Timing attack

About: Timing attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 726 publications have been published within this topic receiving 25462 citations.

Timing attack on NEMS relay based design of AES

Abstract: In deep submicron CMOS transistors, the static leakage current has become a significant contributor to power consumption with channel length and subthreshold voltage being continuously scaled down. Also, this increased leakage has recently led to the rise of side-channel attacks on CMOS based implementations. Nanoelectromechanical System (NEMS) relay technology is emerging as an alternative to CMOS with one of its most prominent advantages being the zero static leakage, providing an inherent defense against power side-channel attacks at the same time. On the other hand, this emerging technology introduces timing challenges in the design process; to minimize the timing delay of NEMS relays, binary decision diagram (BDD) based implementation is utilized to design combinational logic. What's important from a security perspective is that the timing delay of the BDD implementation of a NEMS relay based design is inherently input dependent. An adversary can therefore leverage the data dependency to identify secret information of the chip. We propose a timing delay based attack on NEMS relay based designs, use AES as a case study, and show that it can achieve a success rate of 1.0 for interconnect delay variations within a standard deviation of 0.0022. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to expose an inherent security vulnerability of a NEMS relay based design.

Security analysis of CRT-based cryptosystems

Abstract: A side channel attack (SCA) is a serious attack on the implementation of cryptosystems, which can break the secret key using side channel information such as timing, power consumption, etc. Recently, Boneh et al. showed that SSL is vulnerable to SCA if the attacker gets access to the local network of the server. Therefore, public-key infrastructure eventually becomes a target of SCA. In this paper, we investigate the security of RSA cryptosystem using the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) in the sense of SCA. Novak first proposed a simple power analysis (SPA) against the CRT part using the difference of message modulo p and modulo q. In this paper, we apply Novak’s attack to the other CRT-based cryptosystems, namely Multi-Prime RSA, Multi-Exponent RSA, Rabin cryptosystem, and HIME(R) cryptosystem. Novak-type attack strictly depends on how to implement the CRT. We examine the operations related to CRT of these cryptosystems, and show that an extended Novak-type attack is effective on them. Moreover, we present a novel attack called zero-multiplication attack. The attacker tries to guess the secret prime by producing ciphertexts that cause a multiplication with zero during the decryption, which is easily detected by power analysis. Our experimental result shows that the timing with the zero multiplication is reduced about 10% from the standard one. Finally, we propose countermeasures against these attacks. The proposed countermeasures are based on the ciphertext blinding, but they require no inversion operation. The overhead of the proposed scheme is only about 1–5% of the whole decryption if the bit length of modulus is 1,024.

Host Based Detection Approach Using Time Based Module for Fast Attack Detection Behavior

Abstract: Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an important component in a network security infrastructure. IDS need to be accurate and reliable in order to detect the intrusive behaviour of a packet that travelling through the network. With the current technological advancement attack on network infrastructure has evolve to a new level and to make IDS sensitive enough to detect the new attack, the detection framework need to be frequently updated. Both the fast attack and slow attack mechanism has become the subset of phases inside the anatomy of attack. Each of the attack mechanism has their own criteria and fast attack is the important type of attack that need to be considered as any late detection of the fast attack can cause a major bad impact to the organization. Therefore, there is a need to identify a suitable technique to detect the fast attack and based on this, this paper introduce a static threshold using statistical and observation technique for detecting the fast attack intrusion that is within one second time interval. The Threshold selected was based on the real network traffic dataset and verified using classification table on real network traffic.

LSTM-Based Detection for Timing Attacks in Named Data Network

Abstract: Named Data Network (NDN) is an alternative to host-centric networking exemplified by today's Internet. One key feature of NDN is in-network caching that reduces access delay and query overhead by caching popular contents at the source as well as at a few other nodes. Unfortunately, in-network caching suffers various privacy risks by different attacks, one of which is termed timing attack. This is an attack to infer whether a consumer has recently requested certain contents based on the time difference between the delivery time of those contents that are currently cached and those that are not cached. In order to prevent the privacy leakage and resist such kind of attacks, we propose a detection scheme by adopting Long Short-term Memory (LSTM) model. Based on the four input features of LSTM, cache hit ratio, average request interval, request frequency, and types of requested contents, we timely capture more important eigenvalues by dividing a constant time window size into a few small slices in order to detect timing attacks accurately. We have performed extensive simulations to compare our scheme with several other state-of-the-art schemes in classification accuracy, detection ratio, false alarm ratio, and F-measure. It has been shown that our scheme possesses a better performance in all cases studied.