Trojan

About: Trojan is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2028 publications have been published within this topic receiving 33209 citations.

An optimal Earth Trojan asteroid search strategy

Abstract: Trojan asteroids are minor planets that share the orbit of a planet about the Sun and librate around the L4 or L5 Lagrangian points of stability. They are important solar-system fossils because they carry information on early Solar system formation, when collisions between bodies were more frequent. Discovery and study of terrestrial planet Trojans will help constrain models for the distribution of bodies and interactions in the inner Solar system. Since the discovery of the first outer planet Trojan in 1906, several thousand Jupiter Trojans have been found. Of the terrestrial planets, there are four known Mars Trojans, and one Earth Trojan has been recently discovered. We present a new model that constrains optimal search areas, and imaging cadences for narrow and wide-field survey telescopes including the Gaia satellite for the most efficient use of telescope time to maximize the probability of detecting additional Earth Trojans.

The origin of the high-inclination Neptune Trojan 2005 TN53

Abstract: Aims. We explore the formation and evolution of the highly inclined orbit of Neptune Trojan 2005 TN 53 . Methods. With numerical simulations, we investigated a possible mechanism for the origin of the high-inclination Neptune Trojans as captured into the Trojan-type orbits by an initially eccentric Neptune during its eccentricity damping and rapid inward migration, then migrating to the present locations locked in Neptune's 1:1 mean motion resonance. Results. Two 2005 TN 53 -type Trojans out of our 2000 test particles were produced with inclinations above 20°, moving on tadpole orbits librating around Neptune's leading Lagrange point.

A power analysis based approach to detect Trojan circuits

Abstract: Because of globalization of the semiconductor industry, the IC fabrication is increasingly outsourced. This poses a significant risk for integrated circuits (ICs) used for security critical applications. Attackers can maliciously alter the ICs during fabrication in untrusted foundries. In the case of ICs bought externally, they may have hidden functions that users would never know. These malicious alterations and hidden functions are also referred to as “Hardware Trojan”. It is extremely difficult to discover such Trojan circuits using conventional testing strategies. In this paper, we propose a nondestructive, power analysis based Trojan detection approach which is able to detect Trojan circuits in the presence of large noise. The approach is validated using 90nm FPGA (Xilinx Spartan-3E) chips. Experimental results with a 64-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) cipher circuit show that Trojans which are 2 orders of magnitude smaller than the DES circuit can be detected by using statistic signal processing techniques.

An attribute based classification of hardware trojans

Abstract: This paper considers the classification of hardware trojans in semiconductor chips. The phases of the chip production life-cycle are reviewed and opportunities for trojan insertion are discussed. Trojans are classified using a comprehensive attribute taxonomy based on eight categories. A matrix describing the relationships between these attributes is defined which can be used to identify hardware trojans.

Hardware Trojans in incompletely specified on-chip bus systems

Abstract: The security, functionality, and performance of the on-chip bus system is critical in an SoC design. We highlight the susceptibility of current bus implementations to Hardware Trojans hiding in unspecified functionality. Unlike existing Trojans which aim to disrupt normal bus behavior and are often designed for a specific protocol and topology, we present a general model for creating a covert Trojan communication channel between SoC components. From our channel model, which is applicable to any topology and protocol, one can create circuitry allowing information to flow covertly by altering existing bus signals only when they are unspecified. We give the specifics of this circuitry for AMBA AXI4, then create a system comprised of several master and slave units connected by an AXI4-Lite interconnect to quantify the overhead of the Trojan channel and illustrate the ability of our Trojans to evade a suite of protocol compliance checking assertions from ARM.