About: System safety is a(n) research topic. Over the lifetime, 6025 publication(s) have been published within this topic receiving 79681 citation(s).
01 Jan 1995
Nancy G. Leveson1•Institutions (1)
TL;DR: This chapter discusses the role of humans in Automated Systems, the nature of risk, and elements of a Safeware Program, which aims to manage Safety and Security through design and implementation.
Abstract: I The Nature Of Risk. Risk In Modern Society. Changing Attitudes Toward Risk. Is Increased Concern Justified?. Unique Risk Factors in Industrialized Society. Computers And Risk. The Role of Computers in Accidents. Software Myths. Why Software Engineering is hard. The Reality We Face. Causes Of Accidents. The Concept of Causality. Flaws in the Safety Culture. Ineffective Organizational Structure. Ineffective Technical Activities. Human Error And Risk. Do Humans Cause Most Accidents?. The Need for Humans in Automated Systems. Human Error as Human-Task Mismatch. Conclusions. The Role Of Humans In Automated Systems. Mental Models. The Human as Monitor. The Human as Backup. The Human as Partner. Conclusions. II Introduction To System Safety. Foundations Of System Safety. Safety Engineering Pre-World War II. Systems Theory. Systems Engineering. Systems Analysis. Fundamentals Of System Safety. Historical Development. Basic Concepts. Software System Safety. Cost and Effectiveness of System Safety. Other Approaches To Safety. Industrial Safety. Reliability Engineering. Application-Specific Approaches to Safety. III Definitions And Models. Terminology. Failure and Error. Accident and Incident. Hazard. Risk. Safety. Safety and Security. Accident And Human Error Models. Accident Models. Human Task and Error Models. Summary. IV Elements Of A Safeware Program. Managing Safety. The Role of General Management. Place in the Organizational Structure. Documentation. The System And Software Safety Process. The General Tasks. Conceptual Development. Design. Full-Scale Development. Production and Deployment. Operation. "Examples. Hazard Analysis. The Hazard Analysis Process. Types of System Models. General Types of Analysis. Limitations and Criticisms of Hazard Analysis. Hazard Analysis Models And Techniques. Checklists. Hazard Indices. Fault Tree Analysis. Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) Analysis. Event Tree Analysis. Cause-Consequence analysis (CCA). Hazards and Operability Analysis (HAZOP). Interface Analyses. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA). State Machine Hazard Analysis (SMHA). Task and Human Error Analysis Techniques. Evaluations of Hazard Analysis Techniques. Software Hazard And Requirements Analysis. Process Considerations. Requirements Specification Components. Completeness in Requirements Specifications. Completeness Criteria for Requirements Analysis. Constraint Analysis. Designing For Safety. The Design Process. Design Techniques. Design Modification and Maintenance. Design Of The Human-Machine Interface. General Process Considerations. Matching Tasks to Human Characteristics. Reducing Safety-Critical Human Errors. Providing Appropriate Information and Feedback. Training and Maintaining Skills. Guidelines for Safe HMI Design. Verification Of Safety. Dynamic Analysis. Static Analysis. Independent Verification and Validation. Summary.
•28 Feb 2006
TL;DR: This definitive new book explores this groundbreaking new development in safety and risk management, where 'success' is based on the ability of organizations, groups and individuals to anticipate the changing shape of risk before failures and harm occur.
Abstract: For Resilience Engineering, 'failure' is the result of the adaptations necessary to cope with the complexity of the real world, rather than a breakdown or malfunction. The performance of individuals and organizations must continually adjust to current conditions and, because resources and time are finite, such adjustments are always approximate. This definitive new book explores this groundbreaking new development in safety and risk management, where 'success' is based on the ability of organizations, groups and individuals to anticipate the changing shape of risk before failures and harm occur. Featuring contributions from many of the worlds leading figures in the fields of human factors and safety, Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts provides thought-provoking insights into system safety as an aggregate of its various components, subsystems, software, organizations, human behaviours, and the way in which they interact. The book provides an introduction to Resilience Engineering of systems, covering both the theoretical and practical aspects. It is written for those responsible for system safety on managerial or operational levels alike, including safety managers and engineers (line and maintenance), security experts, risk and safety consultants, human factors professionals and accident investigators.
•13 Jan 2012
Abstract: A new approach to safety, based on systems thinking, that is more effective, less costly, and easier to use than current techniques.Engineering has experienced a technological revolution, but the basic engineering techniques applied in safety and reliability engineering, created in a simpler, analog world, have changed very little over the years. In this groundbreaking book, Nancy Leveson proposes a new approach to safety?more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world?based on modern systems thinking and systems theory. Revisiting and updating ideas pioneered by 1950s aerospace engineers in their System Safety concept, and testing her new model extensively on real-world examples, Leveson has created a new approach to safety that is more effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques.Arguing that traditional models of causality are inadequate, Leveson presents a new, extended model of causation (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, or STAMP), then shows how the new model can be used to create techniques for system safety engineering, including accident analysis, hazard analysis, system design, safety in operations, and management of safety-critical systems. She applies the new techniques to real-world events including the friendly-fire loss of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in the first Gulf War; the Vioxx recall; the U.S. Navy SUBSAFE program; and the bacterial contamination of a public water supply in a Canadian town. Leveson's approach is relevant even beyond safety engineering, offering techniques for ?reengineering? any large sociotechnical system to improve safety and manage risk.
17 Dec 1987
TL;DR: This handbook has been developed not only to serve as text for the System Safety and Reliability Course, but also to make available to others a set of otherwise undocumented material on fault tree construction and evaluation.
Abstract: Introduction: Since 1975, a short course entitled "System Safety and Reliability Analysis" has been presented to over 200 NRC personnel and contractors. The course has been taught jointly by David F. Haasl, Institute of System Sciences, Professor Norman H. Roberts, University of Washington, and members of the Probabilistic Analysis Staff, NRC, as part of a risk assessment training program sponsored by the Probabilistic Analysis Staff. This handbook has been developed not only to serve as text for the System Safety and Reliability Course, but also to make available to others a set of otherwise undocumented material on fault tree construction and evaluation. The publication of this handbook is in accordance with the recommendations of the Risk Assessment Review Group Report (NUREG/CR-0400) in which it was stated that the fault/event tree methodology both can and should be used more widely by the NRC. It is hoped that this document will help to codify and systematize the fault tree approach to systems analysis.
Abstract: In recent years, the topic of car-following has become of increased importance in traffic engineering and safety research. Models of this phenomenon, which describe the interaction between (typically) adjacent vehicles in the same lane, now form the cornerstone for many important areas of research including (a) simulation modelling, where the car-following model (amongst others) controls the motion of the vehicles in the network, and (b) the functional definition of advanced vehicle control and safety systems (AVCSS), which are being introduced as a driver safety aid in an effort to mimic driver behaviour but remove human error. Despite the importance of this area however, no overview of the models availability and validity exists. It is the intent of this paper therefore to briefly assess the range of options available in the choice of car-following model, and assess just how far work has proceeded in our understanding of what, at times, would appear to be a simple process.