Showing papers on "Value (ethics) published in 1971"

The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies

Abstract: A transformation of basic political priorities may be taking place in Western Europe. I hypothesize: (1) that people have a variety of needs which are given high or low priority according to their degree of fulfillment: people act on behalf of their most important unsatisfied need, giving relatively little attention to needs already satisfied—except that (2) people tend to retain the value priorities adopted in their formative years throughout adult life. In contemporary Western Europe, needs for physical safety and economic security are relatively well satisfied for an unprecedentedly large share of the population. Younger, more affluent groups have been formed entirely under these conditions, and seem relatively likely to give top priority to fulfillment of needs which remain secondary to the older and less affluent majority of the population. Needs for belonging and intellectual and esthetic self-fulfillment (characterized as “post-bourgeois” values) may take top priorities among the former group. Survey data from six countries indicate that the value priorities of the more affluent postwar group do contrast with those of groups raised under conditions of lesser economic and physical security. National patterns of value priorities correspond to the given nation's economic history, moreover, suggesting that the age-group differences reflect the persistence of preadult experiences, rather than life cycle effects. The distinctive value priorities imply distinctive political behavior—being empirically linked with preferences for specific political issues and political parties in a predictable fashion. If the respective age cohorts retain their present value priorities, we would expect long-term shifts in the political goals and patterns of political partisanship prevailing in these societies.

Propaganda Technique In World War I

Abstract: This classic book on propaganda technique focuses on American, British, French, and German experience in World War I. The book sets forth a simple classification of various psychological materials used to produce certain specific results and proposes a general theory of strategy and tactics for the manipulation of these materials.In an introduction (coauthored by Jackson A. Giddens) written for this edition, Harold Lasswell notes that this study was partially an exercise in the discovery of appropriate theory. It raised the crucial questions of how to classify the content of propaganda--for instance, a distinction is made between "value demands" (war aims, war guilt, and casting the enemy as evil personified) and "expectations" (the illusion of victory)--and how to summarize the procedures employed in organizing and carrying out propaganda operations. Propaganda Technique in World War I deals primarily with problems of internal administration and lateral coordination rather than with the relationship between policymakers and propagandists. However, Jackson Giddens enumerates procedures in the book that illustrate an underlying assumption that decision makers were deeply involved in propaganda and influenced by considerations of public opinion. He takes the study of propaganda further by elaborating on the nature and meaning of the category of "war aims" and its relation to the propagandist, for this, more than any other category of content, "is the catalyst of transnational political action." Giddens's exploration of the development of a comprehensive theory of propaganda adds another dimension to Lasswell's study while confirming its value as outstanding groundwork for continuing research.

The myth of the eternal return, or, Cosmos and history

Abstract: This founding work of the history of religions, first published in English in 1954, secured the North American reputation of the Romanian emigre-scholar Mircea Eliade (1907-1986). Making reference to an astonishing number of cultures and drawing on scholarship published in no less than half a dozen European languages, Eliade's "The Myth of the Eternal Return" makes both intelligible and compelling the religious expressions and activities of a wide variety of archaic and "primitive" religious cultures. While acknowledging that a return to the "archaic" is no longer possible, Eliade passionately insists on the value of understanding this view in order to enrich our contemporary imagination of what it is to be human. Jonathan Z. Smith's new introduction provides the contextual background to the book and presents a critical outline of Eliade's argument in a way that encourages readers to engage in an informed conversation with this classic text."

Long-range experimental modification of values, attitudes, and behavior.

Abstract: 1. Contemporary social psychologists generally agree that a necessary prerequisite to cognitive or attitude change is the presence of a state of imbalance or inconsistency. Two major experimental methods generally employed to create such a psychological state are (a) to induce a person to engage in behavior that is incompatible with his attitudes and values and (b) to expose him to information about the attitudes or values of significant others that are incompatible with his own attitudes and values. In contrast to these two well-known methods, we have employed a third method, namely, to expose a person to information designed to make him consciously aware of states of inconsistency that exist chronically within his own value-attitude system below the level of his conscious awareness. 2. While the main theoretical focus of contemporary social psychology is on the concept of attitude and on theories of attitude change, the present focus is on the concept of value and on a theory of value change. This shift from attitudes to values is made on the assumption that values are more fundamental components within a person's makeup than attitudes and, moreover, that values are de-

Repetition as a Factor in the Development of Musical Preferences

Abstract: LDUCATIONAL THOUGHT in recent years has focused on the ways and means of teaching the most fundamental aspects of the m!ajor disciplines. Music education has responded by engaging in a serious and prolonged debate about the nature and value of music and the teaching of music. One view of the present position of music education in this debate is summarized by Bennett Reimer: "The most fundamental value of music is its ability to give aesthetic insights through a particular kind of experience of music: aesthetic experience. The primary function of music education, is therefore, to develop the ability of every child to have aesthetic experience in music.''l It is not difficult to find agreement with this viewpoint. Robertson, for example, states that the most important consideration in music education is the development of attitudes and appreciation: "It is not too far-reaching to assert that all music educaiion aims at developing an appreciation for musicraining for music a foothold in the student's life and broadening this foothold to the point that the student will continue to seek musical experiences and find valuable pleasure and aesthetic satisfaction in so doing."2 Educational psychology, too, has begun to-emphasize the attitudinal aspects of education, particularly in explaining such phenomena as the development of value judgments, aesthetic attitudes, and preferential responses. From Kingsley there is the assertion that "What one enjoys is determined in a large measure by training and experience. The attitude of appreciation and enjoyment is like other attitudes, developed through learning. The school can and should enrich the lives of its pupils by the cultivation of attitudes that predispose them toward appreciative response."3 While no one disagrees with the idea that training affects the type of listening response, the degree to which such training reinforces or

An organizational analysis of collectivities

Abstract: T ABLE 1 presents a typology of collectivities. In Chart 1, these same types are arranged in a cross-classification that specifies their defining properties. I can commend this classification, not on the grounds of its being complete or formally elegant, but, instead, as having grown from work on diverse problems, as being quite general in conception, and as correlating well with important variables. The analytic scheme that underlies this typology has developed with use. I want to characterize that scheme more fully than was possible in its earlier stages. Then I will consider two further questions: How is this type of classification related to other ways of looking at collectivities; what, in general, is the range of its power to order observations? I begin by reporting illustrative correlations in order to establish the desirability of undertaking the theoretical explication contained in this paper. We can get to these illustrative correlations by using the lowercase letters in the second column of Table 1. The first illustration will use the letter "a" which appears beside "individuated heteronomy" and certain other types and the letter "b" which appears beside "commensalism" and "simple centralism." Child et al. (1958) have analyzed folk tales from a sample of 54 primitive societies, giving each society a score on the degree to which the theme of "need achievement" is present in these stories, (They follow McClelland and his associates (1953: 110-114) in defining need achievement as a need to succeed in "competition with a standard of excellence.") McClelland (1961:66) shows that there is a positive relationship (p-< .02) between these societies' scores on need achievement and the presence in them of full-time entrepreneurs. I had had occasion to classify 26 of the same societies according to the typology given in Table 1. For reasons reported later in this paper, I decided to see whether there was any relationship between this classification and the societies' scores on need achievement. As Chart 2 indicates, there is such a relationship. The types of society indexed in Table 1 by the letter "a" are more likely than others to have a high score. The value of chi square for this comparison is 12.32. (Chi-square was computed by the maximum likelihood method: df=2, p=<.Ol, C= .57.) Now compare the types of collectivities bearing the letter "c" with those indexed by "d." These notations guide us to the results in Chart 3. Slater and Slater (1965) coded 90 primitive societies for signs of male narcissism and then performed a centroid factor analysis on the resulting indices. They believe that their first factor (the first of two) is representative of the whole pattern of narcissism contained in their indices. The principal ingredients of this factor are indices of boasting and personal display. I had coded 38 of their 90 societies for another purpose, using the categories in Table 1.

Thinking about threats

Abstract: The development of a science of threat systems is a desirable but slow-dangerously slow-process (cf. Boulding, 1963). The uneven evolution of this science has given it several characteristics of doubtful value. In the first place, "strategic thinking" has acquired military connotations. When a student of international politics refers to "the strategists," he usually has in mind those who are primarily concerned with military policy-and he expects other students of international politics to know that this is what he has in mind. Although there are many nonmilitary situations in international politics in which the ability of one nation to gain its ends depends to an important degree on what other nations do (cf. Schelling, 1960, p. 5), such situations are rarely viewed as "strategic." Even within the field of military affairs, the term "strategic thinking" usually connotes a concern with nuclear deterrence policies. Although the valuable contributions to theorizing about threats by students of nuclear strategy must be acknowledged, it would be undesirable to treat such theories as the exclusive province of such scholars. In addition to its military connotations, the concept of strategic thought has become associated with game theory. Thinking about threats, however, is too important to be left to the game theorists. For example, after a highly stimulating discussion of "fractional threats," Schelling (1960, p. 184) talks about them as if the importance of his discussion lay in having found a rationale for such tactics in game theory terms. But what if Schelling had failed to find a niche in game theory for fractional threats? Should we then forget about them? Such tactics are clearly phenomena of the real world. Many students of international politics can benefit from Schelling's imaginative discussions regardless of their implications for game theory. This might be called the problem of "how to steal without getting caught"that is, how can the student of international politics "steal" Schellings's ideas without getting caught by Schelling's game theory orientation? For many students of international politics, the primary significance of Schelling's work lies in improved understanding of the real world, not in his contributions to the game theory. Threats pervade human relations and should not be discussed solely in terms of nuclear deterrence or game theory. The purpose of this paper is to broaden the context within which threats are discussed by looking at selected aspects of recent thinking about threats from a more general perspective than that of either game theory or nuclear strategy. The discussion will focus on: (1) the basic concept of threat, (2) the relationship between threats and promises, (3) the coerciveness of threats, (4) the costs of threats, (5) the role of ambiguity in threat systems, and (6) the relationship between threats and the concept of deterrence.

An Ethical Model for the Study of Values

Abstract: The author challenges conventional notions of societal development as dynamic economic performance, modernization of institutions or proliferation of goods and services. For him, authentic development aims toward the realization of human capabilities in all spheres. He examines common assumptions of social scientists who study value change in non-technological societies, contrasting these with another view on the dynamics of value change. Dr. Goulet presents an alternative research model which requires researchers to make themselves vulnerable to the populace under study.

The Fictive Use of Language

Abstract: Fiction has been of concern to both the aesthetician and the ontologist. The former is concerned with the criteria or standards by which we judge the aesthetic worth of a fictional work, the latter with whether our ontology must be enlarged to include possible or imaginary worlds in which are housed the characters and incidents referred to and depicted in such works. This is a paper on the ontology of fiction. It will attempt to answer these ontological questions concerning truth and reference in fiction by clarifying the use of language. Our paradigm case of the fictive use of language will be one in which the story-teller orally relates the fictional story in the presence of his audience, rather than one in which he inscribes his story so that it may be read at a later date. The value of considering the use of language in a face-to-face situation is that it brings before us in their full explicitness all of the different facets of a speech act, many of which often lie dormant in non-face-to-face uses and therefore are hard to discover from a consideration of such uses.

The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal: Comment by Two Who Are Unreconstructed

Abstract: Professor Sen (1970) in his recent paper advances a definition of liberalism which he claims "represents a value involving individual liberty that many people would subscribe to." He then shows that liberalism, by his definition, may conflict with Pareto optimality. We shall argue that his definition does not correspond to any common or acceptable notion of liberalism at all and that the only generally accepted principle of liberalism, far from conflicting with the Pareto principle, is in fact a special case of it. Liberalism means a devotion to liberty or individual freedom. We are no more eager to plunge into a full-scale analysis of the philosophical aspects of these terms than Sen has declared himself to be.1 A minimal explication of the values and assumptions underlying both Pareto optimality and liberalism is, however, required in order to come to a reasoned judgment on the possibility of conflict between the two. Implicit in the Paretian principle is the idea that the preferences of the individual, as conceived by himself, are the basis for determining his welfare. The Paretian principle also assumes that increases in individual welfare are desirable and that, whenever one person can be made better off without making another worse off, this results in a more desirable economic state. Liberalism may be broadly defined as the desire not to coerce individuals to accept choices that they would not have made voluntarily. With this definition, it is apparent that when the actions of one individual do not impinge on the welfare of others, then liberalism follows as a special case of the Paretian principle. Pareto optimality will be attained when individuals are not at the mercy of the collective and coercive actions of of others-when each individual makes choices on the assumption that no other single individual can cause him to take a particular action. Whenever the choices of one individual impinge on the welfare of

Support for Nation and Government Among English Children

Abstract: Political socialization refers to the developmental process through which political orientations and patterns of behavior are acquired by members of a society. Some persons acquire only limited political dispositions as they mature while others continuously elaborate and revise personal systems of political belief, value, motivation and activity as they pass through childhood arid adult life. In some part socialization of political orientations is conscious self-adaptation to an otherwise confusing social environment. More often, perhaps, it is the result of taking unconscious cues and examples from such convenient sources as family, school, peers and mass media of communication.

Social Determinants of Moral Ideas

Abstract: "Moral facts are facts like any others, they consist of rules of action which can be recognized by some distinctive characteristics; thus it must be possible to observe them, to describe and classify them."-Emile Durkheim A leading philosopher of the Warsaw school, Maria Ossowska here seeks to show that moral ideas can be examined with scientific rigor. She offers a sociology of morals that can be verified by observation and is philosophically based on the development of descriptive ethics. Ossowska goes on to examine how her approach to ethnical theory is related to the most important schools of moral philosophy, and considers how the model individual is related to social harmony. A central chapter demonstrates that the moral values a culture assigns to ideas and events are variables depending on social factors: the value put on human for instance, may vary with the birthrate. Among the social influences investigated in this book are the physical environment, demography, and urban ways of life, degree of industrialization, and many other factors. In the book's final section, Maria Ossowska addresses herself to a problem that is vexing in all ethical systems: how the ideal personality, the model individual, is related to social harmony. Among the ideal types of past societies, she singles out the Homeric warrior, the knight, the courtier, and the eighteenth-century bourgeois as case studies that illuminate different relations between society and the individual. Thoroughly at home in literature as well as in sociology and anthropology, Ossowska illustrates her approach with examples drawn from sources as familiar to English-speaking audiences as Benjamin Franklin and Robinson Crusoe.

Science is not value-free

Abstract: The scientific attitude involves a willingness to be objective. But many falsely assume additionally that such willingness implies being completely value-free. Actually, scientific research is value-saturated. At every step one faces the question, “Which is the best way?” Not only is it better to be than not to be scientific, scientists believe, but one ought to seek what is best relative to all aspects of science. Exploration is limited to (1) problems, (2) attitude and (3) methods. Even prejudice, which is evil when bias prevents or produces false results, may also be good when it helps produce true conclusions. Do policy scientists have special obligations regarding this issue?

Social Innovations in Organizations

Abstract: One of the vogue words these days is innovation. For some people it is even more it is a value word that implies something good and positive. As with most popular words, it is misused and has different meanings for different people. It may therefore be appropriate to present some definitions in order to reduce the semantic aspects of the problem as much as possible . The word innovation is used here in a broad sense covering the use of knowledge for creation and introduction of something new. In its widest sense the word encompasses discovery, invention, application, and diffusion. Whereas technological innovation is concerned with application of new technology, social innovation deals with application of new social patterns of human interaction.

The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal: Reply

Abstract: Professors Hillinger and Lapham's critique of my theorem on the impossibility of combining Conditions P (Pareto principle), L (liberalism), and U (unrestricted domain) does not question the validity of the theorem but denies that my definition of Condition L corresponds to the correct notion of liberalism. When writing my paper, I was afraid of definitional disputes, and after claiming that "Condition L represents a value involving individual liberty that many people would subscribe to" (a sentence that Hillinger and Lapham quote), I added that "whether such people are best described as liberals is a question that is not crucial to the point of the paper" (a sentence that they do not quote). However, while the validity of the theorem is not in dispute, its practical importance will depend on the exact interpretation of liberalism; and, hence, Hillinger and Lapham are within their rights to question my definition of Condition L. The alternative interpretation of liberalism on which Hillinger and Lapham (henceforth, HL) base their paper, and which they claim to be "the only generally accepted principle of liberalism," is nowhere precisely defined by HL. It is only "broadly defined" (to quote their expression) in highly general terms, but they do spell out its implications fairly precisely.' It appears from their definition that, whenever interpersonal interdependences are present, the principle of liberalism would not assert anything. "Whenever the choices of one individual impinge on the welfare of others there is no general presumption in favour of freedom of individual choice," and HL "are aware of no relatively value free principle of liberalism which could decide the issue in such a case" (p. 2).2 Liberalism, on this interpretation, would seem to demand freedom of individual action only when a person's action is not opposed by anyone else. It is clear why the principle of liberalism, thus defined, will not conflict with the Pareto principle: because it does not demand anything that the

On Transcending the Absurd: An Inquiry in the Sociology of Meaning'

Abstract: The literature of the absurd, represented by the works of Camus, Beckett, Sartre, and others is analyzed for its heuristic value in generating sociological theory. Drawing upon this literature it is argued that rebellion in the face of "institutional absurdity" may be a source of meaning for students and blacks in contemporary American Society. Further, it is suggested that we cast off our traditional perspective of viewing man as a "consonance seeker" in favor of viewing him, theoretically, as a "creator of dissonance" to which he can react, the end result of which is the acquisition of meaning The framework of the absurd is used to offer a critical appraisal of American Sociology. The paper concludes in support of an action orientation on the part of American sociologist.

Notions on National Characters in the Eighteenth Century

Abstract: IN THE eighteenth century, considerations relating to national characters formed a lively and intellectually reputable issue. Of one aspect of the concern, Hume declared: "There are few questions more curious than this, or which will oftener occur in our inquiries concerning human affairs.", In a more popular and less probing account, Goldsmith was later to concur. "In all the circle of human knowledge," he determined, "there is not perhaps a more pleasing employment, than that of comparing countries with each other."2 There was, in fact, a consensus on this, since the value of delineating the character of a nation was essentially that which was attributed to travel in general. It was again clearly stated by Goldsmith. In a misleading claim of originality, he remarked that "to consider nations in the same light as individuals, and to improve our native customs by whatever appears praiseworthy among foreigners, has been hitherto unattempted; it makes a subject at once replete with instruction and entertainment" (ibid.). Though the didacticism associated with this concern marks it as typically of the century, in practice the English commentator usually reassured himself by writing unfavorable accounts of foreign nations. The value of this topic for us today lies elsewhere. Viewed most generally, it reveals an intellectual activity of central importance in the eighteenth century-namely, the practice of drawing distinctions within the controlling framework of generalization. Viewed more closely, it reveals in this process quite a complicated jostling of ideas, for the recognition (or assumed existence) of national characters had to be reconciled with the premise of a universal human nature. In addition, there was the question of causation. Was a national character formed primarily by the climate? Or by a mode of government, by religion, by the gradual development of a tradition? To stress the influence of climate could be tantamount to adopting a materialistic understanding of man's nature, and so a decision here had implications which touched on basic

The Political Ideal of Privacy

Abstract: Privacy is a value or ideal in our society, in the Western World, and in liberal thought generally. By this I mean at least, and perhaps only, that ceteris paribus we think much more highly of a society which respects privacy and much less highly of one in which privacy is exposed to invasions. Privacy is therefore in some sense a basic contemporary liberal value. We liberals abhor the thought of a society in which there is censorship of letters, unrestricted phone tapping, bugging of private homes and of offices, searching, compulsory questionnaires by the government, employers, etc. Indeed, much of the force of novels such as Brave New World and 1984 rests on the total loss of privacy portrayed in the imagined new society. We value privacy, and we believe ourselves to have a right to privacy; and the right is thought of as not simply a negative right, the basis of which consists in the lack of rights in others to invade our privacy, but as a positive right in the enjoyment of which we may, by virtue of it, demand the help of the state, society, and other persons. The right to privacy, like all other rights, is of course seen to be a prima facie right. It may legitimately be overridden and is so overridden in situations such as those of national emergency. However, it is generally believed that there must be very good reasons for overriding this right, for invading privacy. This too is part of what I mean by saying that privacy is a value or ideal of our society, namely, that it is generally believed that there must be positive, powerful, justificatory reasons for invading a person's privacy. The U.N. acknowledged this. In its declaration concerning human rights it noted in its International Covenants of Human Rights, Article 17, that: "1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation. " 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."l

The Political Uses of Social Research

Abstract: As scientific disciplines, the social sciences are more limited, and hence less useful to government, than either the social science "establishment" or its radical critics contend. However, as a rationale for political action and inaction, and as a mode of political discourse, they have many demonstrable uses. The social sciences are not "value free" but a social enterprise of some complexity. At the same time, the federal government is not a conspiracy but a collection of subsystems loosely brought into coherence through the combined policy functions of the President and the Congress. At one level of government, social scientists contribute an orderly collection of facts and information. At another, they contribute to the interpretation of information. But in this interpretive role, their performance cannot be understood in apolitical terms; several kinds of politics influence their behavior: personal, professional, tactical, and party.

Ideology and Politics: The Rechtsstaat Idea in West Germany

Abstract: W hen in 1970 Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany exchanged visits with the East German Prime Minister, Willi Stoph, he began a new approach to the old problem of a divided Germany. The problem is one of many that politicians in West Germany's Federal Republic have faced as part of the legacy of the Nazi era. Since the founding of the Republic in 1949, West German politics has been marked by a widespread belief in a set of value judgments that have seemed to prohibit Governments from dealing with problems from the past in ways that otherwise had much to commend them. It was once thought, for example, that if these value judgments were to govern West German politics it would be impossible for exchanges like the one between Brandt and Stoph to take place, or for Nazi criminals apprehended after a certain date to be prosecuted. Belief in these value judgments is itself a product of the Nazi experience, though that alone is not a sufficient explanation. The value judgments form an ideology, if we take "ideology" to mean a set of interrelated ideas about human beings and their interactions, at least some of which are value judgments and all of which are believed. The value judgment discussed here have as their theme the rule of law; taken together they constitute the idea of the Rechtsstaat. My purpose is to examine the Rechtsstaat idea, to offer an adequate explanation of the belief in it, and to show how this belief has affected political behavior in West Germany.

Evaluation as Public Policy

Abstract: Before one can evaluate anything, however, a standard for it must exist. What is the origin of standards? In the Bureau of Standards in Washington, D.C., immutable tangible models of materials exist which provide those specific descriptions needed to create and use a standard wherever it is needed. In social affairs too, we have standards, but they obviously vary with community and individual. One central problem in evaluating public school programs derives from the absence of standards. Standards are the specifications of models of excellence which, in turn, are validated by value. Value assumptions are first posited and then verified where possible through reality testing. Generally, however, the values underlying models of excellence and standards remain unproven--they are reflections of philosophy or social mores rather than fact.

A Philosopher's View of Values and Ethics.

Abstract: Counseling is the practical art of making rational decisions about values; thus it is part science and part philosophy. As a professional activity it falls midway between science and philosophy and partakes of the characteristics of both. Counseling readily recognizes its dependence on professional science for empirical knowledge about fact and theory but tends to ignore the analytic contributions of professional philosophy for understanding the nature of value and value theory. Counseling will be a better art when counselors are as concerned with what philosophy says about values as they are with the contributions of the social sciences.

The Concept of Hierarchy

Abstract: The Concept of Hierarchy, as well as various problems, aspects and doctrines attaching to it, was preposterously overrated in Greek philosophy, especially Platonic and Neo-platonic; probably even more so in medieval Scholastic philosophy which attempted to rationalize its supernaturalistic obsession with arguments taken from Greek, chiefly Aristotelian and thus semi-Platonic perfectionalism as a putative “natural” basis for it. Some great exponents of the modern German philosophy of Value, Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, represent the same tradition in a doubtless more critical and more properly philosophic, less naively metaphysical, but still in a pretty dogmatically intuitional fashion. The counterpart to this we find to be rampant in modern English-speaking philosophy dominated by the thought-style of Logical Positivism, though many of its more recent representatives would disown that label. Mouthpieces of an egalitarian, machine-ridden and (at least apparently) utilitarian and functional society intolerant of the idea of kings, aristocrats, slaves, serfs, even rich and poor nay literate and illiterate, these thinkers idolize human “wanting” as such, whatever its contents and characteristics, would reduce all value to “needs” or “desires” and their different “intensities” and in their turn, I venture to say, seek preposterously to evade the very concept of Hierarchy, not only on the plane of social philosophy but also in the context of Axiology. They postulate a flattened world from which the experience of Verticality is all but wholly excluded.

Task Experience and Intertribal Value Differences on the Wind River Reservation

Abstract: A study of the value orientations of the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Indians living on a reservation in Northwestern Wyoming suggests that the Shoshone, who stress individualistic and achievement orientations, hold values closer to the whites living on or near the reservation, than the Arapaho who stress collectivistic and nonachievement orientations. These tribal differences in value orientations can be explained by the different ways in which the two tribes perceive the white reference group. The Shoshone consider the white reference group as an audience group which rewards them for task performances sanctioned by achievement and individualistic values. The Arapaho, who consider the whites as a reference group which punishes but does not reward them for task performances based on white values, have tended to reject white values and to develop tribal solidarity vis-'a-vis the whites by rewarding collectivistic task solutions as well as giving positive sanction to lower aspiration levels through stress on "being," "present," and "subjugation-to-nature" orientations. A great deal of research has been done on the role which values and value systems play in promoting sociocultural integration as well as their influence on the nature and direction of culture change. However, there has been little research investigating the actual sociocultural processes that promote value persistence or variation. The term value has been defined in many ways but in this paper values will be considered to be conceptions ofthe desirable patterns, goals and norms. Values are moral standards which serve as criteria by which the worthwhileness of the modes, means and ends of action can be evaluated. Thus Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961:395) have defined a value as ".... a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from the available means, modes and ends of action.." Values or evaluative orientations must be distinguished from cathectic orientations which represent preferences for one kind of behavior, activity or relationship whether considered highly desirable or not and cognitive orientations which involve axioms, propositions, or empirical generalizations dealing with some feature of human experience but not involving a liking or disliking for objects or relationships (Locke and Breer, 1965:7). Values are objects, goals or relationships which are considered desirable not necessarily currently desired or preferred in every situation. They serve as criteria by which conduct is judged

A Philosophy for the Teacher of Foreign Languages.

Abstract: W E ARE all very well aware indeed that we are caught up in a crisis in foreign-language teaching. While this is not the first time in the twentieth century that teachers of foreign languages have seen their discipline attacked and its value questioned, it seems clear that this crisis is fundamentally different in one essential respect from all of the others that have preceded it: foreign languages have not been singled out and attacked by critics who question specifically the value of study of a foreign language as a requirement either for admission into college or as part of an undergraduate curriculum-the crisis in which we find ourselves enmeshed is much more general. The fundamental question being raised on all sides concerns no specific discipline or even any particular combination of disciplines. What is under attack in the colleges is the basic principle that an authority-the Faculty-has the right and obligation to establish specific curricula whose requirements students must meet in order to be graduat d with the degree of bachelor of arts. My impression is that the day is not far off when th requirements for the degree of bachelor science will be subjected to the same kind of s rutiny. Nevertheless, for the moment at least, the science curricula are not being questioned as severely and searchingly as are those leading to degrees in the arts. It is certainly not difficult to understand the reason for this state of affairs. A curriculum in science-for all the claims scientists may make about the generalizable value of t aining in one science-is a thorough-going and integrated training in a specific discipline and in closely allied disciplines for the purpose of producing a competent, trained scientist able to perform in certain specifiable ways. On the other hand, the basic claim of a liberal-arts curriculum is that it produces "educated men and women"whatever we may mean or may ever have meant by that expression. Until recently there was a consensus in the United States and in other 5

Art as Communicable Knowledge.

Abstract: The following remarks are addressed to the notion that fine art is a special mode of thought and knowledge. This speciality is most interesting, for we suppose the value of that knowledge shares in the value we place on knowledge in general, and, additionally, in the special value we place on art for both aesthetic and nonaesthetic reasons. The implications this holds for a theory of art education are obvious. Insofar as aesthetic speculation may regard the experience of fine arts as essentially an exchange of knowledge, this would certainly be considered as contributing to a theory of fine arts as communicable knowledge. As a kind of knowledge, even special or unique, it must be supposed as well that it can be learned and promoted by educational means. Art as knowledge in the above sense is especially, perhaps peculiarly, a modem innovation. In the traditional view, from the Latin ars and the Greek techne, art was any knowledge that served as a skill in transforming material. Art was craftsmanship and learned as such. That the experience of art was a form of divine or inspirational madness was never entirely absent from classical aesthetics. Inspired madness was more a disease of poets than artists and was not believed by the ancients to be a functioning, valuable knowledge. The fine arts stood in sometimes subservient, sometimes purely mystical relation to philosophy, the paragon of true knowledge. St. Thomas did speak of art as intellectual, its apprehension the response of the "maxime cognoscitivi" sight and hearing. But art was still essentially "making," a job, in the classic sense,

Wykłady z etyki

Abstract: In scientific ethics which is equivalent to the theory of human action analysed in terms of the value of goodness, researches tend to follow different directions depending on how its principal problems are solved. Thus, as regards the scope of procedure of ethical research, we can distinguish between individual and social ethics. The question about the source of morality (what is the origin of the difference between good and evil acts) is the point of departure of heteronomic (authoritative) and autonomous ethics. Different answers to the question about the ethical emotionalism or intellectualism, with ethical rigorism as one of its variants. The answers to the problems involved in the ethical criterion, as far as its concerned, lead either to teleological (eudeamonism or perfectionism) or ateleological or nomical ethics. If it is thought necessary to justify some ethical criterion, the justifications tend either in the direction of ethical criterion is answered either in terms of absolutist or relativists ethics. Metascientific analyses of the cognitive status of ethics in turn provide the points for debates between those advocating the scientific nature of moral axiology and normative ethics and the followers of descriptive ethics.

The Symbolism of Archery

Abstract: Homage to you, fletchers, and to you, makers of bows! —TS. 1 IV.5.3.2 and 4.2 THE symbolic content of an art is originally bound up with its practical function, but is not necessarily lost when under changed conditions the art is no longer practiced of necessity but as a game or sport; and even when such a sport has been completely secularized and has become for the profane a mere recreation or amusement it is still possible for whoever possesses the requisite knowledge of traditional symbolism to complete this physical participation in the sport, or enjoyment of it as a spectacle, by an understanding of its forgotten significance, and so restore, for himself at least, the "polar balance of physical and metaphysical" that is characteristic of all traditional cultures. The position of archery in Turkey, long after the introduction of firearms had robbed the bow and arrow of their military value, provides us an excellent example of the ritual values that may still inhere in what to a modern observer might appear to be a "mere sport". Here archery had become already in the fifteenth century a "sport" under royal patronage, the sultans themselves competing with others in the "field" meidān. In the sixteenth century, at the circumcision festivals of the sons of Muhammad II, competing archers shot their arrows through iron plates and metal mirrors, or shot at valuable prizes set up on high posts: the symbolisms involved are evidently those of "penetration", and that of the attainment of solar goods not within the archer's direct reach; we may assume that, as in India, the "doctrine" implied an identification of the archer himself with the arrow that reached its mark.