Supreme Court Decisions

About: Supreme Court Decisions is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1804 publications have been published within this topic receiving 17066 citations.

How Do You Solve a Problem Like in Kelo

Abstract: This article analyzes one of the most controversial recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and demonstrates that the common perception of the Kelo case, that now the government can take any property under the 5th Amendment if they simply allege or show that the new use of the property will achieve a higher economic use, is a misreading of the majority and concurring opinions in Kelo. The article then argues that the Kelo decision is still very troubling for the dicta in the majority, concurring, and even Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, that judges should show extreme deference to a legislative judgment of public use and not to "second guess" legislative judgments. The article then reviews all of the cases cited to by the Court in Berman and Midkiff (the two key cases relied upon by the Court in Kelo) and demonstrates that none of them provide support for this extreme judicial deference in the context of a non-traditional taking. Consequently, the Court is in a very strong position to re-examine the continued applicability of this deferential approach in the context of non-traditional takings. Rather than interpret public use to exclude all such non-traditional exercises of eminent domain, this article suggests that an approach that better comports with the legitimate functions of the legislative and judicial branches is for courts to more closely scrutinize these takings to make sure that the alleged public benefits from the taking are real rather pretextual or highly speculative and to increase the level of review when the taking will lead to high uncompensated subjective values to home owners. The article concludes by developing three distinct categories of takings and specific appropriate levels of judicial review and legislative burdens for each category in order to restore the system of checks and balances between the legislative and judicial branches that are essential to the American Constitutional system.

Metro broadcasting v. FCC: Supreme Court upholds FCC minority preference policies, but affirmative action victory seems tenuous at best

Abstract: The analysis provides a recent history of Supreme Court decisions on Title VI and Title VII issues in order to understand the Court's position on minority ownership of broadcast outlets. A doctrinal swing on the Court jeopardizes future minority merit and distress sale preferences for minority owners.

The "Sole Organ" before the Court: Presidential Power in Foreign Policy Cases, 1790-1996

Abstract: Few substantive areas have merited as little empirical scrutiny as the Supreme Court's decisions on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The Court's edicts on diverse domestic policy issues such as civil rights and liberties(1) and economic regulations(2) have been given a considerable degree of social science analysis, yet a systematic examination of rulings in this "high politics" domain have lagged far behind. While the public law literature has provided us with extensive historical and especially doctrinal analyses of Supreme Court decisions,(3) many scholars have seemingly accepted as axiomatic that foreign policy decisions have been rare and that when the Court does enter into the political thicket of foreign affairs, the decisions are almost always supportive of the president. We believe that these twin assumptions regarding the president's prerogative power may not be completely accurate because of the Court's strategic importance as an institution in the separation of powers and the Court's role as an arbiter in the horizontal and vertical separation of powers.(4) In addition, most analyses of foreign policy tend to focus on specific periods in U.S. history,(5) but almost all of the research focuses a critical eye on the Supreme Court's watershed decision in the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936).(6) There, the Court supported a much earlier interpretation regarding a sole-organ theory of presidential power because the "President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."(7) We believe that interpreting the Court's role as an institution requires an analysis that covers the entire history of Supreme Court jurisprudence and conflict resolution. The Supreme Court is, first and foremost, responsible for resolving disputes between the different institutions of government and the policy actors who challenge the executive's authority. Aware of its role in adjudicating conflicts that allocate or deny power, the Court serves as a check on executive power. As a policy player--particularly in this substantive area where the nation's security may be at stake--the Court may be careful to not openly defy the executive's foreign policy powers, even though it may ultimately limit his authority. Thus, the scholarly community may have accepted a veiled perspective on judicial decision making that takes a narrow view on what constitutes a "foreign policy" decisional outcome. A few examples of where this has occurred in foreign policy decisions prove illustrative. New York Times Co. v. United States (1971) is generally taught as a classic case involving freedom of the press, but it was also a case where the executive branch lost the argument that the powers of the president and the effective conduct of the nation's foreign policy were at stake.(8) Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) is best remembered for the Court's opinions that discussed the parameters of executive power and the major defeat it occasioned for President Truman.(9) Yet, it was also related to the Korean conflict and the president's ability to manage the war-making effort. Far less known is Little v. Barreme (1804), where the Court held that President John Adams--much like Harry Truman--overstepped his powers by ordering a naval officer to take certain actions that exceeded the legislative authority the president had been given to patrol the high seas.(10) Thus, while much has been made of the High Court's reluctance to tackle foreign policy cases and limit presidential power, we believe a more detailed review of Court decisions is necessary to provide more thorough evidence about judicial decision making. We do several things in this article. First, we provide a brief overview of the literature on the Supreme Court and foreign policy to detail why the common wisdom encourages the stereotype that the justices show deference to the president. Second, we follow recent research by taking a broader perspective in examining the doctrine of presidential prerogative power. …

Fictions in Tort

Abstract: This essay examines the use of fictions in the reasoning of the House of Lords and United Kingdom Supreme Court in the context of two recent lines of authority on English tort law. First, the essay explores the relevance of counter-factual scenarios to liability in the tort of false imprisonment, in the light of the Supreme Court decisions in Lumba and Kambadzi. The second series of decisions is on causation in negligence claims arising from asbestos exposure (beginning with Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services and considered most recently in The ‘Trigger’ Litigation). These cases have revealed fundamental, ongoing judicial disagreement about the nature and extent of the exceptions made to general principles. The cases are also shown to lend force to Del Mar’s argument about the diachronicity of legal fictions. Overall, it is argued that such fictions play an important role in common law reasoning.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey: the flight from reason in the Supreme Court

Abstract: In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a bare majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade. Although Roe was not directly implicated by any of the statutes challenged in Casey, all of which could have been upheld without overruling Roe, the Justices agreed to reexamine Roe because of the uncertainty regarding its continued viability and the need to provide guidance to state and federal courts and state legislatures. The result of this reexamination, however, was a badly divided Court that could not muster a majority in support of any standard of re-