Showing papers on "Supreme court published in 1973"

Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty

Abstract: The record of executions in the United States has long shown that black defendants are disproportionately subjected to this sanction. But racial differentials in the use of the death penalty may not alone reveal the existence of racial discrimination. The Supreme Court in the Furman decision ruled that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it is a "cruel and unusual" punishment. Some allusions to racial discrimination appeared in the opinions, but more evidence seems called for. Some earlier studies of racial differentials in sentencing are reviewed, followed by a summary of the research procedure and conclusions from an elaborate study of sentencing for rape in states where that offense has been a capital crime. Strong statistically significant differences in the proportions of blacks sentenced to death, compared to whites, when a variety of nonracial aggravating circumstances are considered, permit the conclusion that the sentencing differentials are the product of racial discrimination.

A Study of Poisson's Models for Jury Verdicts in Criminal and Civil Trials

Abstract: This article gives an exposition of models provided by Poisson to account for actual jury decisions in criminal and civil trials in France in the first half of the 19th century. The model parameters are jury size, juror error, and probability that the accused is guilty. Poisson's models are cast in a modern setting, and this provides a framework in which new investigations can be initiated. A recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on jury size for felony proceedings in state courts should provoke more analyses that can build on the basis provided.

Reactions of state supreme courts to a u.s. supreme court civil liberties decision

Abstract: decisions. Because of its direct relationship and administrative responsibilities, the Supreme Court can exercise a closer supervisory control over the lower federal courts than it can over state courts. But many controversial Supreme Court policies of the last couple of decades have involved issues coming from the state courts, e.g., obscenity prosecutions, right to counsel, desegregation, exclusion of illegally seized evidence, police interrogation practices, etc. Considering the origin and structure of our federal system, a natural antagonism exists between the Supreme Court and state courts- particularly the states' highest appellate courts. While this was perhaps most dramatically illustrated in the early classic struggles between John Marshall and Spencer Roane, the mistrust and resistance is ever-present. It attained unusual visibility in 1958 when the Council of State Chief Justices in a 36-8 vote adopted a resolution criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court Justices for promoting "an accelerating trend towards increasing power of the national government and correspondingly contracted power of the state governments" and charging that judicial federalism was endangered by "the extent of the control over the action of the states which the

Regression Analysis and Discriminant Analysis: An Application of R. A. Fisher's Theorem to Data in Political Science

Abstract: The conversion of multiple regression analysis to discriminant analysis is not only of theoretical interest, but—in view of the extensive use of these methods in political science—it also has considerable value for applications. It is the purpose of this presentation to explain the underlying theoretical relationship and to demonstrate its application in the form of an example chosen from the judicial process. Specifically, the Supreme Court's acceptance or rejection of the fact that the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel in an involuntary confession case is considered as a function of the appearance, nonappearance, or denial of the fact in lower court records and appellate briefs. Since the acceptance or rejection of the fact by the Supreme Court is a dichotomous dependent variable, discriminant analysis is appropriate. It is shown in this study how discriminant analysis can be employed by initially using regression analysis, not only in the example presented for illustration, but in any situation in which a phenomenon with dichotomous manifestations may be examined as a function of specified variables.

Was There a Compromise of 1877

Abstract: THERE was a time, not too long ago, when the disputed election of 1876 could be treated as a relatively uncomplicated story. The Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden, had won the popular vote and undisputed title to 184 electoral votes, only one short of victory. The campaign managers of Rutherford B. Hayes claimed victory for their side on the basis of disputed returns from the three southern states still under Republican control-Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina. The ensuing deadlock proved unresolvable by traditional means, and, in "one of the wisest pieces of statecraft ever evolved by an American Congress,", an extraordinary electoral commission was created, composed of members of the Senate, House, and Supreme Court. The decision of this commission in favor of Hayes, by a strictly partisan eight to seven vote, so angered Democrats that many of them openly threatened revolution, while others in the House of Representatives began a filibuster to prevent Hayes' inauguration. Fortunately for the nation, reasonable men in both parties struck a bargain at Wormley's Hotel. There, in the traditional smoke-filled room, emissaries of Hayes agreed to abandon the Republican state governments in Louisiana and South Carolina while southern Democrats agreed to abandon the filibuster and thus trade off the presidency in exchange for the end of Reconstruction. This familiar account was challenged in 1951 with the publication of C. Vann Woodward's Reunion and Reaction. The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction.2 Generally well received by reviewers in the major historical journals,3 Woodward's new interpretation soon won "almost universal accep-

Constitutionalism and the Supreme Court in a Changing Philippine Polity

Abstract: On September 22, 1972, martial law was proclaimed in the Philippines. Among the immediate steps taken by the government were the general shutdown of the mass media, the temporary closing of all schools and universities, the banning of the possession or sale of private firearms, the placing of certain public utilities under government control, the mass arrest of persons regarded to be engaged in anti-government activities, and the imposition of a 12:00 midnight to 4:00 a.m. curfew. In a speech delivered on nation-wide radio and television one day after martial law was proclaimed, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos said: "The proclamation of martial law is not a military takeover. I, as your duly-elected President of the Republic, use this power implemented by military authorities to protect the Republic of the Philippines and our democracy."' He went on to state that "the judiciary shall continue to function in accordance with its present organization and personnel," subject to certain limitations. Four months later, addressing the Consultative Council at Malacanang after he announced the ratification of the new Constitution, the President pledged that the government would be based on constitutionality and reiterated that he had declared martial law legitimately on the basis of the old Constitution. "I have not grabbed power," the President said at a news conference. He described the new government as one of "constitutional authoritarianism," and added that the broad powers he wields are subject to "checks and balance" by the country's Supreme Court.2 These and similar statements by high Philippine officials collectively paint the image which the government wishes to portray to observers at home and abroad, which is that despite the realities of martial law, constitutional procedures have not been abrogated and that the judiciary is alive and well. It therefore becomes worthwhile to inquire into current constitutional developments in the Philippines and, within a limited context, assess the nature of the interaction between the President and the Supreme Court under martial law conditions.

Confidentiality of Social Science Research Sources and Data: The Popkin Case

Abstract: On November 21, 1972 Samuel Lewis Popkin, an assistant professor of government at Harvard University, was imprisoned in the federal section of the Norfolk County jail in Dedham, Massachusetts, under a contempt order of the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts. He was imprisoned for contempt of court for refusal to answer several questions before a federal grand jury investigating the publication of the Pentagon Papers. In the course of the grand jury proceedings Popkin asserted a right under the First Amendment to refuse to answer questions concerning the identity of confidential sources and the content of his opinions and data developed in the course of research on and in Vietnam. He refused to answer the questions on the grounds that they violated his rights to freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly under the First Amendment in the absence of a showing by the government that the information sought was relevant and necessary to the government's investigation.On November 28, 1972, the grand jury was discharged at the government's request and Popkin was released from jail.In early January, 1973, Popkin filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to review the case. The petition was denied by the Court in April, 1973.The Popkin case is the first on record in American law in which the question of a scholar's right to the confidentiality of his sources and data has been raised and decided, at least in part, on the merits.

Southern School Desegregation, 1954-1973: A Judicial-Political Overview

Abstract: Following the Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955, the Supreme Court refrained from ordering immediate dismantlement of the dual school system, leaving formulation of specific orders with regard to school desegregation in the hands of district courts. Obstruction and delay resulted, with massive southern resistance and a weak federal response. It was not until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when federal desegregation standards were adopted, that substantial desegregation could begin. Soon both the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the federal courts took a unified stand behind the law, attacking "free choice" and southern delay. Progress finally seemed at hand. However, under the Nixon administration, federal enforcement efforts have been undercut. Major responsibility for enforcing school desegregation has been shifted from HEW to the slower judicial efforts of the Justice Department. Negative executive leadership has set a tone of national retreat. The current issue of busing and n...

Pornography: The Emergence of a Social Issue and the Beginning of Psychological Study

Abstract: Pornography has not always been a social issue. Indeed societal concern about it has waxed and waned several times in the past 200 years, and this concern seems to have been a function of accessibility, religious influences, and social manners. The emergence of pornography as a current social issue is associated with a series of Supreme Court cases beginning in the late 1950s, posing the question as to whether or not legal prohibition of obscenity violates the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The ensuing discussion was based primarily on fear and speculation because there were few empirical facts to inform the discussion. In 1967 Congress declared that obscenity and pornography were matters of national concern, raised questions about the effects of these materials, called for a thorough study, and authorized the use of funds for the collection of relevant scientific data. Thus the beginning of extensive “scientific” analysis of the social issue of pornography.

Induced abortion: source of guilt or growth?

Abstract: With the Supreme Court recognition of abortion as a matter between a woman and her physician, the commitment of the medical profession to the highest standards of total patient care requires greater consideration of the psychological component in the abortion experience than has heretofore been provided. This paper suggests providing social work service—individual, family, or group—in all obstetric-gynecologic facilities.

An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion

Abstract: \"[\"]f the deliberate extinguishment of human life has any effect at all, it more likely tends to lower our respect for life and brutalize our values.\"' \"New York courts have already acknowledged that, in the contemporary medical view, the child begins a separate life from the moment of conception.\" 2

Supreme Court Justices as Strict and Not-so-Strict Constructionists: Some Implications

Abstract: In making his televised announcement on the nominations of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist for seats on the Supreme Court, Richard Nixon observed that he was merely fulfilling a campaign promise. For, he said: ". .. during my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to nominate to the Supreme Court individuals who shared my judicial philosophy which is basically a conservative philosophy. ... As a judicial conservative, I believe some Court decisions have gone too far in the past in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in our society"' (New York Times, 1971: 24C). In 1968, Mr. Nixon said: "We need more strict constructionists on the highest court of the United States. In my view, the duty of a Justice of the Supreme Court is to interpret the law, not to make the law, and the men I support will share that view" (U.S. News & World Report, 1968: 42). These two statements are, to some extent, in conflict-at least by implication. Nixon's emphasis on the strict constructionist who avoids law-making is clearly, however, contingent on the assumption that a strict constructioiiist will take a less "friendly" stance toward those accused of crime than was evidenced by the Justices of the Warren Court. His approach to each of his Supreme Court nominations suggests a belief that judges make policy and that the way to change policy is to change judges. Justices Burger and Blackmun have now been on the Court sufficiently long to provide a preliminary test of Mr. Nixon's ability to choose the appropriate "policy changer." In 37 criminal law cases in which Burger participated in the 1969-70 term, he took a position favorable to government in 26 or 70.1%. In 38 such cases in the 1970-71 term, Burger was favorable to government in 31 or 81.6%. In the same term, Harry Blackmun favored government over the individual in 30 of 38 cases, a rate of 78.9%. And Burger and Blackmun were in agreement in 37 of these 38 cases.' Earl Warren was able to find for government in only 19% of the criminal law cases

The Prosecutor and the Researcher: Present and Prospective Variations on the Supreme Court's Branzburg Decision

Abstract: rently rare and probably will continue to be infrequent. But the occurrence of only a few cases of the violation of researcher-subject confidentiality can seriously jeopardize the trust which underlies that relationship. Like the infrequent skyjack or terrorist bombing, the effect of these violations is not limited to the persons involved. The violations undermine and change the expectations of several groups of people. They undermine the confidence necessary for respondents to freely volunteer information to researchers. They encourage prosecutors and others to use researchers in their efforts to obtain all available information for their investi-

A Historical Perspective on Selective Conscientious Objection

Abstract: tion (SCO) has been addressed by a National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, by the Supreme Court, and by numerous legal scholars, political philosophers, and religious ethicists. For the most part, the contemporary debate concerning SCO has been carried on without explicit reference to discussions of SCO by the classic just-war theorists.' The few documents which cite the just-war tradition have arrived at apparently contradictory conclusions.

Social Policy, Power, and Social Science Research

Abstract: In its historic decision of May 17, 1954 (Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka), the United States Supreme Court ruled that state laws which required or permitted racial segregation in public education violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. In concluding that "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," the Court cited the work of social scientists in its pioneering and controversial footnote eleven. This citation demonstrated dramatically that the theories and research findings of social scientists could influence public policy decisions on educational and other social problems. The use of social science research in the making of such important policy decisions raised the question among social scientists of the propriety of their involvement or the validity of their contribution to the decisions.

Criminal law : cases and materials

Abstract: Selected cases and materials are likely to evoke the interest of students. The book contains factual situations that are likely to spark emotional responses--and students must then filter through the requirements of the law and its underlying rationales. Authors have given preference to recent cases and have taken account of the development of new crimes such as identity theft, carjacking, and home invasion. The new edition includes relevant significant discussions of substantive criminal law issues by the U.S. Supreme Court. Selected material reflects the criminal law's impact on women, as reflected in the """"battered person"""" aspect of self-defense and contents of the crime of rape or sexual assault.