Showing papers on "Supreme Court Decisions published in 1995"

A relational approach to moral decision‐making: The majority opinion in planned parenthood V. Casey

Abstract: Advocates supporting and opposing abortion rights were disappointed by the United Stales Supreme Court ruling on the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). The majority opinion upheld a “fundamental” right to abortion prior to fetal viability but also affirmed a State's right to regulate, abortions. Thus, in establishing a middle ground, the Court rejected simplistic approaches to moral reasoning and acknowledged the complex web of relationships involved in abortion decision‐making. This essay defines a relational approach to moral reasoning and analyzes the Casey decision as an exemplar of that approach. The case study suggests that rhetoricians should “revision” the art of persuasion and argument, in particular, to place more emphasis on relational values.

Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington.

Abstract: KIE: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed a district court judgment that ruled unconstitutional a Washington statute banning assisted suicide, as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to obtain prescription medication to hasten their deaths. The statute, which was challenged by a group of patients, physicians, and the nonprofit organization Compassion in Dying, was held to be unconstitutional because it violated the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court took into consideration the interests of the state in protecting life, preventing suicides, preventing undue, arbitrary, or unfair influences on an individual's decision to end his life, and ensuring the integrity of the medical profession. These interests were balanced against an individual's strong liberty interest in determining how and when one's life should end. The court recognized this interest after assessing the growing public support for assisted suicide, changes in the causes of death and medical advances, and Supreme Court cases addressing due process liberty interests. The court then determined that the state's interest, which could be protected by adopting sufficient safeguards, did not outweigh the severe burden placed on the terminally ill, and thus the statute as applied was unconstitutional.

Armed with the Constitution: Jehovah's Witnesses in Alabama and the U.S Supreme Court, 1939-1946

Abstract: The contribution of Jehovah's Witnesses in expanding the meaning of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, both in substance and in federal application, has not been fully explored. Not only did the Witnesses prick the conscience of the nation, they also prodded the judiciary to reinforce and define the Amendment's guarantees. Constitutional historians have recognized that the zealous minority conducted a national campaign seeking legal recognition of the right to practice its particular religion but generally have confined their attention to surveys. This book seeks to acknowledge the Witness contribution in an in-depth study of two key U.S. Supreme Court decisions born of the Witness struggle in Alabama between 1939 and 1946, Jones v. Opelika and Marsh v. Alabama. Using contemporary periodicals and legal journals; Witnesses' memoirs, letters, and interviews; works published by the Witness parent organization; and scholarly studies of the Witnesses, Newton places the cases in legal context by examining extensive court records and relevant papers as well as the biographical backgrounds of the judges involved in the decisions. But the book is more than a legal study; it is also a dramatic history of two powerful personalities, Rosco Jones and Grace Marsh, whose total commitment to their faith enabled them to carry the Jehovah's Witnesses' battle from rural Alabama to the halls of the U.S. Supreme Court. It portrays the courage and strength of two "ordinary" people, one black and one white, whose dedicated struggle not only challenged the white male power structure in Alabama but also helped to influence the U.S. Supreme Court in protecting individual liberty and ultimately inenhancing the First Amendment rights of all Americans.

Reapportionment Wars: Party, Race, and Redistricting in California, 1971-1992

Abstract: Understanding the impact of the redistricting of state legislative and congressional seats in California in the 1990s on ethnic minorities and the two principal political parties requires more than a narrative of events Without explicit quantitative techniques for estimating the partisan consequences of plans that were unsuccessfully proposed, as well as those that were adopted, we cannot gauge what difference the ultimate choice of plans made or fully evaluate the intentions of the framers and opponents of each plan Accordingly, in Social Science Working Paper 929, I developed and tested two methods of comparing the likely partisan outcomes under different reapportionment schemes In this paper, I apply those techniques But neither quantitative methods nor a story that begins in 1990 tells us all we need to know The recent past indelibly imprinted the actors in 1991 and deeply affected their behavior Therefore, I begin in 1971 and explain how a controversy over electing a Latino to the Assembly wrecked an agreed compromise and led to a reapportionment imposed by the State Supreme Court, employing Special Masters and technicians, an experience that kindled Democratic, as well as Republican hopes in 1991 that the judiciary and those whom they appointed to carry out the redistricting would not treat their party unfairly Even more important for the combatants in the 1990s was the fact that Democratic party control of the redistricting process in the 1980s led to a bitter ten-year partisan struggle that ultimately undermined the state legislature as an institution, brought about a partisan Republican takeover of the State Supreme Court, and encouraged Republicans to torpedo all compromise on redistricting in 1991 and turn reapportionment over to the court In the background of these events, and helping to shape them, were actions by the Congress and the federal judiciary The equal population and minority vote dilution cases and the evolving Voting Rights Act significantly constrained the degree of discrimination against partisan and ethnic minorities in California, as elsewhere in the nation As Latinos and African-Americans became a more and more important part of the Democratic leadership, as well as of the Democratic voters, partisan and ethnic interests became more and more correlated, and external legal constraints, less necessary to protect minority political power - as long as Democrats controlled redistricting When Democrats lost control, and when unelected technocrats, particularly a redistricting commission created and appointed by Gov Pete Wilson in 1991, took over, minority interests were largely ignored Fortunately, in 1991, the judicial precedents protecting minorities were still strong and the technocrats who drafted the plans for the State Supreme Court were both diligent and, overall, sympathetic to minority concerns What would happen if those precedents were reversed or weakened, as some have interpreted the US Supreme Court decisions in Shaw v Reno and Miller v Johnson as doing, depends on who retains the ultimate power to draw districts The three chief findings of the quantitative analysis in this paper are striking: Neither the Masters' Plan of 1973 nor the so-called "Burton Gerrymander" of 1981 was as pro-Democratic as has often been suggested, nor was the Masters' Plan of 1991 so nonpartisan The lessons for future reapportionments in California suggested by the analysis of those from 1971 on are pessimistic Term limits will rob the legislature of any expertise in redistricting, turning remapping entirely over to unaccountable technicians, lobbyists, and party leaders Term limits are also likely to increase partisan strife, because a bipartisan incumbent gerrymander will become impossible The recent California tendency to replace legislative bargaining over reapportionment with judicial fiat, the courts' habit of intervening in matters previously left to the legislature, the public's cynicism about any legislative activity, and the US Supreme Court's invitation to anyone aggrieved by a remapping to file suit virtually insures that redistricting in 2001 will be designed by, or at least exhaustively challenged in the courts Whether that will be good for democracy and for the rights of ethnic minorities is less certain

Understanding Affirmative Action: From the Practitioner's Perspective

Abstract: After a quarter-of-a-century and dozens of U.S. Supreme Court decisions the meaning of affirmative action is still not clearly understood by public administrators at the county and municipal level. Because these public administrators are the street-level implementors of federally prescribed legislation it is vital that they comprehend national statutory intentions in order to promote coherent public policy goals. Simply stated, affirmative action needs to be established as a uniform policy among local public administrators [i.e., as an avenue toward alleviating past and existing discriminatory employment practices] because to do otherwise would mean the maintenance of a vaguely perceived and impotent theory. In addition, although mainstream American political culture embellishes Thomas Jefferson's idea of "equality," the concept of affirmative action, which attempts to promote equal employment opportunity for women and minority groups, is often greeted by whites, in many instances, as a policy of "inequality." This attitude is due to a negative perception of quotas and programs aimed at eradicating the effects of past discriminatory employment practices. The result of this public fixation on quotas has, in recent years, generated the view that women and minority group members have guaranteed accessibility to jobs they are not qualified to fill.(1) Moreover, affirmative action's meaning and purpose has been clouded by a multiplicity of interpretations. Indeed, the very essence of affirmative action has, from its inception in the early 1960s to the present, been described as a principle with no single definable meaning.(2) In this same vein of thought, guidelines and mechanisms intended to effectuate affirmative action, such as set-asides, quotas, preferences, and hiring goals, similarly escape consistent or uniform expression.(3) The result of which supports the notion that affirmative action means different things to different people - everything from the elimination of apparent discriminatory practices against individuals by employers to conscious favoritism toward groups of persons based on race, ethnic status or sex.(4) The issue of affirmative action becomes more pronounced when one considers that a quarter century's experience with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its promise of employment equality for racial minorities and women in the American economic system has done little to diminish the strong disagreement over the fundamental meaning of employment equality.(5) To a large degree the U.S. Supreme Court's uneven and contradictory record(6) concerning affirmative action's definition, legality, and intent has only added uncertainty and confusion to its interpretative meaning. In this regard the Supreme Court has been reluctant, or unable, to engage in any systematic exposition of the law of affirmative action.(7) According to some scholars, the divisions among the justices reflect the divisions within American society over affirmative action, thus making any immediate clear-cut resolution of this issue as undesirable as it is difficult.(8) This notion reflects the feeling among white men [in particular] that once affirmative action programs for women and minorities are started, the result is bound to be reverse discrimination against white men through the imposition of a quota system.(9) In consequence to this volatile social, political, and legal dilemma the Court has been fractured.(10) More importantly, the Court's ambiguous, and oftentimes bitter and divisive, rulings over affirmative action have only exacerbated the controversy rather than fixing the policy meaning and purpose.(11) For instance, consider the judicial dichotomy between the Court decisions in Fullilove v. Klutznich, 448 U.S. 448,492 (1980) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989). In Fullilove the Court upheld a congressional spending program stipulating that a ten percent set-aside of federal funds granted for local public works projects be used to procure services or supplies from minority-owned businesses(12), whereas in Croson the Court found a set-aside for minority owned businesses, which required city contractors to subcontract as least 30 percent of the dollar value they received to minority owned businesses, to be in violation of the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. …

A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Education. Third Edition.

Abstract: t lection of school board members, taxation for school district budgets, collective bargaining and tenure for teachers, vaccination and suspension of pupils, instruction in the Darwinian theory and in foreign language. School prayers, loyalty oaths, flag salutes, pro test armbands, maternity leaves, race discrimination.... The list of topics dealt with in U.S. Supreme Court cases goes on and on, extending to virtually all aspects of school operation. Are school leaders aware of the do's and don'ts of these

Stemming the Tide: Assisted Suicide and the Constitution

Abstract: n November 8,1994, Oregon became the first state in the nation to legalize assisted suicide. Passage 0 of Proposition 16 was a milestone in the campaign to make assisted suicide a legal option. The culmination of years of effort, the Oregon vote followed on the heels of failed referenda in California and Washington, and other unsuccessful attempts to enact state laws guaranteeing the right to suicide assistance. Indeed, in 1993, four states passed laws strengthening or clarifying their ban against assisted suicide.’ No doubt, Proposition 16 is likely to renew the effort to legalize assisted suicide at the state level. The battle over assisted suicide is also unfolding in the courts. Litigation challengmg Proposition 16 on the grounds that it violates the equal protection clause is ongoing in Oregon.2 More significantly, three cases, two in federal courts and one in Michigan state court, have been brought to establish assisted suicide as a constitutionally protected right. These three cases have yielded important rulings that foreshadow the ultimate resolution of this issue by the United States Supreme Court. The federal lawsuit challenging Washington State’s law barring assisted suicide as unconstitutional, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, resulted first in a much-publicized district court ruling striking down the law.3 O n March 9, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned that decision, holding that a right to assisted suicide is not protected by the United States Con~titution.~ In a similar lawsuit challenging New York‘s laws prohibiting assisted suicide, Quill v. Koppell, the district court upheld the statutes, dismissing the lawsuit after a preliminary hearings The Michigan Supreme Court decision was a consoli-

Abortion: The Supreme Court Decisions

Abstract: Any books that you read, no matter how you got the sentences that have been read from the books, surely they will give you goodness. But, we will show you one of recommendation of the book that you need to read. This abortion the supreme court decisions is what we surely mean. We will show you the reasonable reasons why you need to read this book. This book is a kind of precious book written by an experienced author.

Justice blackmun and legal abortion : a besieged legacy to women's reproductive health

Abstract: Justice Harry A. Blackmuns 24-year tenure on the Supreme Court ended in 1994. Justice Blackmun probably will be best remembered for writing the majority opinion in Roe vs. Wade (HO US 113 1973). This landmark decision together with its companion decision of Doe vs. Bolton (410 US 179 1973) declared restrictive state abortion laws unconstitutional. However the same Supreme Court decisions that had permitted public health advances in the 1970s were challenged in the 1980s and then supplanted in the 1990s. The trimester-threshold model which underlay both Roe vs. Wade and Doe vs. Bolton had its foundations in medicine and not in the US Constitution. At the time few of the elated pro-choice advocates foresaw the implications of these rulings for the delivery of reproductive health care in the 1980s and 1990s. The increased availability of legal abortion in the United States in the 1970s also improved both the safety of abortion methods and the skill of physicians performing abortions. For example clinicians recognized that dilatation and evacuation could terminate pregnancies at 13 weeks gestation or later more safely than intrauterine instillation methods; thus the rigid trimester-threshold concept became irrelevant. Because Roe vs. Wade had expressly allowed regulation of the conditions under which abortion could be performed states were in effect invited to draft new rules to guide medical practice. These regulations took several forms requiring 1) parental consent or notification 2) spousal consent or notification 3) written informed consent 4) 24-hour waiting periods 5) counseling only about risks of the procedure and 6) bureaucratic clinic licensing. Today the trimester-threshold concept is clinically obsolete and has been judicially replaced by one of undue burden. Moreover anti-abortion violence today may threaten legal abortion to a greater extent than Blackmuns fear of judicial restriction. The recent murders of physicians and other abortion clinic employees represent the most severe terrorism by antiabortion extremists.

The first amendment, freedom of the press, and the issue of “harm”: A conundrum for publishers

Abstract: Does strict adherence to the principles of the First Amendment and opposition to any forms of censorship inflict “harm” on women and American society? In this article, the author surveys the published literature, U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and substantive issues raised by “tabsolutist” defenders of the First Amendment as well as by feminists opposed to pornography. He argues that the “Mill-Paul hypothesis” should be adopted by society to confront the censorship morass that has deeply divided American society. Namely, if an image or a printed work causes harm to anyone, it should be prosecuted under existing legal codes.

Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, the Entrapment Defense

Abstract: Thomas Tobias, Ralph Hubert (“Sonny”) Barger, Richard Wayne Mummert, Kenneth Musslyn, and J. Wilton Hunt have much in common: each was induced by a government agent to commit a crime he would not have otherwise committed, and, as such, each was convicted despite the presentation of a sensible entrapment defense. In those cases, each was found to have been predisposed toward criminal activity. Much has changed, however, since those decisions, and today, each of those five defendants would have a strong chance of winning his entrapment claim based on the predisposition standard. Two United States Supreme Court decisions helped shift the application of that subjective standard centered on predisposition: Sherman v. United States and United States v. Jacobson. These decisions essentially moved the emphasis from an exclusive analysis of the defendant’s state of mind to one accounting for the nature of the improper government inducement. The challenge is to identify individuals who pose a serious threat to the community without government solicitation; thus the better approach is to apply the tried and true criminal law notion of causation to entrapment. Presented within this more proper context, each of the five defendants likely would have acquitted, and rightfully so, as the proper purpose of the entrapment defense is to determine if the defendant was truly a threat to society.

Cases and materials on patent law : including trade secrets, copyrights, trademarks

Abstract: The Sixth Edition has been completely updated and includes new Supreme Court decisions on claim construction, injunctions and plant patents. It also includes new en banc decisions of the CAFC. There is also a new Teacher's Manual that includes case outlines, interesting materials, and teaching points. In addition the new edition of the Teacher's Manual includes: Amusing patents and famous patents for teachers to share with students to enrich and inform their study A portion of an oral argument to make a point about always being prepared Detailed case outlines for all of the cases in the book A discussion about critical theory (i.e. text interpretation) as it relates to patent law Writings by judges on the practice of patent law A sample writing assignment Sample final examinations for both 2- and 3-credit hour courses

Advertising and the Legal Profession

Abstract: Many state bar associations have sought to make their advertising regulations more stringent, arguably because the image of the legal profession has been suffering in recent years. This article seeks to explain these reform efforts by examining whether bar associations are responding to demands of members as demonstrated by attitudes toward advertising, as well as by their advertising behaviors. It is possible that Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977) and subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions are not having their intended effects and that advertising by lawyers is misleading and confusing, creating a climate ripe for reform. Alternatively, the decisions might be having their intended effects of driving down prices and allowing young firms/attorneys to compete for clients more effectively-outcomes leaders of the bar might like to thwart. Using survey data of small-firm lawyers gathered in four states before the reform movement received much attention, the evidence suggests that neither of these explanati...

Housing and the Justification of School Segregation

Abstract: The intense attack on court-ordered busing rests largely on the public belief that the courts are artificially interfering with normal neighborhoods and communities. A central premise in the early Supreme Court decisions was, however, that the courts were attempting to correct violations with deep roots in both school and housing discrimination. When the Court later decided to limit and then to permit termination of desegregation, however, fundamentally different conclusions about housing were relied on-that housing segregation simply happened for some unknowable reason or that it was a natural force, separate from schools, that courts could do nothing about. The changing conception of housing, often reached with little or no empirical basis, has provided a principal grounds for judicial acceptance of segregated education. To determine whether or not court-ordered desegregation in urban areas is needed, justifiable, and feasible, courts must reach decisions about urban residential segregation and its relationship to schools. The radical change in the Supreme Court's understanding of the relationship between school and housing segregation between the early 1970s and the 1974 Milliken v. Bradley' decision, which brought an end to significant increases in desegregation and locked in the isolation of minority students in the metropolitan North, provided a key element in the justification of a constitutional policy that made desegregation a right without a remedy in the metropolitan North, where virtually all major cities have large majorities of nonwhite students who attend segregated and inferior schools. The Milliken decision, blocking desegregation in the North, and the 1991 and 1992 decisions, Board of Education v. Dowell2 and Freeman v. Pitts,3 permitting resegregation of southern school districts, rest to a considerable degree on court findings about housing segregation, theories that changed drastically as the courts moved from requiring all-out urban desegregation within school

The Fourth Amendment handbook: A chronological survey of Supreme Court decisions

Abstract: This is the second edition of the ABA Criminal Justice section's flagship product, its comprehensive summary of every case relating in any way to the Fouth Amendment ever decided by the US Supreme Court. This edition offers a decade of updated case summaries, through the end of the 2002 term.

Cometh the Revolution: The Case for Overruling Mccollum V. Board of Education

Abstract: In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education', a 1948 Supreme Court case, Justice Frankfurter stated that public education was "the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny." This is an alarming statement. It suggests that our common destiny is in the hands of the government, not the people. Additionally, by using the word "destiny," Justice Frankfurter raised a religious concept of a determined future, held in the hands of the public school. Since religion has been expelled from the school house, the statement suggests that a destiny and a culture can be achieved without religion. Most alarming, this concept of a destiny and a culture apart from religion is wrong; yet, it has become the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence as applied to elementary and secondary public schools. This Article will address two ways in which the isolation of religion from destiny and culture is fundamentally wrong. Part A will show that culture, particularly American culture, and law, including the religion clauses of the First Amendment, are dependent upon and actually stem from religion. While the analysis in Part A is not presented as the only possible understanding of the origins of culture and law in America, it is a sufficient analysis to justify a place for religion in' the nurturing of future generations. It suggests that religion is a crucial and perhaps determining thread in the fabric of America, a thread. which, to use one of Justice Frankfurter's metaphors, cannot be removed from the educational process without unraveling the entire fabric.' Many will deem this portion irrelevant, primarily because historical development and the field of historical jurisprudence are presently considered of little import. However, a religious analysis is essential to understanding the development of American society, the American legal system, and the very doctrine of religious liberty. Part B will examine the basic premises underlying the Supreme Court decisions affecting religion in public elementary and secondary schools; it will suggest that developments since the first Establishment Clause cases have invalidated the educational premises upon which those decisions rely. These changes include the now well known breakdown of the family, a spiraling illegitimacy rate, and the pressures of a drug culture. All of these combine to destroy the lives of millions of youths in America, particularly those who are poor and most dependent on the free public school system.

The living U.S. Constitution : historical background landmark Supreme Court decisions with introductions indexed guide pen portraits of the signers

Abstract: This invaluable book updated the study of constitutional law with the addition of twenty contemporary Supreme Court cases dealing with such controversial topics as the legislative veto, stop-and-frisk, "set asides" to benefit minorities, and hate speech. Beginning with the story of the forming of the Constitution, it includes illuminating character sketches of the delegates written by their contemporaries, as well as the complete text of the Constitution itself. The Supreme Court decisions that the author cites were selected for their variety and complexity, and because they shed light on the problems that arise under the rule of the Constitution and the interpretations of that rule. This third edition was prepared by Jacob W. Landynski, an expert on constitutional law and a longtime colleague at the New School for Social Research of the original author, the outstanding historian and political scientist Saul K. Padover. Besides adding twenty additional cases, Professor Landynski re-edited the existing cases and rewrote the case introductions throughout in order to make the book as informative and concise as possible. The result is a unique and important contribution toward understanding the document upon which our nation is founded.

Using Science to Influence the Supreme Court on the Right to Refuse Treatment: Amicus Curiae Briefs in Washington v. Harper

Abstract: The Supreme Court's use of empirical behavioral science data has grown dramatically in the 40 years since Brown v. Board of Education . Most of these data are submitted in amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs submitted by parties with an interest in the outcome of the significant mental health law cases coming before the court. The increasing use of such briefs raises important questions. Is there evidence that the court is actually influenced by such briefs? Can scientific/professional organizations present scientific data objectively in a clearly adversarial document? A review of the nine amicus briefs filed in Washington v. Harper , a right to refuse treatment case, and a comparison of the Court's opinion with that of the dissent demonstrate that both the majority and the dissent refer to arguments contained in the briefs, incorporate elements of these arguments, and occasionally paraphrase references cited in the briefs. It remains unclear whether the Court uses such arguments to formulate opinions or to justify them. A comparison of the briefs presented by the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association highlights the challenge to scientific objectivity inherent in participation in the amicus process.

Shaw, miller and the districting thicket

Abstract: Recent Supreme Court decisions involving majority-minority electoral districts have introduced new uncertainty into the political boundary-drawing process, particularly with regard to the relative importance applied to such factors as geography, incumbency, political affiliation, ethnicity, and race.

Religious Freedom and Unemployment Compensation Benefits

Abstract: In both 1990 and 1991 the Congress showed a penchant for strongly disapproving of recent Supreme Court decisions. This was the case, for example, in both the now-defunct Civil Rights Bill of 1990 and the newly enacted Civil Rights Act of 1991. Much less dramatic, but nonetheless important for employment law, were two 1991 House bills - Religious Freedom Act - both of which were triggered off by one 1990 Supreme Court case, Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith (1990). In this case unemployment compensation benefits were denied the respondents who had been discharged for engaging in certain religious practices. It will be the purpose of this article to (1) briefly consider both the 1991 House bills and the legal background of unemployment compensation and (2) more extensively examine existing Supreme Court decisions and trends concerning the payment of unemployment compensation benefits in light of both the free exercise and establishment clauses of the First Amendment. The 1991 House Bills Each of the 1991 House bills went beyond unemployment compensation; they aimed to protect the fee exercise or "practice religion in general.(1) At the core of each bill are the following concepts: 1. The government shall not burden the exercise or practice of religion "even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability" except when 2. The government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person - a. "[I]s essential to further a compelling governmental interest"; and b. "[I]s the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest". Three points are in order at this juncture concerning these two bills. First, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act alone also contained the provision that it was not to be interpreted to address any part of the First Amendment's establishment of religion clause. Second, the core concepts included in each bill indicated above were drawn from the Supreme Court decisions to be discussed below, and thus will be analyzed later. Third, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act had in it a provision that nothing "in this act shall be construed to authorize any government to burden any religious belief" (H.R. 2796, Sec. 6(c)). Representative Christopher Smith introduced in the Religious Freedom Act provisions more specific than this with respect to both the issues of abortion and the status of religious organizations. Basically, Smith wanted to overcome a "Religious Freedom Restoration Act [RFRA] that does not contain an exclusion for religiously based challenges to abortion-restrictive statutes" and was concerned about "H.R. 2927's possible effect on the tax-exempt status of religious organizations and their capacity to participate in Government sponsored social service programs" (Congressional Record, 137, November 26, 1991, E4187). Employment Compensation: The Legal Background Unemployment compensation was provided for in the Social Security Act of 1935. Rather than being an all federal program, it was set up as "a cooperative federal-state program in which employer costs and employee benefits may vary from state to state, rather than being set at a national rate as under social security" (Greenlaw & Kohn, 1986, p. 391). This feature resulted because President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress "feared that the United States Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional any social security legislation that imposed federal taxes for the purpose of paying unemployment benefits" (Becker, 1982, p. 366). To reduce this danger, a provision was made for a federal unemployment tax on employers but no federal benefits to be paid to those who became unemployed - only the states could provide strong inducement, all states have enacted unemployment compensation laws. Even though they are state laws, the unemployment compensation statutes fall within the realm of Supreme Court scrutiny of the two First Amendment religious clauses: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (the emphasis is added). …