Supreme Court Decisions

About: Supreme Court Decisions is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1804 publications have been published within this topic receiving 17066 citations.

Employer Drug Testing: Disparate Judicial and Legislative Responses

Abstract: In recent years, concerns about the increasing use of drugs has led many employers, both private and public, to use drug testing programs in an attempt to eliminate drug use in the workplace.(1) These testing programs raise numerous constitutional, employment law and statutory questions. This article will explore many of these questions. In the employment context, the use of drug tests has been considered in a number of situations including: drug testing of all prospective employees; drug testing of employees who exhibit some signs of drug use (reasonable suspicion testing); random drug testing of current employees or random drug testing of current employees in safety-sensitive positions; drug testing of employees who are involved in accidents; and drug testing as part of an annual physical examination.(2) When the employer is a government agency, the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure(3) must be considered. Additionally, states which have expansively interpreted the search and seizure protections in their own state constitutions(4) must consider the implications of those constitutional protections on employer-mandated drug testing. This Article will begin with an evaluation of drug testing by public employers and conclude with an evaluation of drug testing by private employers. I. PUBLIC EMPLOYER DRUG TESTING Public employers who wish to drug test their employees must deal with the ramifications of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment limits the right of government--federal, state and local--to engage in unreasonable searches and seizures.(5) The United States Supreme Court has held that drug testing constitutes a search for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis.(6) Therefore, whenever a government employer wishes to engage in a drug testing process, it must act consistently with the Fourth Amendment.(7) A. United States Supreme Court Decisions The United States Supreme Court has decided four cases dealing with suspicionless drug testing. Two of the cases deal directly with drug testing by employers,(8) a third deals with a situation similar to employer drug testing,(9) and a fourth deals with drug testing of students.(10) This fourth case, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton(11) permitted the testing of student athletes.(12) The third case was Chandler v. Miller,(13) in which the Court dealt with the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that required all candidates for public office to submit to a drug test.(14) The Court held that this statute was unconstitutional because a special need to engage in drug testing was not demonstrated.(15) It was this "special needs" approach that had been used by the Court in both Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n(16) and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab(17)--the two cases involving employer drug testing--to justify drug testing in the absence of any particularized suspicion.(18) According to black letter law, searches and seizures without a warrant and probable cause are presumptively invalid.(19) However, there are numerous exceptions to this general rule.(20) In 1989, in the companion cases Skinner and Von Raab, the Supreme Court recognized the "special needs" approach as another exception to the general rule necessitating warrants and particularized suspicion.(21) In Skinner, the Court focused on regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration requiring drug and alcohol testing of train crew members involved in an accident--even though no particularized suspicion is required that any of the crew members had been using drugs or alcohol.(22) The Court found that there were "special needs" involved that permitted the dispensation of the particularized suspicion requirement.(23) Justice Kennedy in his opinion reasoned that heavy regulation of the railroad industry reduced the employees' expectation of privacy.(24) Furthermore, protecting the safety of the traveling public permitted the testing. …

The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255(1)

Abstract: INTRODUCTION Originally enacted in 1948, 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255 created a remedy for federal prisoners seeking "to vacate, set aside or correct [a] sentence ...." (1) Section 2255 is "the principal postconviction remedy for federal convicts." (2) Congress "intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus." (3) Until 1996, motions filed under [section] 2255 were subject to no statute of limitations (4) and could be filed at any time. (5) The lack of a statue of limitations in [section] 2255 reflected the history of federal habeas corpus. (6) On April 24, 1996, the 104th Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). (7) The purpose of the AEDPA is "[t]o deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, [and] provide for an effective death penalty...." (8) Title I of the AEDPA, "Habeas Corpus Reform," provides for a one year statute of limitations in [section] 105. (9) This section thus amends 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255. Section 105 provides in pertinent part: "A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final...." (10) Soon after the passage of the AEDPA, several circuit courts of appeals had to decide when a judgment of conviction becomes "final" for purposes of the new limitation in the case of the prisoner who does not file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. (11) Specifically, the courts were asked to decide whether the statute of limitations for [section] 2255 motions begins to run when the court of appeals affirms the district court's conviction and sentence, or when the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expires. A minority of courts have held the former, (12) a majority the latter. (13) In arriving at their different outcomes, both sides of the argument relied heavily upon different constructions (14) of the relevant statutory language. (15) Among the factors the courts measured were the intent of the legislature when enacting the AEDPA, (16) the purpose of the AEDPA, (17) the dictionary definitions of "final" and "judgment of conviction," (18) and, to a much lesser extent, practical (19) and policy considerations. (20) As this Note will illustrate, however, careful analysis of the arguments on each side reveal that the textual, intrinsic arguments fail, leaving only extrinsic factors, policy considerations, and the historical purpose of the writ of habeas corpus to accurately guide courts to the correct conclusion. The conclusion of this Note is that both sides' methods of analysis were faulty and internally inconsistent, and that extrinsic, policy, and historical considerations prove that the conclusion of the Kapral court and the other courts in the majority is, in fact, the correct one. For the purposes of 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255(1), a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for filing a petition of certiorari expires, not when the court of appeals affirms the conviction and sentence of the defendant. Part I of this Note briefly sketches the history of habeas corpus, the purposes and historical context of the passage of [section] 2255 in 1948, and the purposes and context of the 1996 AEDPA amendments to [section] 2255. Part II analyzes the arguments behind the conclusions of both the majority and minority of courts, pointing out flaws and weaknesses on each side, focusing principally on the presumptions that each side makes. Part III discusses one of the most relevant and recent Supreme Court decisions, Duncan v. Walker. (21) The analysis of Duncan reveals that although a majority of the Court may be considered textualists, their own reasoning will lead them to conclude that a textualist approach is inappropriate in this case. …

Critics Say Rulings Give State U. License to Steal

Abstract: Recent Supreme Court decisions may have given states, including research universities, a leg up on the competition by making them immune from suits over patent infringement. Many lawmakers and biomedical executives are pushing Congress to pass legislation closing what they see as a potential multibillion-dollar loophole in the patent laws. But some academics and state officials say that Congress should wait to see if a problem develops before acting.

How Free Can Religion Be

Abstract: Randall P Bezanson's "How Free Can Religion Be?" explores the Supreme Court's varied history of interpreting the religious guarantees outlined in the First Amendment The book discusses eight provocative Supreme Court decisions to track the evolution of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause doctrine, focusing on the court's shift from strict separation of church and state to a position where the government accommodates and even fosters religion Understanding the First Amendment as a complex stew of untested political theory, fear of unlimited central government, universal acceptance of Christianity, uncertain ideas about liberty, and the backbone of a secular democracy, Bezanson evaluates the way that the Supreme Court has invoked historical perspectives to follow the shifting threads of judicial theory through a series of detailed case studies Beginning with cases in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the cases present new problems and revisit some old ones as well: the Mormon Church's claimed belief in polygamy; state support for religious schools; the teaching of evolution and creationism in public schools; Amish claims for exemption from compulsory education laws; comparable claims for Native American religion in relation to drug laws; and rights of free speech and equal access by religious groups in colleges and public schools Historical but not a work of history, "How Free Can Religion Be?" invites readers into a rewarding examination of the contested and ever-changing role and meaning of religion in America Rather than aiming at conclusions about whether the Court's varied enforcement of the First Amendment's ambiguously worded guarantees is right or wrong, Bezanson instead works to identify the principles underlying the changes Using transcripts of oral arguments before the Supreme Court accompanied by his own editorial narration, he engages the reader in a revealing Socratic discussion of the issues and encourages them to draw their own conclusions

The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley v. Valeo and Its Supreme Court Progeny

Abstract: This report first discusses the key holdings enunciated by the Supreme Court in Buckley, including those upholding reasonable contribution limits, striking down expenditure limits, upholding disclosure reporting requirements, and upholding the system of voluntary presidential election expenditure limitations linked with public financing. It then examines the Court's extension of Buckley in several subsequent cases, evaluating them in various regulatory contexts: contribution limits, expenditure limits, disclosure requirements, and political party soft money and electioneering communication restrictions.