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Trojan

About: Trojan is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2028 publications have been published within this topic receiving 33209 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the second transient Earth Trojan known, 2020 XL5, has been observed from three ground-based observatories in 2019, 2012, 2019 and 2020, and it has a diameter of 1.18 ± 0.08 km, larger than the first known Earth Trojan.
Abstract: Trojan asteroids are small bodies orbiting around the L4 or L5 Lagrangian points of a Sun-planet system. Due to their peculiar orbits, they provide key constraints to the Solar System evolution models. Despite numerous dedicated observational efforts in the last decade, asteroid 2010 TK7 has been the only known Earth Trojan thus far. Here we confirm that the recently discovered 2020 XL5 is the second transient Earth Trojan known. To study its orbit, we used archival data from 2012 to 2019 and observed the object in 2021 from three ground-based observatories. Our study of its orbital stability shows that 2020 XL5 will remain in L4 for at least 4 000 years. With a photometric analysis we estimate its absolute magnitude to be [Formula: see text], and color indices suggestive of a C-complex taxonomy. Assuming an albedo of 0.06 ± 0.03, we obtain a diameter of 1.18 ± 0.08 km, larger than the first known Earth Trojan asteroid.

7 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
01 Oct 2014
TL;DR: This paper demonstrates that some Trojans in production-worthy SRAM circuits can easily evade standard verification techniques, and describes a novel Trojan detection mechanism based on X-propagation during functional simulation of verification vectors.
Abstract: Over the past several years, there has been growing concern regarding the possibility that Hardware Trojan Horse circuits may be present in 3rd party IP. In this paper, we focus specifically on 3rd party IP related to Static Random-Access Memories (SRAMs), and we demonstrate that some Trojans in production-worthy SRAM circuits can easily evade standard verification techniques. We then describe a novel Trojan detection mechanism based on X-propagation during functional simulation of verification vectors. Our experiments from a silicon-worthy verification environment illustrate that our techniques can be significantly more effective at Trojan detection than standard SRAM verification practices.

7 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
Yanjiang Liu1, Yiqiang Zhao1, Jiaji He1, Liu Aqiang1, Ruishan Xin1 
01 Oct 2017
TL;DR: A side-channel correlation analysis for hardware Trojan detection is proposed, utilizing the intrinsic dependencies between the fingerprinting of transient current and magnetic field emission to distinguish the minute differences between golden chips and Trojan-infected chips in the presence of process variations.
Abstract: The fabless trends of semiconductor industry increasingly pose security risk to the trustworthiness of the integrated circuits (ICs) employed in sensitive fields and critical applications. Due to the uncontrollable characteristic of IC supply chain, an adversary can insert a Trojan into the original design during the whole IC design and fabrication process. In order to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of ICs, a side-channel correlation analysis for hardware Trojan detection is proposed in this paper. We utilize the intrinsic dependencies between the fingerprinting of transient current and magnetic field emission to distinguish the minute differences between golden chips and Trojan-infected chips in the presence of process variations. In addition, a test vector generation approach based on ring oscillator network is proposed to improve the detection sensitivity by maximizing switching activities of arbitrary Trojan instances. The side-channel experiment platform based on the SAKURA-G test board is set up and several regions corresponding with the test vectors are exerted to validate the effectiveness of our method. Experiment results show that the ring oscillator can be capable of capturing the power fluctuations consumed by HT, and the test vectors we select can amplify the differences of the correlation coefficient between the fingerprinting of transient current and magnetic field emission.

7 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors combine the methods introduced in two recent papers (Paez & Efthymiopoulos, 2015, Paez & Locatelli, 2015) in order to analytically predict the location of secondary resonances in the Trojan problem.
Abstract: A number of studies, referring to the observed Trojan asteroids of various planets in our Solar System, or to hypothetical Trojan bodies in extrasolar planetary systems, have emphasized the importance of so-called secondary resonances in the problem of the long term stability of Trojan motions. Such resonances describe commensurabilities between the fast, synodic, and secular frequency of the Trojan body, and, possibly, additional slow frequencies produced by more than one perturbing bodies. The presence of secondary resonances sculpts the dynamical structure of the phase space. Hence, identifying their location is a relevant task for theoretical studies. In the present paper we combine the methods introduced in two recent papers (Paez & Efthymiopoulos, 2015, Paez & Locatelli, 2015) in order to analytically predict the location of secondary resonances in the Trojan problem (SEE FILE FOR COMPLETE ABSTRACT)

7 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
01 Aug 2020
TL;DR: This work successfully demonstrate a new attack scenario on shared FPGAs: it is shown that an FPGA tenant can activate a dormant hardware Trojan without any physical or logical connection to the private Trojan-infected FPGa circuit.
Abstract: Albeit very appealing, FPGA multitenancy in the cloud computing environment is currently on hold due to a number of recently discovered vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks and covert communication. In this work, we successfully demonstrate a new attack scenario on shared FPGAs: we show that an FPGA tenant can activate a dormant hardware Trojan without any physical or logical connection to the private Trojan-infected FPGA circuit. Our victim contains a so-called satisfiability don't-care Trojan, activated by a pair of don't-care signals, which never reach the combined trigger condition under normal operation. However, once a malicious FPGA user starts to induce considerable fluctuations in the on-chip signal delays—and, consequently, the timing faults-these harmless don't-care signals take unexpected values which trigger the Trojan. Our attack model eliminates the assumption on physical access to or manipulation of the victim design. Contrary to existing fault and side-channel attacks that target unprotected cryptographic circuits, our new attack is shown effective even against provably well-protected cryptographic circuits. Besides demonstrating the attack by successfully leaking the entire cryptographic key from one unprotected and one masked AES S-box implementation, we present an efficient and lightweight countermeasure.

7 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
2023136
2022282
2021111
2020139
2019144
2018168