Topic
Timing attack
About: Timing attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 726 publications have been published within this topic receiving 25462 citations.
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TL;DR: Three kinds of cyber attack models are considered: timing attack, replay attack and false data injection attack are considered and results have shown that all three kinds of attacks are capable of driving the AC-HVDC system into large oscillations or even unstable conditions.
Abstract: Hybrid AC/HVDC (AC-HVDC) grids have evolved to become huge cyber-physical systems that are vulnerable to cyber attacks because of the wide attack surface and increasing dependence on intelligent electronic devices, computing resources and communication networks. This paper, for the first time, studies the impact of cyber attacks on HVDC transmission oscillation damping control.Three kinds of cyber attack models are considered: timing attack, replay attack and false data injection attack. Followed by a brief introduction of the HVDC model and conventional oscillation damping control method, the design of three attack models is described in the paper. These attacks are tested on a modified IEEE New England 39-Bus AC-HVDC system. Simulation results have shown that all three kinds of attacks are capable of driving the AC-HVDC system into large oscillations or even unstable conditions.
18 citations
TL;DR: This paper develops a methodology by which an adversary capable of limited number of side-channel measurements can choose the best strategy prior to the actual attack and shows that the best attacking strategy can be estimated closely, without the requirement of an exhaustive search.
Abstract: The vulnerability of cryptographic devices to side-channel attacks is of interest in the domain of information security. The success of a side-channel attack depends on the crypto-algorithm implementation, the platform being attacked, and the attack strategy. While the former two parameters are generally beyond the adversary's control, the choice of the attack strategy is solely with the adversary. However, there is no unique “best attack strategy.” The attack strategy that works best for one platform may not be the best for another. Further there is no systematic way to choose the best attack strategy from the available pool. In this paper, we analyze a category of side-channel attacks known as profiled cache-timing attacks and develop a methodology by which an adversary capable of limited number of side-channel measurements can choose the best strategy prior to the actual attack. The methodology is tested on several platforms and cipher implementations and shows that the best attacking strategy can be estimated closely, without the requirement of an exhaustive search.
17 citations
13 Jul 2015
TL;DR: A systematic approach for determining the optimal protection against timing attacks, on the example of cryptosystems based on discrete logarithms, that includes a resource-bounded timing adversary, and a defender who strives to reduce the cost while maintaining a certain degree of security.
Abstract: Timing attacks can effectively recover keys from cryptosystems. While they can be defeated using constant-time implementations, this defensive approach comes at the price of a performance penalty. One is hence faced with the problem of striking a balance between performance and security against timing attacks. In this paper, we propose a systematic approach for determining the optimal protection against timing attacks, on the example of cryptosystems based on discrete logarithms. Our model includes a resource-bounded timing adversary who strives to maximize the probability of key recovery, and a defender who strives to reduce the cost while maintaining a certain degree of security. We obtain the optimal protection as an equilibrium in a game between the defender and the adversary. At the heart of the equilibrium computation are novel bounds for the probability of key recovery, which are expressed as a function of the applied protection and the attack strategy of a timing adversary. We put our techniques to work in a case study in which we identify optimal protections for libgcrypt's ElGamal implementation. We determine situations in which the optimal choice is to use a defensive, constant-time implementation and a small key, and situations in which the optimal choice is a more aggressively tuned (but leaky) implementation with a longer key.
17 citations
17 Aug 2000
TL;DR: In this article, a coprocessor for double-modal exponentiation in a mobile telecommunication terminal has been developed to resist side channel attacks that extract secret exponent by analyzing the target's power consumption and calculation time.
Abstract: Following requirements are necessary when implementing public key cryptography in a mobile telecommunication terminal. (1) simultaneous highspeed double modular exponentiation calculation, (2) small size and low power consumption, (3) resistance to side channel attacks. We have developed a coprocessor that provides these requirements. In this coprocessor, right-to-left binary exponentiation algorithm was extended for double modular exponentiations by designing new circuit configuration and new schedule control methods. We specified the desired power consumption of the circuit at the initial design stage. Our proposed method resists side channel attacks that extract secret exponent by analyzing the target's power consumption and calculation time.
17 citations
TL;DR: The proposed attack method is based on an inter-keystroke timing dictionary built from a human cognitive model whose parameters can be determined by a small amount of training data on any users (not necessarily the target victims) and can be potentially launched on a large scale in real-world settings.
17 citations