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Supreme court

About: Supreme court is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 41858 publications have been published within this topic receiving 306787 citations. The topic is also known as: court of last resort & highest court of appeal.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: If the Court today were to decide Jacobson once again, the analysis would likely differ--to account for developments in constitutional law--but the outcome would certainly reaffirm the basic power of government to safeguard the public's health.
Abstract: A century ago, the US Supreme Court in Jacobson v Massachusetts upheld the exercise of the police power to protect the public's health. Despite intervening scientific and legal advances, public health practitioners still struggle with Jacobson's basic tension between individual liberty and the common good. In affirming Massachusetts' compulsory vaccination law, the Court established a floor of constitutional protections that consists of 4 standards: necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance. Under Jacobson, the courts are to support public health matters insofar as these standards are respected. If the Court today were to decide Jacobson once again, the analysis would likely differ--to account for developments in constitutional law--but the outcome would certainly reaffirm the basic power of government to safeguard the public's health.

59 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Tom S. Clark1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the ideological direction of panel decisions should influence the probability of en banc rehearing only in conjunction with the panel's ideological predisposition, and they build upon existing theories of en-banc review by incorporating the multiple levels of the judicial hierarchy into the context in which the circuit decides to hear a case en- banc.
Abstract: This paper adds to the existing literature on en banc rehearings in two ways. First, I incorporate theoretical results from the literature on Supreme Court certiorari decisions and argue that the ideological direction of panel decisions should influence the probability of en banc rehearing only in conjunction with the panel’s ideological predisposition. Second, I build upon existing theories of en banc review by incorporating the multiple levels of the judicial hierarchy into the context in which the circuit decides to hear a case en banc. From these insights, I develop and test three hypotheses about the determinants of en banc review. Specifically, I contend that the ideological relationship between a threejudge panel, the full circuit, and the Supreme Court should all interact with the ideological orientation of the panel’s decision when the circuit decides whether ornot toreview thepanel en banc.Original data including allen bancrehearings between 1986 and 1996 are then used to test the theoretical predictions. The empirical analysis provides considerable support for the hypotheses. The findings represent two important advances in the study of the judicial hierarchy: They highlight the strategic interaction between ideological disposition and panel composition in the en banc review process and demonstrate the incentives created by the multiple levels of the federal judiciary. More broadly, the theory and findings developed here have implications for strategic auditing in a political hierarchy. (JEL K40, D72)

59 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of congressional preferences on the certiorari decision were modeled and found strong evidence that the Court's constitutional agenda is systematically influenced by Congress, and the Court is significantly less likely to contain cases wherein there are large congressionally induced deviations between what the Court would like to do, and what it can do in its final rulings.
Abstract: Existing studies of congressional influence on Supreme Court decision making have largely failed to recognize the fact that the Court has a discretionary docket. We model the effects of congressional preferences on the certiorari decision and find strong evidence that the Court’s constitutional agenda is systematically influenced by Congress. The Court’s docket is significantly less likely to contain cases wherein there are large congressionally induced deviations between whattheCourtwould like to do, and what it can do in its final rulings. This selection bias in the Court’s docket can lead to considerable uncertainty in estimating the effects of congressional constraint on the Court’s final decisions, including a failure to properly reject the null hypothesis of no constraint.

59 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, the authors argues that the willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada to defer to reasonable legislative sequels will be the key to success, and proposes a new theory of dialogue that is more realistic and more in line with existing SCC practice.
Abstract: For those concerned about the democratic legitimacy of Charter review by Canadian courts, the idea of dialogue offers a promising midway path between the extremes of judicial and legislative supremacy. Current dialogue theory, however, largely fails to live up to this promise of compromise. Instead of distinguishing democratic worries associated with US style, strong-form judicial review, it largely endorses the legitimacy of such review. For dialogue to live up to its original promise, a new theory that more clearly distinguishes Canada from the United States is required. In this article, which offers a new theory of dialogue, the willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada to defer to reasonable legislative sequels will be the key to success. As a result, section 33 of the Charter will play a valuable but largely background role in promoting dialogue. The advantage of this approach, compared to rival approaches that would weaken judicial review, is that it is more realistic and more in line with existing SCC practice. Moreover, it is normatively desirable when judged from the perspective of the courts’ capacity to counter blockages in the legislative process that might otherwise impair the enjoyment of Charter rights.

59 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored the struggle for judicial power in Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf focusing on two questions: how pro-Musharraf regime judges expanded judicial power, leading to a confrontation with the regime, and how the bar and the bench mobilized in the struggle to defend judicial power.
Abstract: This article explores the struggle for judicial power in Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf focusing on two questions. First, how did pro‐Musharraf regime judges expand judicial power, leading to a confrontation with the regime? Second, how did the bar and the bench mobilize in the struggle for judicial power? The author shows how, instead of blindly supporting economic liberalization in a period of economic growth, the Supreme Court expanded power by scrutinizing questionable urban development, privatization, and deregulation measures in a virtuous cycle of public interest litigation. The author also describes how a politics of reciprocity explains the social mobilization of lawyers as the bench protected the bar from regime penetration, and the bar protected the bench from regime backlash. The Pakistani case questions some of our assumptions about economic liberalization and courts in authoritarian regimes, and the study invites scholars to explore the role of courts in developing judicial support structures and the role of lawyers in social movements.

59 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20231,077
20222,410
2021599
20201,063
20191,149
20181,225