Supreme court

About: Supreme court is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 41858 publications have been published within this topic receiving 306787 citations. The topic is also known as: court of last resort & highest court of appeal.

Human Rights and the South African Legal Order

Abstract: As an Advocate of the Supreme Court, John Dugard observes the South African legal order daily in operation. In this book he provides a thorough description and probing analysis of the workings of the system. He places South Africa's legal order in a comparative context, examining the climate of legal opinion, crucial judicial decisions, and their significance in relation to contemporary thought and practice in England, America, and elsewhere. He also considers South Africa's laws in the light of its history, politics, and culture. Originally published in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: For four decades scholars have sought to explain the rise of dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court. While the specific explanations they offer vary, virtually all rest on a common story: during the nineteenth (and into the twentieth) century, the Supreme Court followed a norm of consensus. That is, the justices may have privately disagreed over the outcomes of cases but masked their disagreement from the public by producing consensual opinions. The problem with this story is that its underlying assumption lacks an empirical basis. Simply put, there is no systematic evidence to show that a norm of consensus ever existed on the Court. We attempt to provide such evidence by turning to the docket books of Chief Justice Waite (1874-1888) and making the following argument: if a norm of consensus induced unanimity on Courts of by-gone eras, then the norm may have manifested itself through public unanimity in the face of private conference disagreements. Our investigation, which provides systematic support for this argument and thus for the existence of a norm of consensus, raises important questions about publicly unified decision-making bodies, be they courts or other political organizations. ver the course of four decades, scholars have produced mounds of paper providing explanations for the cause of the dramatic phenomenon depicted in Figure 1: the rise of dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., Caldeira and Zorn 1998; Halpern and Vines 1977; Mason 1956; Murphy 1964; Pritchett 1948; Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988).1 Certainly the specific reasons they offer vary (compare Goldman 1982 and Haynie 1992), but the underlying story contemporary scholars tell does not. During most of the nineteenth (and into the twentieth) century dissent rates remained low, so the story goes, because Supreme Court justices followed a norm of consensus, reflecting their belief that unanimity would "greatly strengthen the authority" of the Court and its rulings (Rehnquist 1996, 58; see also Beveridge 1919; Goebel 1971). That is, the justices may have privately disagreed over the outcomes of cases but they masked their disagreements from the public by producing consensual

The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective

Abstract: We believe that at a deeper level the independent judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government. Part I of this paper explains our theory of the independent judiciary. Part II discusses several implications of the theory, relating to administrative regulation, the form of interest-group legislation, the tenure of judges, and constitutional adjudication. The appendix to this paper presents an empirical analysis of judicial independence using data on Acts of Congress that have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: @fmct:Contents @toc4:List of Figures and Tables Preface Acknowledgments @toc1:Part I: Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:1 Introduction @toc3:Plan of the Book @toc2:2 Seven Distinctions in the Literature @toc3:Distinction #1: A Psychological Metaphor vs A Rational-Choice Metaphor Distinction #2: Theories of Attitude Activation vs Theories of Rational Choice Distinction #3: Theories of Choice vs Theories of Measurement Distinction #4: Explaining Final Votes vs Explaining What Final Opinion Is Adopted Distinction #5: Explaining Just the Final Vote vs Explaining All Five Stages of Decision-Making Distinction #6: Theories of "Sincere" Rational Choice vs Theories of "Strategic" Rational Choice Distinction #7: A "Status-Quo" Policy vs No "Status-Quo" Policy Conclusion @toc2:3 Assessing Previous Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc3:The Pioneers: Pritchett, Schubert, and Murphy Schubert's Attitude-Activation Model The Attitudinal Model Conceptual Problems with the Attitudinal Model Other Issues Involving the Attitudinal Model The Literature on Strategically-Rational Justices Conclusion @toc1:Part II: A Formal Model of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:4 Why Formal Models? @toc3:The Role of Theories and Models in Empirical Research Some Potential Benefits from Formal Modeling Potential Costs and Other Criticisms of Formal Modeling How Can We Be Sure That the Potential Benefits Exceed the Potential Costs? Conclusion @toc2:5 Definitions and Assumptions @toc3:Lines, Points, and Utility Functions The Status Quo Policy Preferred-To Sets and Win-Sets The Number of Justices An Informational Assumption "Sincere" and "Strategic" Behavior The Independence of Cases Joining, Concurring, and Dissenting Costless Opinion Writing Conclusion @toc2:6 Coalition Formation and the Final Vote @toc3:When Can the Status Quo Policy Be Upset? What Are the Constraints on the Set of Policies Which Could Be Adopted? What Policies Do Different Majority Coalitions Prefer to SQ? How Do Justices Behave When They Dislike the Majority Opinion? The Agenda-Control Version The Open-Bidding Version The Median-Holdout Version Comparison of the Agenda-Control, Open-Bidding, and Median-Holdout Versions Is Agenda-Control Behavior Unstable? Summary of Major Results @toc2:7 Opinion Assignment @toc3:Self-Assignment As An Opinion-Assignment Strategy Alternative Opinion-Assignment Strategies Opinion Assignment by a Justice Outside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Justice Inside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Minority-Side Justice Would An Opinion Assigner Prefer Larger Coalitions? How Much Does Opinion Assignment Matter? Summary of Major Results @toc2:8 The Conference Vote @toc3:Different Kinds of Strategic Behavior from Different Kinds of Justices Strategic Behavior by the Chief Justice Strategic Behavior by an Associate Justice Who Could Become the Opinion Assigner Strategic Behavior by a Low-Seniority Justice Who Cannot Become the Opinion Assigner What If Everyone Behaves Strategically? When Does the Chief Justice Self-Assign? Will the Chief Justice Trust What Other Justices Say on the Conference Vote? Summary of Major Results @toc2:9 Certiorari @toc3:Sincere Behavior on Certiorari Decisions Strategic Behavior on Certiorari Decisions "Aggressive Granting" and "Defensive Denial" When Justices Are Strategic Summary of Major Results @toc1:Part III: Future Directions for Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:10 Empirical Implications @toc3:Understanding the Five Stages of Supreme Court Decision-Making "Non-Strategic" or "Sincere" Behavior on the Supreme Court "Vote Switching" between the Original and Final Votes Problems of Empirical Measurement Conclusion @toc2:11 Future Research @toc3:Do the Justices Have Perfect Information about Each Other's Preferences? Do the Justices Always Have Clear and Fixed Preferences? Are Supreme Court Cases Independent from Each Other? Regular and Special Concurrences How Many Issue Dimensions Are There? Costly Opinion-Writing Extensions of the Model Exogenous Preferences and the Impact of "The Law" Broader Applications Conclusion @toc4:Notes References Index

Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts

Abstract: Justice Powell remarked twenty years ago that '[u]ntil international tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of the various countries afford the best means for the development of a respected body of international law.' Few would challenge this statement which underlines the promise of world-wide development and enforcement of international law by national courts. But can national courts really live up to this challenge? Apparently, there are weighty factors that inhibit national courts from the rigorous application and enforcement of international law. This is particularly the case when the application of international norms is sought in an attempt to constrain the activities of the national court's executive. The somewhat idyllic statement of Justice Powell is the starting point for this article. Sharing his aspiration, this article endeavours to explore its limitations. Only by understanding the factors that hinder national courts from becoming the enforcement agencies of international law will it be possible to assess the real potential of national courts in the international arena and the means to realize i t The first part of the article is an inquiry into die practice of national courts with respect to the application of international law. This comparative analysis demonstrates the existence of 'a similar pattern of behaviour in most jurisdictions. It provides the background for assessing the reasons that prompt most national courts to adopt an apprehensive approach towards international norms, and die circumstances in which such an approach could be revised. In light of this general study, the second part of die article examines more closely the jurisprudence of die Israeli Supreme Court in this context The claim I shall make in the second part is that die continuation of die