Showing papers on "Surprise published in 1976"

Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War

Abstract: The principal question which this article seeks to answer is: Why was the intention of the Arabs to launch the Yom Kippur War misperceived despite the fact that Israeli Intelligence had ample and accurate information on enemy moves and dispositions? In this anatomy of the Israeli intelligence failure, extensive use is made of the report of the official commission of inquiry that investigated the events leading up to the war. The article is equally concerned with the phenomenon of strategic surprise in general, and this case study is used to explore the psychological and organizational roots of intelligence failures. Some safeguards and institutional reforms for reducing the frequency of failure are examined. However, there is no suggestion that surprise can ever be eliminated altogether. In conclusion a case is made for developing a theory of intelligence through case studies and systematic research.

Boundaries of Narrative

Abstract: WITHIN THE SPHERE OF LITERATURE, narrative' may be defined simply as the representation of a real or fictitious event or series of events by language, and more specifically by written language. This common formal definition has the merit of being obvious and simple. Perhaps its principal drawback is precisely that it encloses itself and us within the evidence. This definition masks that which in the very being of narrative creates problems and difficulties by somehow effacing the boundaries of the narrative's practice, the conditions of its existence. To define narrative formally is to accept, perhaps dangerously, the idea or the feeling that the origins of narrative are self-evident, that nothing is more natural than to tell a story or to arrange a group of actions into a myth, a short story, an epic, a novel. However, the evolution of literature and of literary consciousness in the last half century will have had, among other fortunate developments, that of drawing our attention to the singular, artificial, and problematic aspect of the narrative act. We must once again recall the shock of Valery on considering a statement like "The marquise went out at 5 o'clock." We realize the extent to which modern literature, in diverse and at times contradictory forms, has lived and illustrated this fertile surprise, how it has willed itself and how, in its very meaning, it has made itself an interrogation, a shock, a contestation of the narrative term. The falsely naive question--"Why narrative?"-should at least be able to incite us to seek or more simply to recognize the negative limits of narrative, to consider the principal plays of oppositions through which narrative defines and constitutes itself in the face of various nonnarrative forms.

Development and Distribution

Abstract: Surprise that the poor are still poor after two decades of rapid growth has become a constant refrain, but development theorists have always maintained that growth is an inegalitarian process. This was so in the classical models of Smith, Ricardo and Marx. Theorists since the Second World War approached the subject differently, via the behaviour of different sectors of the economy, but reached the same conclusion. If anything surprises, it must be the surprise.

Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks

Abstract: As a step toward further conceptualization and differentiation of the problem of surprise attacks, this article suggests a new framework for analyzing the assumptions of decision makers. Two main categories are distinguished: (i) strategic assumptions of possibilities—the explicit and implicit assumptions held by an “observing state” about the conditions and circumstances under which the “observed state” would strike; (2) tactical assumptions of actualities—assumptions that have become realities in the eyes of the observing state, or that are on the verge of realization. Five cases of failures in intelligence estimates are discussed: (1) the Barbarossa Operation; (2) the attack on Pearl Harbor; (3) the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; (4) the Sino-Indian Border War of October 1962; (5) the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.The analysis indicates that in each case, when discrepancies existed between tactical assumptions of actualities and strategic assumptions of possibilities, the latter prevailed without reassessment of the situation.

Looking Smart: The Relationship between Affect and Intelligence in Infancy

Abstract: Without being wholly conscious of it, parents, pediatricians, and particularly psychologists have used facial expression to infer the existence and development of intelligence. We use facial expression or “affect” to denote consciousness, interest, surprise, intention, fear, or frustration; then we use these states of emotions to determine motivation, knowledge, and ability. This may surprise some readers, since we claim to be looking at behavior to determine motivation, knowledge, and ability. By behavior we usually mean actions accomplished—“grasped the block,” “looked under the pillow,” “turned away.” Awareness of these actions accomplished seems to block awareness of the affect accompanying, preceding, substituting for, or following the action, even though we use affect to interpret the action.

Towards Linguistic Competence

Abstract: The dominant trend in modern linguistics has developed through attention to a single function of lang & on the basis of an abstracted, homogeneous form, cut off from concrete existence. It is in need of the kind of critique that Marx directed at Feuerbach: it must be shown that it refuses to see the constitutive role of social relationships. Although many linguists are radical, or at least liberal, in their social views, their scientific commitments make impossible an integration of the knowledge of lang with the knowledge of social life. Linguistic theory celebrates the equality in principle of all forms of lang while dismissing as superficial the inequalities due to cultural traditions & social relations between actual langs & users of lang. It should be no surprise that the 'speaker-hearer' imagined in the dominant theory resembles the worker free to sell his or her labor, or the consumer free to select according to his or her wants, of another branch of liberal science. Even a linguistic theory that claims to deal with 'pragmatics', 'conversation', & the like, projects as universal foundations of communication principles that express an American Mc conversation between friendly equals. Remedies for this situation are outlined. Modified HA.

The genesis of a mediaeval historian: Pierre Duhem and the origins of statics

Abstract: Contrary to what might be expected given a religious or other motivation, Pierre Duhem's interest in mediaeval science was the result of his surprise encounter with Jordanus de Nemore while working...

Systems analysis perspectives

Abstract: It is widely recognized that the systems analyst's task is a formidable one. To perform his duties, the systems analyst must rely upon a broad array of disciplines. In particular, he must be familiar with the intricacies of two diverse worlds: that of the organization and that of the computer. Aside from the obvious size and complexity of these concerns, the contrast between these two ends of the spectrum is most striking. On one hand, the organization is qualitative and unstructured. On the other hand, the computer is technical and rigid. Therefore, it is no surprise to anyone that we have had difficulty with the application of computing technology to the information systems of organizations.

Models and Social Reality: An Alternative to Caws

Abstract: Recently in these pages (AA 76:1-10, 1974) Peter Caws claimed that the objective social structure of the societies we study is dependent, in part, upon our own theories or models of them. "It is the scientist's representational (i.e., explanatory) model, the theory he constructs to account for the data and their interrelation, that confers objective structure on the system. And the use of 'confers' is deliberate, since it would be quite accurate to say that until the explanatory model was constructed the system had no objective structure" (p. 7). This might come as something of a surprise to anthropologists. Most of us have probably not considered it part of our job to confer objective structure on the societies we study by theorizing about them, much as children in Peter Pan keep fairies in existence by believing in them. The more common view is that objective social structure is something a society has (perhaps not at the empirical level) before we get there-and is, indeed, one of the main things we go to learn about. It is not something the society receives from us. I want to argue, against Caws, for the more common view. At the same time, I want to acknowledge his contribution in constructing a compelling argument that challenges us to think carefully about some of the fundamental issues in anthropology: the nature of the phenomena we study and the nature of our knowledge of them. Before proceeding with my critique, let me summarize Caws' argument as I understand it. The relations studied by social science are mind-dependent. That is, while natural relations such as between the moon and the tides exist and operate whether men know about them or not, social or cultural relations can be nothing other than what they are construed by men to be. There is no universal intrinsic social relationship between father and son; proper behavior between them is just what it is defined in one or another kinship system to be. Often such definitions can be attributed to the natives: in their explanation and conceptualization of the system (Caws calls these representational models) and/or in their conscious or unconscious motivation for acting (operational models). Occasionally, however, anthropologists say things about social systems that cannot be attributed to native

Cognitive Decisions under Partial Information

Abstract: Since Shannon’s original work about information theory the notion of information and later on the notions of information content, semantic information, information value etc. have run through many definitions. Carnap (1966), Hintikka (1970), and others defined semantic information in a way (tracing back to Laplace (1812)) which virtually states that the more probable (or less surprising) an information is, the less valuable it is. This view is closely connected with Popper’s (1959) work, in which less probable hypotheses are considered more valuable, more informative, and more easily accessible to falsification. The ‘Surprise Thesis’ of information theory was questioned mainly by Levi (1969), Menges (1972), and Marschak (1974). The latter, in particular, emphasized the importance of the distinction between prior and posterior probabilities.

The physiological idiom in the poetry of supervielle

Abstract: Such utterances of wonderment can, in their purest poetic manifestations' prompt the reader to admit that he didn't really comprehend these everyday truths after all. One piece of common knowledge of which Supervielle continually reminds his readers is this: people have bodies, with beating hearts inside. From his surprise at this fact arises an important vein of his poetry-poems in which he tries to feel, to seize, to dream the body, to imagine what it is like inside. A short example is 'Hopital':

Teaching Management Research through Computer Simulation

Abstract: The past decade serves as witness to the number of changes that have taken place in management education: management principles have given way to contingency management; the lecture is increasingly accompanied by cases, experiential exercises, and field experiences; and memorization has given way to situational thinking. Changes of this nature should come as no surprise as the field has increasingly borrowed from and incorporated behavioral science findings. In fact, it is the nature of the behavioral sciences that has given rise to this turnabout in management education. Management students are increasingly aware of the value of quantification, the use of scientific inquiry and the need for objectivity in management decision making. They are also coming to know that the practice of management, as a profession, requires an understanding of the complex interactions between variables. For example, when is pay a motivator? Does the nature of the work environment affect a given pay program? How many relevant variables should be considered when making decisions about the motivational aspects of pay?

A disorder of habit.

Abstract: A few years ago when I was assistant director of the Psychiatric Division of a large eastern university health service, I attempted to treat a young woman with a curious disorder of habit I have since presented her case to a number of psychiatric audiences from whom it has inevitably prompted an enthusiastic response and lively discussion So far, none of my colleagues or any other sources that I shall subsequently quote have been able to produce a comparable case or any definitive analysis of the findings With appropriate regard for customary scientific style, I shall present the history in a narrative fashion for greater effect I am certain that my title and the current interest in behavior modification have prepared the reader to understand the material I intend to present I hope I shall be able to communicate the surprise I experienced in dealing with this young woman The reader's surprise will be generated by a different content but a similar mechanism

Why Educational Research is of Limited Use to the Community.

Abstract: It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the subject, that the history of research in education is replete with dismal instances of irrelevance and confusion. A casual study of a journal series over an extended period of time frequently reveals that much (some would say "most") of the research that is done is ill-conceived, methodologically unsound, and of little consequence for the urgent business of improving the educative process. Especially appalling is the extent to which some investigations are intentionally esoteric and far removed from the mundane reality of educating real people for the pursuit of a quasi-adequate existence in the real world. It is the thesis of this paper that educational research is in drastic need of a new and different perspective. At least a portion of this need may be attributed to the fact that the research endeavor, except in rare instances, has become so damnably expensive. The cost of doing a first-class experimental study is at times far in excess of any discernable benefits which might result from the conclusions. Still another influential factor is the recent demand for accountability in all facets of education receiving public support. A shocking revelation was recently offered by Boffey (1975) to the effect that approximately 50 per cent of scientific data is unusable because it is either wrong or so meagerly supported that readers cannot judge its reliability. While the article was primarily concerned with research in the natural sciences, it is probable that the phenomenon is accentuated in education due to the greater constraints placed on adequate controls. Additionally, a sense of optimism prompts those who do not engage in educational research to hope that what researchers do will ultimately shed some light on the treacherous footpath to improved teaching and learning. Needless to say, the very nature of the problems selected for study at times reveals that this concern is not generally shared by those persons actively engaged in the

The Misleading Mediation of the Mental

Abstract: At first when I was asked to make one unified response to the two papers you have just heard, I could see no common theme at all between a discussion of the philosophical problems concerning brain representations and their relation to the external world, on the one hand, and the philosophical problem of the identity of split brain patients on the other. In fact, there seemed to be no problem at all, let alone a common one. After all, we all have brains which are affected by energy in the physical universe, and we deal with things in the everyday world, but these levels of description seem so unrelated as to leave no space for a problem. In the same way, the brain and the person are so different it should be no surprise that a patient whose brain hemispheres have been surgically severed can function in the everyday world like a normal integrated person. Why should anyone suppose that brain representations cut a person off from the world, or that separate brain functions going on in one head cut a person off from himself?

A Georgian Menshevik

Abstract: In November 1900 there appeared in the Georgian periodical Kvali a poem entitled A Fearless Knight, in which the nineteen-year-old poet Irakli Tsereteli described an encounter between a young knight and a disillusioned old man. The old man had abandoned all hope that the younger generation would find the strength and courage to fight for the cause for which so many warriors had sacrificed their lives in the past. The youth vowed, however, to dispel this pessimism. When the old man looked up in surprise, he tapped himself on the chest and said ‘Look! You see before you the man whose arm will not weaken in the just cause and who would die sooner than retire broken-spirited from the lists. Wish him victory in the battle!’ For the rest of his life Tsereteli evidently identified to a certain extend with the young man in this early poem. Much later, when he translated the poem into Russian, he said that he was still so moved by the mood of the poem that he was only able to reproduced it by a literal translation.1