Showing papers on "Time perception published in 1982"

Time Perception in Schizophrenia

Abstract: Symptoms include: •positive-symptom dimension: psychosis hallucinations and delusions •negative-symptom dimension: changes in drive and volition lack of motivation, social withdrawal, reduction in spontaneous speech •cognitive-symptom dimension: alterations in neurocognition difficulties in memory, attention and executive functioning •affective dimension: affective dysregulation giving rise to depressive and manic (bipolar) symptoms (van Os & Kapur, 2009)

Perception of time during examination.

Abstract: Time perception has been viewed as an index of cognitive function (often defined as attention) in a variety of laboratory and applied human performance tasks (1, 2, 3 ) . It was hypothesized that perceived time might also act as an index of some aspect of complex cognitive function for college students performing an academic task. Eighty-three undergraduate students (27 male and 56 female) voluntarily completed a three-item questionnaire immediately after completing a 76-item multiple-choice final examination in educational psychology. They were not informed of the experiment until after they had completed the examination. Students were asked to: ( a ) Estimate the percentage of items missed on the exam, ( b ) htimate the amount of time they felt they had spent on the exam, and (c) Look up at the clock and record the actual time they had spent on the exam. Actual test scores were also obtained. The mean score for the subjects was 53.4 (SD = 7.1), mean estimated score was 57.5 (8.4), the mean true time was 52.7 min. (13.7), and the mean estimated time for the exam was 61.8 (29.3). Significant positive Pearson correlations ( p < .05) were found between true scores and estimated scores ( r = .31) and true time and estimated time ( s = .25). Significant ( p < .05) negative correlations were found between estimated time and true score ( r = --.23), estimated time and estimated score ( r = -.22), and estimated score and true time ( r = -.25). Stratifications of the sample were made by forming subgroups of one standard deviation of highest and lowest true scores and estimated scores. In the subgroup of those scoring within one SD of the lowest score, there was a significant negative correlation ( r = -.60, p < .05, n = 13) between estimated score and true time. In the subgroup of those scoring within one SD of the highest score, also a negative correlation between estimated score and true time was observed ( r = -.47, p < .05, n = 18). There was also a significant positive correlation between true time and estimated time ( r = .81, fi < .01). The subgroup of those estimating their scores to be within SD of the highest estimated score again showed a negative correlation between true time and estimated score ( r = -.GO, p < .05, n = 11) as well as between true score and estimated time (s = -32, p < .05). The subgroup of those who estimated their score within one SD of the lowest estimated score was the only group not to show a negative correlation between true time and estimated score ( s = . l , p > .05, n = 14) but did show a significant positive correlation between true score and estimated score ( r = .57, 9 < .05). These data suggest there were significant differences in the way students perceived time during this examination depending on their performance. Students who did well on the test accurately estimated time. Students who did poorly could not estimate time accurately. This is consistent with the notion of a policy of attentional allocation partially determined by efficiency of cognitive processing. Students who were prepared and competent for the test might theoretically have been able to allocate more effort to monitoring internal and external cues of time, thus the accurate predictions. Students who were not prepared (for lack of adequate preparation, text anxiety, or ability) may have worked less efficiently, allowing less effort to be allocated to the task of attending to the cues of time. Partialling out such variables as achievement motivation, preparation, test anxiety, and ability might prove useful in research.

A Nonspecific Learning Effect in the Perception of Random-Dot Stereograms?

Abstract: An experiment is reported the object of which was to check whether a small amount of nonspecific experience in perceiving random-dot stereograms could facilitate the perception of a previously unseen stereogram. The mean stereopsis perception time of a group of totally naive subjects was found to be significantly slower than that of a group who had previously been shown two different stereograms. Closer inspection of the data showed that this difference was primarily due to approximately one third of the naive group who were much slower than the ‘experienced’ group. It is therefore suggested that nonspecific experience provides most initial help for relatively slow perceivers, since many naive subjects can perform as well as those with prior experience of other stereograms.

Manipulating apparent duration with simultaneous effects on memory

Abstract: This experiment explored the relationship between perceived time and memory. One hundred and forty-four subjects viewed a list of 30 words under one of three conditions. The conditions were designed to induce differences in the perceived duration of the words by varying the number of incidental stimuli during the period just before each word was visible. After viewing the list, all subjects estimated the duration of each word, the number of words, and the duration of the list. Following this, subjects attempted to recognize the words among 50 distractors. It was found that increases in memory accompanied increases in perceived duration. The results were consistent with the hypothesis that changes in time perception and memory are mediated by changes in attention.

Time estimation in some group situations

Abstract: Summary.-The subjective estimations of long durations of time were studied for rwo different types of experience, an analytically oriented (Bionian) group situation and a task group. In each group were 15 subjects. Significant differences emerge in estimations of duration of time for the two situations. Whereas for the mk group there are no substantial errors in the subjective estimation of time, the analytically oriented group shows notable oscillations with respect to different cognitive and emotional situations which, from time to time, characterize the group situation. In the present research we set out to study the estimation of long durations of time in various group situations. The many studies which have been carried out in the past five years on the perception of time essentially take into consideration perceptions of relatively brief durations in milliseconds to minutes. For the perception of duration we mean the perception of the interval which elapses between two stimuli. For a complete review see Zellcind and Sprug (1974), Eisler (1976), and Guay and Hall (1977). In earlier research little attention was given to the estimation of longer durations. This narrowing of the field was necessary for the sake of methodological clarity and for singling out simple structural elements which would have been impossible to extract from studies of long durations of time as these arc influenced by many interfering variables. The study of such durations presents several difficulties. Fraisse (1967) affirms that "when duration exceeds the time field of perception, we can carry out only a global evaluation which we know to be difficult and uncertain." Fraisse (1967) has affirmed also that "the experienced time is always an experience of changes." We maintain that such "changes" pass through the activation of cognitive and emotional factors. Consequently an estimate of time duration must take into account such activation. This is naturally more evident in the estimation of longer durations of time in which memory, subject to processes of recall and forgetting, plays a role of primary importance. Different modalities of experience of time closely linked to modifications of states of consciousness ( Arieti, 1947; Melges & Fougerousse, 1966; Hartocollis, 1975; Fachinelli, 1979) have been described in psychopathology. These studies examined the perceptual distortion of experienced time expressed only in qualitative terms and placed little emphasis on duration.