Showing papers on "Supreme Court Decisions published in 1997"
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TL;DR: The Supreme Court has unanimously ruled that there is no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, and did much more than simply uphold the New York and Washington cases.
Abstract: The Supreme Court has unanimously ruled that there is no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.1,2 Unexpectedly, however, the Court did much more than simply uphold the New York and Wa...
181 citations
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TL;DR: While the Supreme Court is reviewing the decisions by the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals to reverse state bans on assisted suicide, there is a unique opportunity to engage the public in the debate over assisted suicide.
Abstract: While the Supreme Court is reviewing the decisions by the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals to reverse state bans on assisted suicide, there is a unique opportunity to engage the public, h...
155 citations
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TL;DR: In rejecting a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to preserve the distinction between the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and assisted suicide or euthanasia, but it undermined the distinction when it endorsed terminal sedation.
Abstract: In rejecting a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide earlier this year,1,2 the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to preserve the distinction between the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and assisted suicide or euthanasia. In fact, however, the Court undermined the distinction when it endorsed terminal sedation. Terminal sedation seems consistent with traditional medical care but often is a form of euthanasia. Moreover, it is a practice that is ethically more problematic than assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia. The Supreme Court's Opinions In deciding against a right to assisted suicide, the Court faced the claim that such a right is necessary for . . .
124 citations
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TL;DR: This article found long-term shifts in issue attention associated with four decisions, dealing respectively with school desegregation, flag-burning, religious instruction in public schools, and public school prayer.
Abstract: Theory: As with other United States political institutions, the Supreme Court confers and withdraws benefits, both material and symbolic, and can under some circumstances rearrange the ecology of political influence. When these effects occur in the extreme, the result can be an expansion of conflict and a shift in system-wide attention to the underlying issues. Hypothesis: "Politically significant" Supreme Court decisions produce large and enduring shifts in system-wide attention to the underlying issues. Methods: We evaluate the effects of all "politically significant" decisions, gauged by the CQ Guide to the US Supreme Court, on systemic attention to the underlying issues. We measure systemic attention using monthly indicators of media coverage of school desegregation, freedom of speech/censorship, and church/state issues. Box-Tiao (1975) methods are used to evaluate the impact of these decisions on systemic attention. Results: We find long-term shifts in issue attention associated with four decisions, dealing respectively with school desegregation, flag-burning, religious instruction in public schools, and public school prayer. Each decision conferred and withdrew benefits, rearranged the distribution of political influence, and significantly expanded the scope of conflict for the underlying issues.
99 citations
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TL;DR: This article analyzes judicial determinations on the "right to die" from Quinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, Gluckberg, and Vacco.
Abstract: This article analyzes judicial determinations on the "right to die" fromQuinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco. The body of law known as right-to-die cases extends ordinary treatment refusal doctrine to end-of-life decisions. The courts, having affirmed a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, held that certain categorical distinctions that had been drawn lacked a rational basis. No rational distinction could be made between competent vs incompetent patients, withholding vs withdrawing treatment, and ordinary vs extraordinary treatment. The courts, however, had persistently affirmed one categorical distinction: between withdrawing life-sustaining treament on the one hand and active euthanasia or physicianassisted dying on the other.In Washington v Glucksberg and Vacco v Quill, the Supreme Court unanimously held that physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Constitution. Notably, five members of the Court wrote or joined in concurring opinions that took a more liberal view. The Court powerfully approved aggressive palliation of pain. The Supreme Court, hinting that it would find state legalization of physician-assisted suicide constitutional, invited the nation to pursue an earnest debate on physician assistance in the dying process.
96 citations
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TL;DR: The U.S. Supreme Court will decide later this year whether to let stand decisions by two appeals courts permitting doctors to help terminally ill patients commit suicide, which would mean physicians in 12 states would be allowed to provide the means to take their own lives.
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court will decide later this year whether to let stand decisions by two appeals courts permitting doctors to help terminally ill patients commit suicide.1 The Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals last spring held that state laws in Washington and New York that ban assistance in suicide were unconstitutional as applied to doctors and their dying patients.2,3 If the Supreme Court lets the decisions stand, physicians in 12 states, which include about half the population of the United States, would be allowed to provide the means for terminally ill patients to take their own lives, . . .
86 citations
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01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: The history of federal statutes on campaign finance; major Supreme Court decisions; the constitutional contours of the current debate; a roadmap to the present rules of the game; political action committees; national parties; hard and soft money; express and issue advocacy; enforcing campaign finance law; and recent innovations and proposals.
Abstract: This volume pulls together key documentsstatutes, court decisions, FEC advisory opinions, draft legislationand scholarly articles that are essential references for any informed discussion of campaign finance reform. Each chapter includes a set of reprinted materials preceded by an explanation of the relevant issues by the editors. Topics include the history of federal statutes on campaign finance; major Supreme Court decisions; the constitutional contours of the current debate; a roadmap to the present rules of the game; political action committees; national parties; hard and soft money; express and issue advocacy; enforcing campaign finance law; and recent innovations and proposals.The volume is designed to help reformers and interested citizens understand how current campaign finance practices have evolved from previous decisions made by legislative, judicial, and executive bodies and what might be entailed in moving the system in a desired direction.Each of the editors has extensive practical experience in the field of campaign finance."
37 citations
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TL;DR: The case of Babbitt v. Sweet Home as discussed by the authors was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the protection of protected species in the Endangered Species Act.
Abstract: TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION A. Two Sides to a Controversy B. Slippery Slopes C. The Thesis of This Article II. INTRUSIVE, COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AND INEQUITABLE A. A Nation of Zoo-Keepers B. Politics as Usual C. Do Supreme Court Decisions Matter in Environment Policy III. THE POINTLESSNESS OF THEORY A. The Search for a Theoretical Fix B. Is Law Deducible C. A Collision of Views, Not a Conflict of Interests IV. THE END OF THE ECOSYSTEM A. What is Bad for the Marsh Is Bad for Mankind B. Ecology as a Comprehensive View C. The Historization of Nature D. The Problem of Classification E. The Problem of the Baseline F. The redundancy of Species V. LOGOS AND TELOS IN THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A. Everything Is Connected to Everything Else B. Ecology as a Normative Science C. The Non-Equilibrium Paradigm D. The Keystone Species E. Does Nature Know Best? F. Theory in Ecology G. Theory Against History H. Everything Can Connect with Everything Else I. Design in Ecology J. The "Rivet-Popping" Analogy VI. THE WARS OF RELIGION A. The Gospel of Efficiency B. Preference Satisfaction as the True and Only Heaven C. Why Protect Species? VII. CONCLUSION "When landowners find an endangered animal on their property, Chuck Cushman says, the best solution under current law is to `shoot, shovel and shut up'."(1) So the Arizona Republic newspaper reported the response of one landowner to the decision of the Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon.(2) At issue in Sweet Home was section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which makes it a crime to "take" an endangered or threatened species.(3) The ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect."(4) Interior Department regulations extended the definition of "harm" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation [that] actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."(5) In Sweet Home, the Supreme Court by a six to three majority upheld this extension of the meaning of "harm" in section 9 of the ESA.(6) Cushman, executive director of the American Land Rights Association, based in Battle Ground, Washington, identified civil disobedience as a rational response to the Court's decision. He explained, "[a] private-property owner is thinking to himself, `I find a spotted owl on my property, I'm going to lose everything I've worked for all my life.'"(7) A property owner may find immediate recourse in shooting and burying the bird before federal agents discover it.(8) A more general political remedy, Cushman observed, must be sought from Congress.(9) "I think you're going to see an eruption in Congress. It's obvious to everyone now that the Endangered Species Act is broke [sic] and it's gotta be fixed."(10) Newspaper editorials condemned the Sweet Home decision as a confiscation of property rights. "The U.S. Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision yesterday trampled property rights in granting federal regulators broad control of private land to protect endangered species," declared the Detroit News.(11) "No worse environmental decision has come from the high court in two decades. The harm can only be undone by Congress, which must overhaul the Endangered Species Act."(12) In a syndicated editorial, James J. Kilpatrick wrote that the small landowners who brought suit in Sweet Home rely on logging for their livelihoods, which is the only economically viable way that they can use their land.(13) "Now comes the government saying that timber may not be cut in forests supporting the owl and the woodpecker--not if the cutting involves significant habitat modification that actually kills or injures wildlife. …
31 citations
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TL;DR: The authors discusses four recent Supreme Court decisions involving vehicle stops: Whren v. United States, Ohio v. Robinette, Maryland v. Wilson, and Ornelas v United States.
Abstract: This article discusses four recent Supreme Court decisions involving vehicle stops: Whren v. United States, Ohio v. Robinette, Maryland v. Wilson, and Ornelas v. United States. Collecively these reveal a strong, new consensus on the Court about the proper application of the Fourth Amendment. This consensus results not from a settled body of doctrine but rather from shared, largely unspoken understandings -- understandings that heavily favor law enforcement and that, more troublingly, disregard the distinctive grievances and concerns of minority motorists stopped by the police. In ways the recent vehicle stop cases help to illustrate, this disregard is deeply embedded in the structure of current Fourth Amendment doctrine, and it seriously constrains the doctrine's growth.
23 citations
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01 Dec 1997
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss expert witness testimony and amicus curiae in the context of sexual harassment in the law and discuss the role of women in these cases. But they do not discuss abortion.
Abstract: Social science and the law -- Expert witness testimony and amicus curiae -- Abortion -- Sex discrimination -- Sexual harassment.
18 citations
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01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: Siegan as mentioned in this paper argues that a series of Supreme Court decisions have strengthened the legal protection of private property in the United States by limiting the power of state and local governments to impose zoning ordinances and land-use regulations on property owners.
Abstract: Over the past few years, a series of Supreme Court decisions has strengthened the legal protection of private property in the United States by limiting the power of state and local governments to impose zoning ordinances and land-use regulations on property owners. Bernard H. Siegan explores this new direction of the Supreme Court in Property and Freedom: The Constitution, the Courts, and Land-Use Regulation, arguing that this recent jurisprudence implements the objectives of the framers of the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Discussing several key land-use cases, Siegan describes the emergence of a new standard of review for land-use regulations--a standard under which a regulation will be held to be constitutional only when it substantially advances state interests and does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land. This new standard is less demanding than the strict scrutiny test applied to laws limiting freedom of speech or of the press, but considerably more demanding than the standard previously applied in these cases. In elevating the protection of property rights, Siegan contends, the Supreme Court has implemented a fundamental rule of fairness: governments should not force individual property owners to bear the costs of regulations which are supposed to benefit the public. Siegan believes that the new standard of review for land-use regulations accords with the widely held view that the protection of property rights is essential to the viability of the state and the well-being of the people. He cites studies showing that economic regulations seriously limit a nation's productivity and standard of living, and that zoning and no-growth measures reduce housing opportunities and raise the price of housing. Understandably, Siegan notes, people with low and moderate incomes tend to vote against zoning regulations in local elections.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995 was analyzed and the most dangerous justice was identified based on the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.
Abstract: We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the US Supreme Court released two decisions which challenge the current wisdom with regard to the creation of electoral districts that incorporate racial criteria for districting, and the implications for the electoral process in American cities are taken into account.
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TL;DR: In what follows, I would like to examine three issues on which these decisions are likely to exert significant pedagogical influence: the tension between general rules or classifications and the particular needs of individuals; (2) the relationship among pain, dignity, and equality; and (3) the limits of philosophical theory and the importance of practical experience.
Abstract: It is not difficult to compose a brief summary of the Supreme Court's assisted suicide decisions that would be suitable for bar review study guides and law student outlines: With no dissenters, the Court overturned the decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts that conferred Fourteenth Amendment protection upon the choice of competent, terminally ill adults to end their own lives with medication prescribed by their physicians. (1) Holding that the Constitution does not protect a right to commit suicide that itself entails a right to assistance in committing the act, the majority opinions relegate assisted suicide and euthanasia to the "laboratory of the states." (2) However, the decisions leave open the ill-defined possibility that the Court might revisit the issue, particularly if presented with a more narrowly focused claim than the one vindicated by the two circuit courts. Such a description would probably enable recent law school graduates correctly to answer a multiple choice bar exam question on "whether there is a constitutional right to die." But grasping their "bottom line" is not the same as grappling with the power of the two decisions to shape our society's ongoing debate about the neuralgic ethical and legal questions entangled in end-of-life decisionmaking. As legal theorist and literary critic James Boyd White has taught us, courts do not simply issue abstract judgments that impersonally and mechanically guide the behavior of individual and institutional agents in our society. According to White, those who play a role in the legal enterprise are engaged in a type of "constitutive rhetoric" that actually helps shape the moral identity of the community in which they participate. The community-constituting character of law does not inhere solely in the results that issue in particular cases, but also in the very way the questions are framed for decision. A lawyer arguing a client's position, and a fartiori a judge rendering an opinion, "is always saying not only 'Here is how this case should be decided,' but also 'Here--in this language--is the way this case and similar cases should be talked about. The language I am speaking is the proper language of justice in our culture.'" (3) Assuming that White is correct, if we are to understand the full import of the Supreme Court decisions on assisted suicide, we cannot fix our gaze solely on the conclusions they reach. We must also scrutinize the way the justices frame the issues at stake, the communal hopes and fears they invoke, the modes of argument they find persuasive and those that they discount, and the particular words and phrases through which they convey all of those things. By exercising the authority to interpret the constitutive document of our nation that has ultimately rested in their hands since the Court decided Marbury v. Madison in 1803, the justices inevitably wield a tremendous power of moral formation. In effect, they are moral teachers who help to shape the character of our nation. White reminds us that the "habit of regarding law as the instrument by which 'we' effectuate 'our policies' and get what 'we want' is wholly inadequate. It is the true nature of law to constitute a 'we' and to establish a conversation by which that 'we' can determine what our 'wants' are and should be" (p. 42). How, then, do the opinions in Glucksberg (4) and Quill (5) refocus the discussion regarding our communal obligations to the persons in our midst who are confronting the momentous and often terrifying task of relinquishing their earthly existence? In what follows, I would like to examine three issues on which these decisions are likely to exert significant pedagogical influence: (1) the tension between general rules or classifications and the particular needs of individuals; (2) the relationship among pain, dignity, and equality; and (3) the limits of philosophical theory and the importance of practical experience. Equality, Rules, and Exceptions The opinion of the Court in Glucksberg communicates its most significant moral lesson in the way that it frames the legal claim at stake. …
01 Jan 1997
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TL;DR: Dellinger as discussed by the authors defines and analyzes a class of United States Supreme Court decisions in which a photograph, map, replica, or reproduction is attached to a Justice's opinion.
Abstract: In this Commentary, Mr. Dellinger defines and analyses a heretofore unrecognized class of United States Supreme Court decisions: those in which a photograph, map, replica, or reproduction is attached to a Justice's opinion. Such attachments, all relying on visual or sight-based attributes that uniquely differentiate them from words, have appeared in a number of seminal decisions. Mr. Dellinger argues that the use of such attachments poses special dangers: because their neutrality and accuracy are so readily assumed, such attachments often elude the skepticism with which the written positions of Court opinions are generally reviewed. yet their inherent distortions and vulnerability to manipulation make the Justices' reliance on them problematic. Mr. Dellinger then argues that the Court should forgo any future reliance on attachments. In the alternative, the Justices, the companies that reproduce Court opinions, and readers must improve significantly the ways in which they respectively use, publish, and review these attachments.
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TL;DR: Dellinger as mentioned in this paper defines and analyzes a class of United States Supreme Court decisions in which a photograph, map, replica, or reproduction is attached to a Justice's opinion.
Abstract: In this Commentary, Mr. Dellinger defines and analyses a heretofore unrecognized class of United States Supreme Court decisions: those in which a photograph, map, replica, or reproduction is attached to a Justice's opinion. Such attachments, all relying on visual or sight-based attributes that uniquely differentiate them from words, have appeared in a number of seminal decisions. Mr. Dellinger argues that the use of such attachments poses special dangers: because their neutrality and accuracy are so readily assumed, such attachments often elude the skepticism with which the written positions of Court opinions are generally reviewed. yet their inherent distortions and vulnerability to manipulation make the Justices' reliance on them problematic. Mr. Dellinger then argues that the Court should forgo any future reliance on attachments. In the alternative, the Justices, the companies that reproduce Court opinions, and readers must improve significantly the ways in which they respectively use, publish, and review these attachments.
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TL;DR: This paper found that civil liability lawsuits led to law enforcement policy changes more frequently than constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court in recent years, while nearly two-thirds believed that U.S. Supreme Court decisions had little impact or made their jobs easier.
Abstract: Studies of judicial policymaking traditionally focus on appellate court decisions but neglect the importance of civil liability verdicts and settlements as policy-shaping out-comes produced by the judicial branch. This study sought to compare the influence of constitutional appellate decisions and trial court outcomes in shaping criminal justice policies. A national survey of police executives revealed that civil liability lawsuits led to law enforcement policy changes more frequently than constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court in recent years. In addition, more than three-quarters of respondents declared that civil liability cases are making their jobs more difficult, while nearly two-thirds believed that U.S. Supreme Court decisions had little impact or made their jobs easier.
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TL;DR: An analysis of the Court's reasoning reveals that its decisions resolved only a narrow constitutional question that affects relatively few people--mentally competent, terminally ill patients who wish to hasten their imminent deaths by having a physician prescribe medication that they intend to use to commit suicide.
Abstract: Like the debate about many controversial questions of ethics and medical care in America, public debate about physician assisted suicide became focused on questions of constitutional law. On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected any constitutional right of terminally ill patients to physician assisted suicide. An analysis of the Court's reasoning reveals that its decisions resolved only a narrow constitutional question that affects relatively few people--mentally competent, terminally ill patients who wish to hasten their imminent deaths by having a physician prescribe medication that they intend to use to commit suicide. Although suicide is not a crime, states remain free to prohibit assisted suicide. One consequence of the Court's decisions may be renewed debate on state laws. A more productive result would be to address the broader public health concerns that gave rise to support for physician assisted suicide--inadequate care for the terminally ill and prevention of suicide.
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TL;DR: The authors examines U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of taxation of the mass media and concludes that the Court's 1991 decision in Leathers v. Medlock does not represent a substantial change in the law governing taxation of media but is one step in the evolution of two distinct lines of media taxation cases.
Abstract: This article examines U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of taxation of the mass media. It concludes that the Court's 1991 decision in Leathers v. Medlock does not represent a substantial change in the law governing taxation of the media but is one step in the evolution of two distinct lines of media taxation cases. The article also examines how the lower courts have applied Leathers in the six years since it was decided. The lower court decisions uniformly - although not explicitly - recognize the two lines. What is needed now is explicit recognition by both the Supreme Court and the lower courts.
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TL;DR: Levine as discussed by the authors argued that the United States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and belief, and that the Court often tends to group together religious claims and practices regardless of the relative validity or importance of a particular practice within a religious system.
Abstract: In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and belief. While the Justices have articulated valid concerns concerning these cases, courts should not allow these concerns to deter them from making decisions vital to the effective adjudication of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases. In fact, it appears that as a result of the Court's increasing refusal to consider carefully the religious questions central to many cases, the Court often tends to group together religious claims and practices, regardless of the relative validity or importance of a particular practice within a religious system. This approach may lead to a number of disturbing results, some of which have already evidenced themselves in Supreme Court decisions in both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases. In Free Exercise Clause cases, grouping together all religious claims may require courts to accept and protect to the same degree all claims which appear to have a basis in religious belief. Courts may thus lose the ability to reject claims of relatively minor or even questionable religious significance. In such cases, courts may grant unnecessary and improper protections and exemptions to professed adherents, resulting in potential burdens on the government and society as a whole that could otherwise be avoided. Finally, the various dangers in both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence may be exacerbated by the fact that the Supreme Court has continuously broadened the range of the kinds of religious questions it refuses to consider. If courts continue to evade deciding these religious questions, their approach will perpetuate the unfortunate results that are already evident in a number of Supreme Court decisions. Levine concludes that the Supreme Court should reexamine the results of its Religion Clause jurisprudence, and adopt a willingness to consider more carefully questions of religious practice and belief.
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TL;DR: Lawyer Karen Capen discusses the legal issues facing doctors over the reporting of child abuse and outlines their obligations and responsibilities.
Abstract: Cases involving child abuse have received wide coverage lately, as has a case involving possible risk to a fetus because of a mother's addiction to solvents. Lawyer Karen Capen discusses the legal issues facing doctors over the reporting of child abuse and outlines their obligations and responsibilities.
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TL;DR: In this article, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a liberty interest exists in choosing the time and manner of one's death, and concluded that, with respect to competent, terminally ill adults, Washington's prohibition of assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Abstract: Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.
—Justice William Brennan Two recent circuit court decisions have reinvigorated the debate over the constitutional, practical and ethical ramifications of physician-assisted suicide. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a liberty interest exists in choosing the time and manner of one’s death. The court found this right to outweigh all asserted state interests, and concluded that, with respect to competent, terminally ill adults, Washington’s prohibition of assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The ruling effectively strikes down laws against assisted suicide in all of the states in the Ninth Circuit.
In April 1996, in Quill v. Vacco, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York’s prohibition of assisted suicide violates the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.
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TL;DR: The Supreme Court’s decisions do not resolve the ethical or legal debate about euthanasia and assisted suicide, and the court has returned these issues to the state legislatures, reflecting the reluctance of the Supreme Court Justices to substitute their views for the democratic will of the people.
Abstract: On June 26, 1997, the US Supreme Court ruled in 2 unanimous decisions that there is no constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide. Overturning 2 1996 Federal Appeals Court rulings that had struck down Washington and New York state laws prohibiting assisted suicide, the Supreme Court rejected 2 key arguments. First, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the right to liberty guaranteed by the US Constitution includes the right to seek the assistance of a physician to commit suicide. The court has previously assumed that the right to liberty includes decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment. However, it drew a clear distinction between forgoing life-sustaining treatment, which was consistent with “the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment,” and assisted suicide, which “may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment . . . [but] has never enjoyed similar legal protection.” The court found that “[t]he distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die is important, logical, rational, and well established” and is “widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession, the state courts, and the overwhelming majority of state legislatures.” Second, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that laws prohibiting assisted suicide violate the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the US Constitution — that states must treat like cases alike. In the rejected argument, decisions to forgo treatment (which are legally permissible) were said to be the same thing as assisted suicide and so should be legally permissible, too. However, the court opined that permitting decisions to forgo treatment (but prohibiting assisted suicide) does not “[treat] anyone differently from anyone else, or [draw] distinctions between persons. Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted life-saving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.” The Supreme Court’s decisions do not resolve the ethical or legal debate about euthanasia and assisted suicide. Instead, the court has returned these issues to the state legislatures, reflecting the reluctance of the Supreme Court Justices to substitute their views for the democratic will of the people. The court said simply that 2 state laws prohibiting assisted suicide withstood constitutional challenge, not that assisted suicide itself is or should be illegal. Therefore, these Supreme Court decisions would not necessarily prevent a state legislature from legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide. In November 1997, residents of Oregon will vote for a second time on that state’s controversial Death With Dignity Act, which was passed by a 51%-to-49% margin in a 1994 referendum but never implemented because of legal challenges. (In Canada the criminal law is a federal responsibility.) In 1993 the Supreme Court of Canada also upheld the Criminal Code prohibition against assisted suicide, although by a narrow 5-to-4 margin, in the Sue Rodriguez case. Like the US Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ guarantee of security of Editorial
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors demonstrate the relevance of the economic approach to the implementation of constitutional rights and show that the economic analysis of law is central to understanding the efficacy of judicial decisions supportive of the interests of relatively powerless groups within society.
Abstract: The study of Law and Economics focuses most often on issues of efficiency and growth. The economic approach has made major contributions, for example, in the areas of regulation, liability, and contract. But an economic approach to the study of courts and law can also shed light on an area that is seldom investigated by traditional legal scholars: the implementation of judicial decisions. In this essay I demonstrate the relevance of the economic approach to the implementation of constitutional rights. In particular, I show that the economic analysis of law is central to understanding the efficacy of judicial decisions supportive of the interests of relatively powerless groups within society.' Supreme Court decisions are not self-implementing. As Alexander Hamilton pointed out long ago in The Federalist Papers, courts are particularly dependent on the actions of others. Hamilton argued in Federalist 78 that the judiciary "has no influence over either the sword or the purse . . . and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."2 Without external support-from the other branches of government or directly from the citizenry-Court decisions announcing constitutional rights are unlikely to affect or change people's lives in important ways. In contrast to traditional legal analysis, the tools of economic analysis can help explain how Court-mandated constitutional rights of relatively powerless groups are actually implemented. In particular, economic analysis suggests that implementation is more likely to occur if at least one of three conditions is present:
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TL;DR: In this Introduction, the author discusses the recent Supreme Court decisions Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, which hold the position that one should have the right to control one’s own death, which is rooted in autonomy, liberty, and equality.
Abstract: In this Introduction, the author discusses the recent Supreme Court decisions Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. On one hand, several panel contributors hold the position that one should have the right to control one’s own death, which is rooted in autonomy, liberty, and equality. Scholarly voices on the other side of the debate, including four panel members, believe that the legalization of physician-assisted suicide would create intolerable risks, particularly to those in the community who are the most vulnerable: the poor, the elderly, and the mentally and physically disabled.