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Showing papers on "Surprise published in 1981"



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article found that the Oxford English Dictionary is still unaware of "development" as a technical term in economics, as contrasted with its use in mathematics, biology, music, or photography.
Abstract: So commonplace has the concept of "economic development" become to this generation that it comes as a surprise to find the Oxford English Dictionary still unaware of "development" as a technical term in economics, as contrasted with its use in mathematics, biology, music, or photography. Nor, incidentally, is there an entry on "economic development" in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. The story of how the term "economic development" entered the English language and came, for a time at least, to be identified with growth in per capita income is both curious and illuminating.

130 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Günther Palm1
TL;DR: Some applications of the new concept of evidence are discussed, concerning statistics in general and the special kind of statistics performed by neurophysiologists, when they analyze the “response” of neurons, and perhaps by the neurons themselves.
Abstract: A numerical measure for "evidence" is defined in a probabilistic framework. The established mathematical concept of information or entropy (as defined in ergodic theory) can be obtained from this definition in a special case, although in general information is greater than evidence. In another, somewhat complementary, special case a numerical measure for "surprise" is derived from the definition of evidence. Some applications of the new concept of evidence are discussed, concerning statistics in general and the special kind of statistics performed by neurophysiologists, when they analyze the "response" of neurons, and perhaps by the neurons themselves.

51 citations



Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: The development of the theory of military surprise has reached the point of diminishing returns and the study of surprise should expand in new directions.
Abstract: Research on the subject of surprise has thus far been limited to its use in war. Current literature on military surprise thoroughly explores topics such as the optimal use of surprise in tactical and strategic planning; methods of anticipating surprise; and the frequent occurrence of intelligence failures despite strong evidence of an imminent attack. The development of the theory of military surprise has, however, reached the point of diminishing returns.1 At this stage, the study of surprise should expand in new directions.

16 citations


Book
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: In this article, Spot goes out on his own to explore the garden and meets lots of surprise new friends, which is a small, sturdy board book version of the popular "Spot" story.
Abstract: Spot goes out on his own to explore the garden and meets lots of surprise new friends. This is a small, sturdy board book version of the popular "Spot" story, for younger readers to enjoy.

13 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
R H Atkin1
TL;DR: In this paper, the idea of a surprise is developed from that of a p-event and compared with probabilistic ideas of expected and unexpected, and an algebra of surprises is shown to contain elementary probability algebra as a trivial case.
Abstract: The idea of a surprise is developed from that of a p-event. It is compared with probabilistic ideas of expected and unexpected, and an algebra of surprises is shown to contain elementary probability algebra as a trivial case. Some indication is given of how the ideas might be used to deal with problems of ‘low risk with disastrous consequences’—such as the dangers associated with atomic power stations.

11 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define the surprise attack problem in terms of warning: how to improve intelligence collection and analysis to detect Warsaw Pact mobilization in its early phases, however, it is shown that warning in itself is often not sufficient to protect a victim from surprise.
Abstract: T h e Western alliance cannot afford a surprise attack. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does not have a cushion of material superiority in standing forces that could counteract the effects of major Warsaw Pact success in the first week of battle; the West‘s material superiority in mobilization potential could only be relevant, if ever, in a prolonged conventional war, which is possible only if defeat is forestalled at the outset. Nor does NATO have great strategic depth which can compensate for initial enemy breakthroughs. The Wehrrnacht had to march 600 miles to get to the gates of Moscow; the Soviet Army, which is much more mechanized than Hitler’s was, needs to traverse only a third of that distance to get to the Rhine. Increased destructiveness of modern conventional weapons also means that the initial phases of war will be even more criticial, and nuclear parity places a higher premium on successful conventional defense. The side that strikes first against an unready opponent will have a substantial edge. Most analyses of the surprise attack problem define it in terms of warning: how to improve intelligence collection and analysis to detect Warsaw Pact mobilization in its early phases. If history teaches anything, however, it is that warning in itself is often not sufficient to protect a victim from surprise. There are powerful psychological and political incentives for decision-makers to misinterpret warning or delay the necessary response. NATO’s potential susceptibility to surprise is as much a political problem as an operational one.

9 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
David Feldman1
TL;DR: Bereiter and Kohlberg as discussed by the authors argued that education should be concerned about things that can be changed, modified, or influenced in a direct way by educators, and they argued that the focus was too myopic and atomistic, too mechanical and controlling.
Abstract: One of the most important debates about education in recent years began (and unfortunately ended) with the first issue of the journal Interchange in 1970. The debate was between Carl Bereiter and Lawrence Kohlberg (Bereiter, 1970), and it was over the issue of what constituted the proper focus of educational research and educational practice. Bereiter argued, to no one's surprise, that education ought to be concerned about things that can be changed, modified, or influenced in a direct way by educators. Kohlberg (also to no one's surprise) argued that Bereiter's focus was too myopic and atomistic, too mechanical and controlling, and urged instead that educators become attuned to the natural processes of change that occur in children. Education, Kohlberg asserted, should facilitate the child's spontaneous attempts to make sense of the world. Bereiter's approach could perhaps be characterized as an "outside to inside" strategy, while Kohlberg, like his mentor Piaget, chose an "inside to outside" approach. I tried to enter this short-lived

9 citations





Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: A Japanese fleet secretly went to sea and carried out one of the most successful surprise attacks in history as discussed by the authors, which is the quintessential example of successful deception and surprise in history.
Abstract: Pearl Harbour is the quintessential example of successful deception and surprise. While Japanese diplomats carried on negotiations for peace, a Japanese fleet secretly went to sea and carried out one of the most successful surprise attacks in history.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Many American universities were founded outside cities, often in places that evoke the admiration of European visitors for their beauty and sometimes their surprise as well that one would think of having a university in such an environment as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Many American universities were founded outside cities, often in places that evoke the admiration of European visitors for their beauty and sometimes their surprise as well that one would think of having a university in such an environment. The attempt to separate the university from the rest of society continues even where the city has caught up to the university, as, for instance, in the case of Harvard. Every attempt is made to keep the boundaries of the American university clear; what belongs to it and what is excluded from it is a matter of concern as it is not in European academic institutions.

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: The problems of intelligence examined in this volume are fraught with implications for United States policy in the 1980s as mentioned in this paper, both in its organisational and substantive dimensions, and several themes have been prominent both in the chapters here and in the broader discussions of the intelligence community in light of United States foreign policy needs for the next decade.
Abstract: The problems of intelligence examined in this volume are fraught with implications for United States policy in the 1980s — both in its organisational and substantive dimensions. Several themes have been prominent both in the chapters here and in the broader discussions of the intelligence community in light of United States policy needs for the next decade. Such a discussion takes place in the aftermath of the widespread dissatisfaction with the intelligence community in the United States in the early-to-mid-1970s. On the one hand, the community was faulted for its alleged excesses, especially in misguided, or unguided, clandestine operations in support of supposedly dubious policies. On the other hand, our intelligence services were condemned for their deficiencies in providing accurate and timely estimates of the growth of Soviet military power. Hence the criticisms emanated from diverse sources. They reinforced an historic suspicion in the United States of secrecy in government focused especially on intelligence, most of whose operations have not, and cannot be, conducted under full public scrutiny.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jul 1981-Survival

Book
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: Mum announces they're going to have a lodger and it seems like the end of the world to Marianne as discussed by the authors. Things are bad enough as it is, with no friends and with trouble at school. But Mr Shonfield is a complete surprise, and suddenly Marianne feels a growing enthusiasm for life and for lodgers.
Abstract: Mum announces they're going to have a lodger and it seems like the end of the world to Marianne. Things are bad enough as it is, with no friends and with trouble at school. But Mr Shonfield is a complete surprise, and suddenly Marianne feels a growing enthusiasm for life and for lodgers.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, contemporary security policy and surprise attack: Into the 1980s, the authors present a survey of the state of the art in the area of surprise attacks. But,
Abstract: (1981). Contemporary Security Policy and surprise attack: Into the 1980s. Arms Control: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 135-156.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the author clarifies major issues of women employment by means of a self-administered true-false questionnaire and answers may surprise and, perhaps, enlighten employment counseling professionals.
Abstract: The author clarifies major issues of women employment by means of a self-administered true-false questionnaire. Answers may surprise and, perhaps, enlighten employment counseling professionals.

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: When is a surprise not a surprise? as mentioned in this paper investigates the question of whether a surprise attack is a real or imagined one, in the context of the German surprise attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.
Abstract: Irreverent though it may seem, perhaps the most purposeful way to embark upon this investigation is through a conundrum all too reminiscent of juvenile party games: when is a surprise not a surprise?1 Such whimsy, however, speedily gives way to a reality which is surpassing grim, precisely because this is a matter of life and death for the Soviet Union (and ourselves, for that matter). Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the spectre of ‘surprise attack’ haunts the Soviet mind, having dominated Soviet thinking for more than three decades, and shows little sign of abating with the passage of time. Much, though not all, can be explained by the massive trauma brought on by the devastating German surprise attack loosed upon the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, an attack which brought the Soviet system to the brink of catastrophe and from which recovery was agonising almost beyond belief; delineating this brush with extinction, apportioning blame and lauding recovery, furnishing alibis — even to the point of insisting that this ‘surprise’ was no ‘surprise’ — has occupied many years and produced some involved commentaries, as we shall see shortly. Meanwhile, by way of recent elaboration on this theme, Army General (now Marshal) V. Kulikov, writing at the time in his capacity as Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, insisted that ‘the most important consideration’ in relation to any future conflict was to ‘oppose an attempted enemy surprise attack’ not merely by defensive mechanisms but by utilising the combat readiness of the Soviet forces to parry an attack under any conditions and to encompass the decisive defeat of the enemy.