Topic
Symmetric equilibrium
About: Symmetric equilibrium is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1855 publications have been published within this topic receiving 58699 citations.
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01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: Fudenberg and Levine as discussed by the authors developed an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time.
Abstract: In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems. In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
3,254 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a bound on the number of rounds at which Fink may be played, when one player may possibly be committed to a "Tit-for-Tat" strategy.
2,468 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with stochastic mutations is analyzed, and the expansion and contraction of strategies are linked to their current relative success.
Abstract: An evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with stochastic mutations is analyzed. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked to their current relative success, but mutuation, perturbing the system from its deterministic evolution, are present as well. The focus is on the long run implications of ongoing mutations, which drastically reduce the set of equilibria. For 2 by 2 symmetric games with two symmetric strict Nash equilibria the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected, even though there is another strict Nash equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
2,129 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a non-cooperative equilibrium concept for super games is presented, which fits John Nash's noncooperative solution and also has some features resembling the Nash cooperative solution.
Abstract: Presents a non-cooperative equilibrium concept, applicable to supergames, which fits John Nash's non-cooperative equilibrium and also has some features resembling the Nash cooperative solution. Description of an ordinary game; Definition and discussion of a non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames; Description of supergame and supergame strategies; Information on the Cournot strategy.
1,672 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that every game has at least one such equilibrium set and that the departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor, because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.
Abstract: A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have a strategically stable equilibrium? We list three conditions which seem necessary for strategic stabilitybackwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance-and define a set-valued equilibrium concept that satisfies all three of them. We prove that every game has at least one such equilibrium set. Also, we show that the departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor, because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.
1,378 citations