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Showing papers on "Value (ethics) published in 1973"


01 Jan 1973
TL;DR: The value of children to parents in several socioeconomic strata of the U.S. and around the world is reviewed in this paper, and it is concluded that child care centers would not decrease fertility because it would make it easier for women at all economic levels to have children and work.
Abstract: Studies on the value of children to parents in several socioeconomic strata of the U.S. and around the world are reviewed. Although these studies are not comparable due to widely varying methodologies they all point to several intrinsic values in the parent-child relationship. There are 4 reasons for studying the value of children: to motivate fertility regulation to anticipate compensations which might be necessary to achieve small family size to predict fertility motivations and population trends and to consider the value of children in the parent-child relationship. In less developed countries children have ec onomic value both in the present and as support in old age. In developed countries however children are an economic liability. Yet Americans still want 2-3 children. Studies have shown that in the U.S. children signify the parent has reached adult status and provide social identity. Children are also an expansion of the self into a larger entity which is related to social norms regarding the desirability of having children as the "natural" thing to do. Children also provide pri mary group ties stimulation fun and a feeling of creativity. For some parents they provide a feeling of power and a means of social comparison or competition. A theoretical model is then presented to help determine changes which would result in a decreased desire for children. It consists of 5 classes of variables: 1) the value of children 2) alternative sources of the value 3) costs 4) barriers and 5) facilitators. Female employment as an alternative to childrearing is explored using this model. It is concluded that child-care centers would not decrease fertility because it would make it easier for women at all economic levels to have children and work. Since the educated woman is more likely to find satisfying employment her fertility is likely to decrease but the uneducated woman who has a routine job could continue to seek fulfillment in her children. Also the drop in children will mean a drop in the employment opportunities in fields related to children. This will make it difficult for the society to find employment for all its women. In countries where the extended family makes surrogate mothers available employment is an adjunct to rep roduction and the employment-fertility relationship may be depressed or nonexistent. Suggestions for further research are then given.

413 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Dec 1973
TL;DR: In this paper, a study of Durkheim seeks to help the reader to achieve a historical understanding of his ideas and to form critical judgments about their value, without which no adequate critical assessment is possible.
Abstract: This study of Durkheim seeks to help the reader to achieve a historical understanding of his ideas and to form critical judgments about their value. To some extent these tow aims are contradictory. On the one hand, one seeks to understand: what did Durkheim really mean, how did he see the world, how did his ideas related to one another and how did they develop, how did they related to their biographical and historical context, how were they received, what influence did they have and to what criticism were they subjected, what was it like not to make certain distinctions, not to see certain errors, of fact or of logic, not to know what has subsequently become known? On the other hand, one seeks to assess: how valuable and how valid are the ideas, to what fruitful insights and explanations do they lead, how do they stand up to analysis and to the evidence, what is their present value? Yet it seems that it is only by inducing oneself not to see and only by seeing them that one can make a critical assessment. The only solution is to pursue both aimsseeing and not seeingsimultaneously. More particularly, this book has the primary object of achieving that sympathetic understanding without which no adequate critical assessment is possible. It is a study in intellectual history which is also intended as a contribution to sociological theory. "

357 citations


Book
01 Jan 1973
TL;DR: The authors examines the ways in which the spread of pragmatism and scientific naturalism affected developments in philosophy, social science, and law, and traces the effects of these developments on traditional assumptions of democratic theory.
Abstract: "Widely acclaimed for its originality and penetration, this award-winning study of American thought in the twentieth century examines the ways in which the spread of pragmatism and scientific naturalism affected developments in philosophy, social science, and law, and traces the effects of these developments on traditional assumptions of democratic theory."

181 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1973
TL;DR: The problem of generalizing expertise is essentially one of confusing expertise in technical knowledge of a given scientific area with knowledge of what is morally required in that area.
Abstract: of expertise arises when, consciously or unconsciously, it is assumed that an individual with scientific expertise in a particular area also has expertise in the value judgments necessary to make policy recommendations simply because he has scientific expertise. This assumption is very pervasive in decision making in scientific areas, but unwarranted. To reject this assumption does not imply that those with scientific expertise have no right or authority to make policy recommendations. It does not even imply that some individuals with scientific expertise might not also have expertise in the ethical and other value considerations which go into policy making. But such relationships must be demonstrated and such demonstrations are difficult to come by. In any case, we cannot generalize expertise by assumption-that, at least, is the thesis of this paper. The problem of generalizing expertise is essentially one of confusing expertise in technical knowledge of a given scientific area with knowledge of what is morally required in that area. A vivid and pervasive example of generalizing expertise has arisen in the discussion of the socalled new definition of death. There has been a strong and lingering tendency to defend the view that the physician should retain the authority to decide which concept of death is used in deciding whether or not a patient in an irreversible and terminal coma is dead or alive. In one commentary, for instance, the claim was made that "a definition of death calls for

81 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1973
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define three basic dimensions of value orientations shared by social workers: preferred conceptions of people, preferred outcomes for people, and preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people.
Abstract: Values may be conceived along three basic dimensions which would account for the major value orientations shared by social workers and related to all aspects of their professional practice. These are: preferred conceptions of people, preferred outcomes for people, and preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people. Distinguished from “knowledge,” and adequately refined, these categories of values might constitute a guide for planning and action in social work practice and education. The predictability of professional behavior which might then result would also define the expectations of clients and society with respect to what the social work profession stands for and what it does.

67 citations


Book
01 Jan 1973
TL;DR: Man Unfolding and The Survival of the Wisest offers a basis for the judgment of ethical principles, a basis from which ethics can be taught, seen within the broad perspective of the natural evolutionary process.
Abstract: These may be the most significant and provocative questions of our time. They are the central questions that Dr. Jonas Salk poses and explores in Man Unfolding and The Survival of the Wisest. In both works Salk draws upon his knowledge and understanding of biological systems to speculate upon the course of human metabiological evolution. Reasoning analogically, Salk compares the curve of human population growth as projected to the year 2000 to the sigmoid curve frequently observed in the population growth of other living systems. He concludes that if human population growth is to follow the sigmoid pattern, massive changes will occur within the next few decades not only in human behavior but also in the deeper attitudes and values that govern behavior. If a catastrophic loss of life is to be averted and the quality of life improved, a complete inversion of values will be required, as man moves from an epoch based upon the survival of the fittest, in the Darwinian sense, into an epoch ruled according to the wisdom of cooperation, an epoch in which the welfare of the individual and the welfare of the species are inextricably bound. In the emerging epoch, it will be not only desirable but also necessary to achieve "double-win" rather than "win-lose" resolutions to human conflicts. Seen within the broad perspective of the natural evolutionary process, ethical precepts can be evaluated and established according to their evolutionary value, biologically and metabiologically. Thus, amid an atmosphere of changing values, Salk offers a basis for the judgment of ethical principles, a basis from which ethics can be taught. ? Mary Ellen Diefenbach (Research associate in metabiology, Salk Institute for Biological Studies)

56 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a preliminary scrutiny of available evidence suggests that a value consensus does not exist, and there is a high concentration of wealth and economic control which appears to extend into vital political and ideological areas, thereby implying the existence of a dominant or ruling class.
Abstract: Sociological theory poses the issue of whether ideational or coercive factors provide the central basis of social order. The former view maintains (and requires) that a value consensus exist in the empirical world; the latter assumes the existence of a ruling class which dominates the ideational institutions of the society. A preliminary scrutiny of available evidence suggests that: (1) a value consensus does not exist, and (2) there is a high concentration of wealth and economic control which appears to extend into vital political and ideological areas, thereby implying the existence of a dominant or ruling class. Based upon these conclusions, the concept of ideological hegemony is introduced as a significant component of a Marxist view of social order. The hegemonic process is described and available evidence is examined in the areas of political socialization and mass media. A pattern in which debate and discussion are circumscribed while alternative values and world views are ignored or suppressed was found to characterize these two areas. This pattern was seen to provide further support for the Marxist view that an ideological hegemony imposed by the dominant class is the ideational manifestation of a social order based upon coercion. THE PROBLEM of social order has been of persistent interest to social and political theorists. The most fundamental issue in the theoretical debates has been whether coercive or ideational forces provide the more central basis for social order. Two well-defined positions have emerged: 1) Following Durkheim, Parsons and his followers have asserted that ideational factors (e.g., cultural values) provide the bedrock of social order; 2) the Marxist position has held that the ideological superstructure emerges in response to the existing social structure defined in terms of coercive economic and political social relations. In the latter view, the dominant class in the society is able to reinforce its material control through the successful extension of that control to the ideational arena, specifically within the institutions of civil society (cf., Marx and Engels, 1947:39).

50 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The theoretical utility of classifying a regime as "authoritarian" remains unclear as discussed by the authors, and the way in which such a regime's defining characteristics produce distinctive political processes and behavior must be demonstrated.
Abstract: In recent years, as political scientists have witnessed the establishment of non-democratic governments in an ever-increasing number of countries, there has been renewed interest in the concept of an authoritarian regime. Despite its frequent use, however, the concept of an authoritarian regime rarely has been defined so that it could be applied in a comparative analysis. Furthermore, the theoretical utility of classifying a regime as “authoritarian” remains unclear. If the classification is to have some explanatory value, the way in which such a regime's defining characteristics produce distinctive political processes and behavior must be demonstrated.

49 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine Kuhn's change of view about the nature of scientific practice, and an attempt is made to show why this new view makes most works by political scientists who used his original ideas of limited, if any, value.
Abstract: The ideas of the historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn have had a considerable impact on discussions about political inquiry. In adopting Kuhn's ideas most political scientists have failed to question either the accuracy, nature or applicability of Kuhn's view of scientific practice. The use political scientists have made of Kuhn's central ideas, and the criticisms philosophers and historians of science have leveled against Kuhn, are examined. Kuhn's change of view about the nature of scientific practice is discussed, and an attempt is made to show why Kuhn's new view makes most works by political scientists who used his original ideas of limited, if any, value. We also examine Kuhn's position on the role of values rather than rules in assessing scientific formulations, and argue that Kuhn's position here is nothing more than speculations about the sociology of knowledge, speculations that hardly go beyond previous remarks on this topic.

32 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1973
TL;DR: Altschuler as discussed by the authors examines the political and administrative issues inherent in planning and land-use decisions in American cities and argues that for planning to be successful, goal premises must be established in a politically compelling manner.
Abstract: Alan Altschuler is interested in examining the political and administrative issues inherent in planning and land-use decisions in American cities. He focuses on how planners make difficult professional and value choices. Based on case studies of planning in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, this selection is concerned with how planners define the public interest and engage in community goal conception. Altshuler argues that for planning to be successful, goal premises must be established in a politically compelling manner.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a conceptual map underlying this program is constructed in reference to contemporary theories of value and system-environment interaction patterns, defining patterns of optimum physical and mental development in persons.
Abstract: Contemporary general systems theory encompasses systems science and technology, as well as systems philosophy. The latter is the growing edge where conceptual innovations are explored and their relevance to concrete problems examined. Philosophical value theory can be reconstructed in the framework of systems philosophy by conceiving of values as expressions of various states of adaptation of the individual to his biological and sociocultural environment. Hereby the way is opened to a science of normative values, defining patterns of optimum physical and mental development in persons. The basic conceptual map underlying this program is constructed in reference to contemporary theories of value and system-environment interaction patterns.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the various contending positions in the contemporary Theory of Value share one tacit presupposition, namely that the world of facts is value-neutral, and a critique attempts to show that it cannot be defended.
Abstract: The first part of this paper argues that the various contending positions in the contemporary Theory of Value share one tacit presupposition, namely that the world of facts is value‐neutral Some of the sources of this premise are identified and a critique attempts to show that it cannot be defended The second part delineates the general implications that the abandonment of this premise would have for the Theory of Value and outlines an alternative position

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, an inventory of personal value statements was constructed, administered to two large samples, and factor analyzed, and four higher-level dimensions were identified in both samples: acceptance of authority, work ethic, humanistic orientation, and Hedonistic orientation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the specific interplay of values and facts in the concrete context of their concern, and distinguish a number of criteria for the specification of social ends; for instance, the maximin principle that improvements in a value distribution consisting in cutting off the bottom of the distribution have priority over raising the top.
Abstract: Social planning deals centrally with human values—values which are important even though they do not appear as explicit factors in the classical problems of social welfare. The philosophical question as to whether facts can provide a logical basis for values need not be considered by the planner. He focuses, rather, on the specific interplay of values and facts in the concrete context of his concern. In the analysis of this interplay we can distinguish a number ofprinciples, criteria for the specification of social ends; for instance, the maximin principle, that improvements in a value distribution consisting in cutting off the bottom of the distribution have priority over raising the top. Social ends, in turn, are analysable intoideals, goals, andobjectives—directions, regions and points, respectively, in the value space. Cutting across these are the desiredqualities of the experience of pursuing those ends, qualities allowing for the assessment of planned alternatives by configurational judgment, rather than by a presumed summation of component values.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Partisanship in the United States Senate: I869-I9oi Increasingly, historians of all ideological persuasions speak of what Wiebe so aptly termed the "search for order" which preoccupied Americans around the turn of the century as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Partisanship in the United States Senate: I869-I9oi Increasingly, historians of all ideological persuasions speak of what Wiebe so aptly termed the "search for order" which preoccupied Americans around the turn of the century.' Between I880 and I920, these historians argue, the United States underwent an organizational revolution that transformed all elements of the social order. Businessmen, workers, and farmers all saw that they must "organize or perish."2 In Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869-1901, Rothman presented a case study of the impact of professionalization and bureaucratization on the development of American political institutions. For Rothman, the dramatic changes taking place within the larger society forced the rationalization of political structures under the leadership of professional politicians who recognized "the value of united action and effective leadership." In general, he found that by the end of the century "American institutions ... [had] proved equal to the challenge." During the years between 1869 and I9go party organization emerged to dominate the business of the Senate and "impose unprecedented discipline on roll calls." 3 Rothman viewed partisanship as a product of party organization that emerged in response

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the value for planning of the systems approach (particularly as expressed by Chadwick and McLoughlin) to (a) the phenomena with which planning is concerned and (b) the planning process.
Abstract: This paper attempts to examine the value for planning of the systems approach (particularly as expressed by Chadwick and McLoughlin) to (a) the phenomena with which planning is concerned and (b) the planning process. It is maintained that the assumption of systemness by Chadwick and MeLoughlin is unwarranted and that the assumption has not produced any interesting substantive propositions. It concludes that planning theory must begin by recognising the ideological and political nature of the planning act and that it is to the social sciences that planning must look for theory construction.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1973
TL;DR: According to Information Theory, the information content of a table of numbers does not depend upon how difficult it was to obtain the entries in the table, but only upon whether or not the authors know how to reconstruct the entire table or any parts of it.
Abstract: According to Information Theory, [Cf Leon Brillouin, Science and Information Theory, Acacemic Press, N. Y. 1956, pp. 292-3], the information content of a table of numbers does not depend upon how difficult it was to obtain the entries in the table, but only upon whether or not we know how, or how precisely we know how, to reconstruct the entire table or any parts of it. Consequently, from present Information Theory, since we "know in advance" how a table of since is constructed, such a table contains absolutely no information. For a person who does not "know in advance" how to construct a table of sines, however, the table would indeed contain "Information." This ambiguity apparently contradicts the basic statement [Leon Brillouin, op. cit., page 10] that "Information is an absolute quantity which has the same numerical value for any observer," a contradiction which remains even when we accept Brillouins next statement that "The human value of the information, on the other hand, would necessarily be a relative quantity, and would have different values for different observers, according to the possibility of their understanding it and using it later."

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the concept of ethnicity, by itself, is of limited value as a key to understanding the political dynamics of a country at all levels, and they need an explanation, not only of what produces solidarity inside groups, but also how groups interact, as they do to some extent, across ethnic barriers.
Abstract: ven in pre-eminently "ethnic" states, such as Malaysia, the concept of ethnicity, by itself, is of limited value as a key to understanding the political dynamics of a country at all levels. It may sometimes be difficult to define what ethnic units are, so recent have been the formation of blocs of individuals of appreciable size which have any ethnic group solidarity. Even if such units have been identified, ethnic considerations do not help much to explain conflict within a group. Moreover, we need an explanation, not only of what produces solidarity inside groups, but also how groups interact, as they do to some extent, across ethnic barriers. To understand this is especially important in Malaysia where the ruling party, at the federal level and also in the states of Sarawak and Sabah, is an "Alliance" party, which has the explicit aim of bridging gaps by a structure which is "ethnic" at the grass roots but "supra-ethnic" at the top.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors identify the different assumptions regarding decision-making systems, interaction, and goals between the establishment and the counter culture which make the rhetorical conflicts so profound and inevitable, and use them to distinguish the major economic, political, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and philosophic value judgments used as premises for persuasion by each culture.
Abstract: Government and poll data released in 1971 and late 1972 suggest that the nation remains culturally divided. Speech communication scholars have broadened the scope of rhetoric in order to more adequately describe, interpret, and evaluate this intensely moral or ethical conflict. The central purpose of this essay is to identify the different assumptions regarding decision‐making systems, interaction, and goals between the establishment and the counter culture which make the rhetorical conflicts so profound and inevitable. Generic and axiological methods are useful critical research tools for such an effort. The generic approach provides the foundation for viewing the establishment and the counter culture as distinct rhetorical genres. The axiological perspective distinguishes the major economic, political, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and philosophic value judgments used as premises for persuasion by each culture. Ultimately, a dialectic, rather than consensus, model would appear to be the most useful way ...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the value of a scientific discipline depends upon the metapropositions upon which it is erected, and the question is raised as to the logic of scientific psychology.
Abstract: Assuming that the value of a scientific discipline depends upon the metapropositions upon which it is erected, the question is raised as to the logic of scientific psychology. Prevailing psychological foundations do not appear to meet natural science criteria. It is suggested that Interbehavioral Postulates offer satisfactory Propositions for a scientific psychology.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a little about Frank Knight as a philosopher and citizen-at-large of the University of Chicago is described, in terms of an observation Aristotle made about his teacher, Plato, who used to remind his associates of the difference between moving from and moving toward first principles.
Abstract: I wish to say a little about Frank Knight as a philosopher and citizen-atlarge of the University. In doing so my first obligation is to take what precautions I can to prevent my being misunderstood. To be sure, he was, from 1945 onward, by title a professor of philosophy as well as of social science; but I am not speaking, except incidentally, of philosophy in its professional or academic form-as what students and professors of philosophy normally busy themselves with. I am speaking of philosophy in its ancient character as an activity which has no end, and produces no authoritative doctrines, just because it reflects critically on the aims, interrelations, limitations, and inevitable distortions of all doctrines. As Immanuel Kant put it, this cosmicall" concept of philosophy, "which has always formed the real basis of the term, and especially when it has been personified in the ideal of the philosopher," is "the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason. . . . In this sense of the term it would be vainglorious to entitle oneself a philosopher and pretend to have equalled the pattern which exists in idea alone." Frank, being the least vainglorious of men, would be the first to disclaim such a title; yet philosophy in that spirit was, I believe, his first intellectual love. I believe, too, that his practice made it clear that he thought that same spirit should be the "ultimate" concern of a university, without which all its other proper and characteristic activities become confused and degraded. Moreover, a university so occupied with philosophy would be one of the best available approximations to what he called "the ideal type of human association; which is to say, of all true society: . . . the [cooperative] pursuit of truth or of value in any form." Our colleague, Bill O'Meara, who saw much of him in his last years, has made the happy suggestion that I describe Frank's intellectual activity in terms of an observation Aristotle made about his teacher, Plato, who used to remind his associates of the difference between moving from and moving toward first principles. Most of the time, we proceed from prin-

Journal Article
01 Jan 1973-Daedalus
TL;DR: For example, the authors argued that the humanities are disserviceable anachronisms and the classical languages are "substantially useless information" because they are unable to reflect upon questions which bear on man as an acting, thinking, feeling subject, not as an object for analytic, factorial, causal analysis.
Abstract: value of the humanities (to be precise, of history and philosophy). Even more, he is convinced that only the humanities are able to handle the question of the worth of human occupations?including the sciences proper?because the sciences are unable to reflect upon questions which bear on man considered as an acting, thinking, feeling subject, not as an object for analytic, factorial, causal analysis. He knows quite well that he is up against a mightly phalanx repre senting the opposing view and against its Goliath, old Thorstein Veblen, who, in his nearly unbearably repetitious manner, made bold to show that there is no legitimate place for traditional learning in modern society: the humanities, he claimed, "are, from the point of view of economic efficiency in the broader sense, disserviceable anachronisms," and the classical languages are "substantially useless information."1 This contention is formidable indeed, since Western, and even Eastern societies insofar as they are to be considered "modern," have gone over to Veblen, wiped out "anthropomorphic," "priestly," and "leisure class" ideals, put a stigma on concepts of "status" and "envious comparison," and re nounced everything non-productive and not "workmanlike." What Veblen called the study of causal relations in nature and society has become, it would appear, the central interest in our world.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors make a connection between Valla's beliefs about the primacy of rhetorical thinking and his conclusions about the nature and purpose of historical writing, and show how these influence his thinking on one specific topic, namely, history.
Abstract: Lorenzo Valla is often identified as the ultimate humanist of the fifteenth century. His extreme advocacy of the power and value of rhetoric, and his contemptuous rejection of any form of intellectual expression-be it bad grammar or scholastic philosophy-which he conceived to be hostile to rhetoric have been remarked on by everyone who has had occasion to examine his works. What I propose to do here is to bring out some of the particular beliefs which Valla held as a consequence of his rhetorical position, and to show how these influence his thinking on one specific topic, namely, history. I do not intend to discuss all of his novel opinions or controversial reinterpretations of legal, philological, Roman, or Church history; rather, to use a convenient anachronism, I propose to examine his philosophy of history. The fundamental assumption on which the discussion is to rest is that there does exist a connection between Valla's beliefs about the primacy of rhetorical thinking and his conclusions about the nature and purpose of historical writing, and that to illustrate this connection is a particularly fruitful way of approaching Valla's thought. In view of the perennial debate as to whether or not Valla was a philosopher, some clarification of terminology is in order at this point. Valla, of course, constantly denied being a philosopher; equally, we now identify many of his concerns with those of philosophy, especially his interest in language and its relation to reality. Valla's objections to "philosophy" or to "dialectic" are directed against a specific concept of philosophical reasoning and use of language, with the intention of substituting a different concept of his own, which he identifies with that of the rhetorician. He claims, indeed, that "dialectic" is simply a subdivision of rhetoric, a type of inventio characterized by exclusive use of the syllogism.' What he is attacking is not just dialectic or scholastic philosophy in itself, but its extraordinary predominance to the exclusion of other, better kinds of argument and uses of language. So when

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The first principle of human behavior is that people do not behave according to the facts as others see them; they behave in terms of what seems to them to be so as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The first principle is this: people do not behave according to the facts as others see them; they behave in terms of what seems to them to be so. The psychologist expresses this technically as: Behavior is a function of perception. What affects human behavior, we are beginning to understand, is not so much the forces exerted on people from without as the meanings existing for the individual within. It is feelings, beliefs, convictions, attitudes … of the person who is behaving that constitutes the directing forces of behavior.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors stress the need to evaluate existing public programs and policies to insure they are meeting their objectives in an efficient and orderly manner, whether it be to consider the political setting of program evaluation or the fact that program evaluation is very different in the public and private sectors.
Abstract: writings have stressed the need to evaluate existing public programs and policies to insure they are meeting their objectives in an efficient and orderly manner.1 Concern with evaluation, whether it be to ". . . consider the political setting of program evaluation .. ."2 or the fact that ". . . program evaluation is very different in the public and private sectors ...,"3 may result in positive contributions to the development of effective urban public policy. Yehezkel Dror has maintained that "trying to evaluate complex activities involves one in a series of difficult problems that have not yet been solved."4 In addition to the problems of complexity, any program or policy evaluation model should attempt to develop sufficient "feedback" and information exchange for the program under evaluation to permit and even encourage "mid-course" corrections and adjustments. If this is not done, program evaluation will have very limited value to the administration responsible for a given program,

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: HIS PAPER deals with that quality of managerial support systems which bears on the ability of such systems to provide the manager with "information".
Abstract: HIS PAPER deals with that quality of managerial support systems which bears on the ability of such systems to provide the manager with "information." If the paper itself is to have that quality which is described as "providing information," it must cause a change in the "knowledge" of those who hear it.' Furthermore, if the information contained in the paper is to have "value," it must cause a change in "knowledge" that in turn causes the receivers of this message to select future courses of action which lead to outcomes which have

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, Babbitt et al. proposed a cognitive balance model to account for individual role-taking ability through an analysis of differing dyadic characteristics of the nuclear family.
Abstract: The study of interpersonal relationships has received continued empirical attention from behavioral scientists since Newcomb's classic study involving college roommates (Newcomb, 1953). Additionally, phenomenologists have exhibited increasing interest in the inner workings of interpersonal perception (Garfinkel, 1964; Icheiser, 1955; Laing, Phillipson, and Lee, 1966; Schutz, 1962; Stark, 1970). In spite of such attention, there has been a general failure to account for differences in an individual's ability to accurately take the role of others. Perhaps this is because the majority of empirical investigations have been carried out by the more psychologically oriented researchers who, for the most part, have chosen to use the concept "empathy" in instances where the more socially oriented researcher and theorist would prefer the concept "role-taking." The result has been a greater emphasis given to the psychological, intrapersonal, and emotive aspects of the phenomenon rather than to the more social, interpersonal aspects. The present report is an attempt to account for individual role-taking ability through an analysis of differing dyadic characteristics of the nuclear family. The theory employed in the present work has been suggested, to one degree or another, by a body of authors which numbers among its members both psychologically and sociologically oriented social psychologists (Broxton, 1963; Byrne, 1961; Byrne and Blaylock, 1963; Levinger and Breedlove, 1966; Newcomb, 1959, 1961; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; Peak, 1958; Scheff, 1967). These authors are in agreement that, in the explanation of role-taking phenomena, the balance model may be useful. In addition, the theory is tied to the work originated by Festinger (1957), Heider (1958), and Newcomb (1953) and is based on the major principle common to all these: that individuals' perceptions will be consistent with their attitudes. This principle is used to create two propositions, one at the intrapsychic level and the other at the dyadic or relationship level, which allow for the generation of hypotheses about role-taking accuracy. The basic statement of the current theory is that accuracy of role-taking is a function of the level of affect in interpersonal relationships together with the degree of similarity of value systems. The first proposition, at the cognitive level of analysis, states that if actor possesses a high positive affective attitude toward other he will perceive other as similar to himself on behavioral dimensions; and conversely, a negative affective attitude will lead actor to perceive other as different from himself. This cognitive balance proposition has received support from a number of authors (Fiedler, 1951, 1953, 1954; Fiedler and Senior, 1952; Fiedler, Blaisdell, and Warrington, 1952; Fiedler, Hartman, and Rudin, 1952; Byrne and Blaylock, 1963; Levinger and Breedlove, 1966). The second proposition in the theory employs the concept of cognitive consistency to determine the similarity or dissimilarity between two individuals. At the dyadic level of analysis, the second proposition holds that two persons sharing similar value systems will advocate similar responses in behavioral (problem-solving) situations. And, conversely, persons with generally dissimilar value systems will advocate different responses in behavioral situations. For example, two persons who agree on political ideology will likely agree on economic ideology; and two persons who differ on political ideologies will likely differ on economic ideologies. Thus, the relationship requires two individuals, both of whom exhibit cognitive balance which results in similaritydissimilarity between individuals. *This research was conducted from June to December, 1970, and was partially supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF-GS-2650) and a Research Grant in Aid from Washington State University. We wish to thank Viktor Gecas for help on an earlier version and Bernard Babbitt, Marlene Huntsinger, and Lorrie Rippee for computer programming assistance. The names are listed in alphabetical order as the responsibility for this work is truly coauthored.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define the nature of the behavior in each of these seven categories, suggest the value to the policy maker of an understanding of the behaviour in each category, and discuss the dynamics and proposes some determinants of marketer behavior.
Abstract: Marketing scholars have an opportunity to help the public policy maker by providing him with information about marketer behavior. Studies of questionable, illegal, defensive, adaptive, opportunistic, regulated, and supportive marketer behavior would all be useful to the policy maker. This article defines the nature of the behavior in each of these seven categories, suggests the value to the policy maker of an understanding of the behavior in each category, and discusses the dynamics and proposes some determinants of marketer behavior.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper argued that any assessment of an art is in terms of values, and that the art of rhetoric is no exception, and pointed out that the critic can never give proof of his opinion but he will always be held responsible for Hs reasons.
Abstract: U N D E R L Y I N G A S S U M P T I O N of this study is that any assessment of an art is in terms of values, and that the art of rhetoric is no exception. For centuries critics have been applying value judgments to public addresses, and rightly so, but few attempts have been made to justify those judgments in terms of the study of values. Although some suggestions have been made about analyzing the values of the rhetorical critic,^ no specific theoretical directions have been identified. Other attempts have analyzed the relationships of rhetoric and the values of specific groups or social values as a genre.^ Again, the critic has been !eft with no specific suggestions about his own values and their relations to his criticism. In an insightful essay RatclifF has dealt with the product of the critic as a value judgment by saying that "The statements of the critic must be weighed carefully in light of his reasons for making them. The critic can never give proof of his opinion but he will always be held responsible for Hs reasons. His reasons will be in light of his own values and world view. If his reasons are meaningfful, his criticism will be meaningful."'* However, the focus of RatdifT's essay was not on the implications of the first principles