Supreme Court Decisions

About: Supreme Court Decisions is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1804 publications have been published within this topic receiving 17066 citations.

The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court

Abstract: I INTRODUCTION Recent (1995-2002) Rehnquist Court decisions striking down federal laws can be tied to "majoritarian" social and political forces. (1) In explaining why I think this is so, I will not defend these decisions. It may be, for example, that these decisions were wrongly decided, or inconsistent with what the Justices have said in other decisions, or both. Moreover, these decisions may well reflect the personal preferences of the Justices voting to invalidate these laws. Instead, my point is that majoritarian forces help explain why the Rehnquist Court seemed so willing to strike down federal laws. Before turning to the Rehnquist Court and to the social and political forces that impact its decision-making, it is useful to provide some background to my project. Having spent much of the past sixteen years examining how constitutional law is shaped by both judicial and nonjudicial actors, I am quite convinced--as Robert Dahl put it in 1957--that the Court's constitutional decisions "are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." (2) This does not mean that the Court never falls out of step with lawmakers or U.S. citizens. Court-curbing proposals, for example, are often a byproduct of shifting alignments within Congress--so that a majority with constitutional views that differ from the Court's views replaces a majority that generally accepts the Court's decisionmaking. (3) While these proposals are often prompted by Court rulings that strike down federal or state laws, it would nevertheless be wrong to measure whether the Court is countermajoritarian by looking at the frequency with which it strikes down legislation. (4) It may be, for example, that lawmakers delegate power to the courts either because the issue (abortion, slavery) threatens to disrupt existing political coalitions or because they want to cast a vote for something that is politically popular (flag burning, internet decency). (5) Also, what if the laws the Court invalidates are unpopular either with lawmakers or with the American people? If the law is truly outdated, its invalidation may well seem majoritarian. (6) On the other hand, a law may be unpopular with the people but not with lawmakers. This was true with Lochner Court invalidations of first New Deal legislation. (7) What then of the Rehnquist Court? By invalidating all or parts of thirty-one laws between 1995 and 2002, (8) the Court has been characterized as "arrogant, self-aggrandizing, and unduly activist" by "giving insufficient deference--or even a modicum of respect--to Congress." (9) Whatever one thinks of this characterization, there is little reason to think that Congress and U.S. citizens will soon countermand Rehnquist Court overreaching. Instead, the Rehnquist Court seems to be paying close attention to signals that Congress and U.S. citizens have sent it. In this way, Rehnquist Court decisions striking down federal laws do not frustrate majoritarian preferences and, as such, follow the historical pattern. (10) In advancing this claim, I do not argue that the federal statutes invalidated by the Court were unpopular. Instead, I call attention to why neither lawmakers nor the people cared passionately about the fate of these statutes. Moreover, I suggest that citizens and lawmakers look especially to the Court to check Congress. Because the people turn to the Court to check Congress, rather than trust Congress to responsibly utilize its enumerated powers, Court decisions striking down federal statutes look more like exercises of delegated authority than like countermajoritarian judicial review. What follows is a laundry list of factors supporting this conclusion. These factors are broken down into sections on public opinion, Congress, and the Rehnquist Court's sensitivity to signals sent by Congress and the American people. II THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUPPORT BOTH THE COURT'S STRIKING DOWN FEDERAL LAWS AND ITS TURN TO FEDERALISM. …

The constitutional influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the UK apex court: institutional proximity and jurisprudential divergence?

Abstract: It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.

Avena and Sanchez-Llamas Come to Germany - The German Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

Abstract: Much attention has been given to a series of decisions by the US Supreme Court regarding the effects of the decisions of the International Court of Justice interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations On 19 September, 2006, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG - German Federal Constitutional Court), has made its first judgment on the issue The decision is significant for international law and even more specifically for US jurists: Its outcome differs significantly from the US Supreme Court decisions

Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit

Abstract: This has been a watershed year for the Federal Circuit, with the Supreme Court granting cert. in more patent cases than any term since the Circuit’s creation in 1982. Moreover, in case after case this year, the Justices soundly and unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit’s logic. Some attribute the tension between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court to a clash between rules and standards, but that view misses the heart of what is occurring. Rather, a strong message echoes through the six Supreme Court decisions. It is a message about restraint, about carefully constructed logic, and about coming into the fold of judicial decision-making. This is a coming of age for the Federal Circuit — or at least the Supreme Court seems determined to coax, cajole and, when necessary, club the Federal Circuit into coming of age.This article examines the messages evident in recent Supreme Court decisions and evaluates whether the Court appears to be gaining ground. Although some indications are positive, others suggest that the Federal Circuit may not be entirely ready to relinquish its role as the judiciary’s enfant terrible.

Is state power to protect health compatible with substantive due process rights

Abstract: Public health laws may mandate drastic limitations on individual liberty, such as forced medication and quarantine. This results in a tension between public health laws and guarantees of liberty such as the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has resolved this tension in favor of one or the other of these legal principles, depending on the facts and issues involved. Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence is internally consistent. The Court has applied a level of scrutiny that, while rigorous, is more flexible than strict scrutiny. I denote this as "enhanced public health scrutiny." Applying this scrutiny, the Court will uphold public health legislation if it protects an inchoate class of people who may not yet be identifiable, who will incur a specific disease or injury absent the law, but who will not experience this disease or injury if the law is enforced. If this doctrine were explicit, it would constitute a clear guideline to courts seeking to balance health and liberty concerns. This guideline would be consistent with current case law, and would not impact on law affecting reproductive liberty.