abstract: It would probably be too much to say that the religion clauses of the First Amendment "ain't nothing" until the United States Supreme Court "calls" them. Yet they are to a large extent a form to which the Court must supply the content, a skeleton on which the Court must put the flesh and blood. The Court has added most of the flesh and blood only since it decided in the 1940s that the free exercise of religion and the establishment of religion clauses apply to the states as well as to the federal government.1 American constitutional law on the relations be tween government and religion is largely a creature of the Court's fashioning in the last one-third of a century. The purpose of this paper is not to undertake a thorough review and analysis of the Court's jurisprudence on this subject, but only to summarize it briefly in order to assess its impact on religion in the United States. For reasons that will presently appear, some opinions of the Court other than those interpreting the religion clauses will be cited. The products of the Court's activity that appear to have the most significance for religion in America are the following. The Court has all but closed the door to substantial public aid to church-related schools at the elementary and secondary levels. At the same time it has insisted on the secularization of the