Topic
Supreme Court Decisions
About: Supreme Court Decisions is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1804 publications have been published within this topic receiving 17066 citations.
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TL;DR: This paper used amicus curiae participation as a measure of case saliency to investigate the effects of amicus participation on dissenting votes at the Texas Supreme Court and found that case salience increases dissensus.
Abstract: This research uses amicus curiae participation as a measure of case salience to investigate the effects of case salience on dissenting votes at the Texas Supreme Court. These decisions are analyzed within the context of a partisan electoral system to see how interest-group participation influences the willingness of state judges to dissent. I constructed an original data set of Texas Supreme Court decisions from 1990-2009 to address this question. The results show that amicus participation is a significant predictor of dissent, but the relationship depends on whether the judge is a freshman or a veteran judge. While interest groups are able to influence new members on the court through amicus briefs, veteran judges are mostly unaffected. Overall, the findings suggest that case salience increases dissensus.
3 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that those vested in the outcome, such as African Americans, religious individuals, and parents, were more likely to change their attitudes in favor of the decision and become more positive toward the institution.
Abstract: Building on the geographic constituency theory of awareness of Supreme Court decisions, we conducted a panel survey in Cleveland, Ohio before and after Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which upheld state-funded vouchers in religious schools. We found several characteristics predict awareness: news consumption, income, and knowledge of and positive feelings toward the Court. Our results also showed those vested in the outcome, such as African Americans, religious individuals, and parents were more likely to change their attitudes in favor of the decision and become more positive toward the institution. These findings help us understand the circumstances under which some individuals may become vested in court decisions.
3 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine empirically levels of vertical and horizontal finance equity generated by Texas' education finance system and make policy recommendations guided by the results, including summations of the Texas Supreme Court decisions on K-12 education finance since 1989.
Abstract: The State of Texas’ education finance mechanism – known as the Foundation School Program (FSP) was challenged in a series of litigation known as Edgewood v. Kirby I - IV and West Orange Cove I- II. Though the state Supreme Court’s holding ultimately moved the Texas Assembly to make changes in the funding mechanism, not since the 1980s has there been a systematic evaluation of the fiscal efficacy of the State of Texas’ FSP. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to examine empirically levels of vertical and horizontal finance equity generated by Texas’ education finance system. Information will be presented in five sections that describe and discuss: (a) summations of the Texas Supreme Court decisions on K-12 education finance since 1989; (b) analyses of initial statistical results generated from efficacy analyses of the Texas Foundation School Program; and, (c) policy recommendations guided by the results.
3 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, a distinguished federal judge maintains that true conservatives are required to substitute principles of judicial restraint for an inquiry into the original meaning of the Constitution, and argues that the Second Amendment decision in District of Columbia v. Heller is an activist decision just like Roe v. Wade.
Abstract: Writing in the Virginia Law Review, a distinguished federal judge maintains that true conservatives are required to substitute principles of judicial restraint for an inquiry into the original meaning of the Constitution. Accordingly, argues J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, the Supreme Court's Second Amendment decision in District of Columbia v. Heller is an activist decision just like Roe v. Wade: "[B]oth cases found judicially enforceable substantive rights only ambiguously rooted in the Constitution's text." In this response, we challenge his critique.Part I shows that Judge Wilkinson's analogy between Roe and Heller is untenable. The right of the people to keep and bear arms is in the Constitution, and the right to abortion is not. Contrary to Judge Wilkinson, the genuine conservative critique of Roe is based on the Constitution, not on judicial "values." Judge Wilkinson, moreover, does not show that Heller's interpretation of the Second Amendment is refuted, or even called into serious question, by Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. Part II shows that Judge Wilkinson himself does not adhere to the "neutral principle" that he claims to derive from "judicial values." Under the principle of judicial restraint that he articulates, many now-reviled statutes, including the Jim Crow laws of the twentieth century, should have been upheld by the courts. Judge Wilkinson does not accept the consequences of his own supposedly neutral principle, preferring instead to endorse or condemn Supreme Court decisions solely on the basis of his policy preferences. That is not judicial restraint. It is judicial lawlessness. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309714 Language: en
3 citations
TL;DR: This article was written in the immediate aftermath of the United States Supreme Court's 2012 term, which concluded with landmark decisions on voting rights and same-sex marriage.
Abstract: This article was written in the immediate aftermath of the United States Supreme Court's 2012 term, which concluded with landmark decisions on voting rights 1 and same-sex marriage. 2 In the former...
3 citations