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Showing papers on "Value (ethics) published in 1986"


Book
20 Mar 1986
TL;DR: In this article, the author argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice and proposes a principle whereby choice is made on an agreed basis of co-operation, rather than according to what would give the individual the greatest expectation of value.
Abstract: In this book the author argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice. According to the usual view of choice, a rational person selects what is likely to give the greatest expectation of value or utility. But in many situations, if each person chooses in this way, everyone will be worse off than need be. Instead, Professor Gauthier proposes a principle whereby choice is made on an agreed basis of co-operation, rather than according to what would give the individual the greatest expectation of value. He shows that such a principle not only ensures mutual benefit and fairness, thus satisfying the standards of morality, but also that each person may actually expect greater utility by adhering to morality, even though the choice did not have that end primarily in view. In resolving what may appear to be a paradox, the author establishes morals on the firm foundation of reason.

1,837 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that "value free" decisions or research that is "neutral" are a myth and that practitioners and academics need to measure the worth of their decisions and research studies in terms of the basic moral conceptions embedded in "the culture of ethics".
Abstract: Corporate managers and business-and-society scholars cannot escape the normative implications of their decisions or their research. "Value free" decisions or research that is "neutral" are a myth. Practitioners and academics need to measure the worth of their decisions and research studies in terms of the basic moral conceptions embedded in "the culture of ethics. "Doing so enhances the legitimacy of corporations and clarines the nature of business-and-society research.

276 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the validation process should be considered nothing more and nothing less than traditional hypothesis testing and suggest that the role of constructs in psychological measurement is considered, as is the general status of construct-validation strategies in employment testing.
Abstract: There have been continuing arguments with respect to the unitarian versus trinitarian view of the validation process. An emerging position is that the threefold distinction among validation models presented by Cronbach and Meehl is not as useful as it once was. This article joins in the unitarian argument and suggests that the validation process be considered nothing more and nothing less than traditional hypothesis testing. The issue of the role of constructs in psychological measurement is considered, as is the general status of construct-validation strategies in employment testing. In addition, the unique knowledges, skills, and abilities that psychologists bring to the discussion of validity and inference are discussed. During the past 15 years, there have been many occasions to regret the simple taxonomy of validity strategies suggested by the American Psychological Association in their "Technical Recommendations for Psychological Tests and Diagnostic Techniques" (1954). Cronbach and Meehl were members of the APA committee that developed those recommendations. They further elaborated on the notion of construct validity in a subsequent publication in 1955 (Cronbaeh & Meehl, 1955). The "Technical Recommendations" proposed a four-category taxonomy of validity models. The taxonomy consisted of predictive, concurrent, content, and construct validity. The predictive and concurrent models are usually combined into a category known as "criterion-related validation strategies." Thus, it is common to hear reference made to three "types" of validity. This view of validity has been aptly labeled the trinitarian view (Guion, 1980). At the time that the "Technical Recommendations" were published, the taxonomy was quite valuable. It provided order where before there was chaos. It added the preliminary structure necessary for progress. For some time, this taxonomy proved a useful tool for validity discussions. The taxonomy represented a point of departure. Prior to that point, validity was considered a correlation between a predictor and a criterion. It was a literalist view directed toward the technology of prediction.Such a positivist view was (and remains) only minimally helpful in developing theories of behavior or a basic understanding of what was being measured by the tests in question. The introduction of the "Technical Recommendations" and the concepts of content-oriented and construct validation represented an attempt to correct the past excesses of dust-bowl empiricism and focus attention on understanding rather than on the simpler and less meaningful search for predictability. The value of that reorientation has been substantially blunted in the past 15 years as a result of a reification of the validity taxonomy that was introduced in 1954. This result is unfortunate because the emphasis on the meaning of test scores rather than the predictive value of those scores is as important today as it was 30 years ago. As a result of the efforts of practitioners (lawyers, judges, expert witnesses, and personnel administrators) to make the taxonomy into something it was never intended to be, the point of departure suggested by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) has become a point of arrival. The three types of validity that were originally proposed as a method for broadening the appreciation of the inferential limits of test scores have become an orthodoxy. Because forensic activity is usually deductive in nature, there has been the tendency in Title VII litigation to try to identify the validity model most appropriate for a given situation. Once the validity model has been identified, the case revolves around whether the requirements of the model have been met. In principle, this is no different from the way in which any court case is approached: Determine which principle covers the issue under scrutiny, and then determine if that particular principle has been violated. This approach can be quite effective if the principles are clear and distinct from one another and if all the parameters of the principles are accepted by all the parties involved. In psychology, an example of the value of this approach has been the development of the DSM-III for the diagnosis of psychological disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Although it is not without its detractors, the DSM-III is a useful way of determining from a set of observable symptoms what might be responsible for those symptoms and how those symptoms might be best treated. The parameters of the diagnostic model are clearly defined and understood (the five "axes" of the DSM-III), and there is a clear listing of the symptoms that warrant one diagnosis as opposed to another. Many would like to use the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978) in a similar manner. Unfortunately, there is substantial disagreement about the meaning and the independence of the principles involved in determining the legality of certain classes of employment decisions. The principles are, for the most part, validity "models." However, if these models are accepted as "principles" in a literal sense, the result is a November 1986 9 American Psychologist Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/86/$00.75 Vol. 41, No. 11, 1183-1192 1183 form of forensic and scientific myopia in which all parties wittingly or unwittingly agree to limit their discussion to the boundaries suggested by the validity models. Viewed from another perspective, this willingness to accept a small and fixed set of validity models is nothing more than a procrustean worldview in which some aspects of the conceptual issue are lopped off and thrown away and other natural conceptual limits are stretched well beyond their elasticity index. Tenopyr (1984) recently bemoaned this

265 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The concept of emotion as a master Western cultural category was explored in this paper, where an examination of the unspoken assumptions embedded in the concept of emotions is important for several reasons, including the fact that emotions have been sought in the supposedly permanent structures of human existence in spleens, souls, genes, human nature, and individual psychology, rather than in history, culture, ideology, and temporary human purposes.
Abstract: The extensive discussions of the concept of the emotions that have occurred in the West for at least the last two thousand years have generally proceeded with either philosophical, religious, moral, or, more recently, scientific psychological purposes in mind. This discourse includes Plato's concern with the relation between pleasure and the good; the Stoic doctrine that the passions are naturally evil; early Christian attempts to distinguish the emotions of human frailty from the emotions of God; Hobbes's view that the passions are the primary source of action, naturally prompting both war and peace; the argument of Rousseau that natural feelings are of great value and ought to be separated from the "factitious" or sham feelings produced by civilization; the 19th-century psychologists' move to view emotions as psychophysiological in nature, with consciousness seen less and less as an important component of the emotions.' One of the notable aspects of this discourse is its concern with emotion as essence; whether the passions are portrayed as aspects of a divinely inspired human nature or as genetically encoded biological fact, they remain, to varying degrees, things that have an inherent and unchanging nature. With the exceptions of Rousseau, to some extent, and of Wittgenstein more recently, emotions have been sought in the supposedly more permanent structures of human existence-in spleens, souls, genes, human nature, and individual psychology, rather than in history, culture, ideology, and temporary human purposes. In this article, I explore the concept of emotion as a master Western cultural category. An examination of the unspoken assumptions embedded in the concept of emotion is important for several reasons. In the first instance, those assumptions guide the investigation of people's lives in social science, including anthro-

215 citations


Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that individuals pursue at least two irreducible sources of value or utility, namely, pleasure and morality, and the possibility that some additional utilities may have to be recognized.
Abstract: In recent decades, neoclassical economists have made heroic efforts to accommodate within the confines of the concept of rational utility maximization the fact that individual behavior is significantly affected by moral considerations. This article argues the merits of using an alternative approach: recognizing that individuals pursue at least two irreducible sources of value or “utility”, pleasure and morality. The possibility that some additional utilities may have to be recognized is explored. This raises the concern that conceptual anarchy will break out, which in turn will force a search for a common denominator, and thus a return to one overarching utility. Arguments are presented to show that this concern is unfounded. The main focus of the article is a criticism of the monoutility conception and a brief for separating the sense of discharging one’s moral obligations from all other satisfactions. The article first deals with general conceptual points, and then cites both everyday observations and empirical evidence in support of this position.

149 citations


Book
01 Jan 1986
TL;DR: In the last half decade or so, Jurgen Habermas has increasingly employed the interview format, both as a means of presenting his changing views on philosophical topics in an accessible way, and as a way of debating current social and political issues as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Over the last half decade or so, Jurgen Habermas has increasingly employed the interview format, both as a means of presenting his changing views on philosophical topics in an accessible way, and as a means of debating current social and political issues This new, expanded edition of "Autonomy and Solidarity" includes an additional five interviews in which Habermas discusses such themes as the history and significance of the Frankfurt School, the social and political development of post-war Germany, the moral status of civil disobedience, the implications of the "Historians' Dispute", and the function of national identity in the modern world Never before published autobiographical material covering Habermas' early years at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research is followed by an extended philosophical interrogation of his latest thinking on the relations between ethics, morality and law With an extended introduction by Peter Dews, exploring the status and prospects of Critical Theory in the light of the recent revolutionary transformations in Europe, "Autonomy and Solidarity" should be of interest and value both to newcomers and those already familiar with Habermas' thought

142 citations


Book
01 Mar 1986
TL;DR: The concept of personal autonomy is central to discussions about democratic rights, personal freedom and individualism in the marketplace as discussed by the authors, and personal autonomy implies individual self-determination in accordance with a chosen plan of life.
Abstract: The concept of personal autonomy is central to discussions about democratic rights, personal freedom and individualism in the marketplace. This book, first published in 1986, discusses the concept of personal autonomy in all its facets. It charts historically the discussion of the concept by political thinkers and relates the concept of the autonomy of the individual to the related discussion in political thought about the autonomy of states. It argues that defining personal autonomy as freedom to act without external constraints is too narrow and emphasises instead that personal autonomy implies individual self-determination in accordance with a chosen plan of life. It discusses the nature of personal autonomy and explores the circumstances in which it ought to be restricted. In particular, it argues the need to restrict the economic autonomy of the individual in order to promote the value of community.

132 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors adopt a social psychological perspective to the study of social organization analyzed in terms of the skills of organizing and find that order is negotiated more or less successfully, the degree of success achieved depending on skilled performance.
Abstract: This paper adopts a social psychological perspective to the study of social organization analyzed in terms of the skills of organizing. The arguments are intended to be general but discussion is grounded in research on womens' centers in Britain. Drawing on Hosking's work on small groups, leadership, and organization, and Brown's doctoral research on womens' centers, we focus on interlocking cognitive and social orders and the manner of their achievement. "Order" is found to be negotiated more or less successfully, the degree of success achieved depending on skilled performance in four main areas. These are outlined and illustrated. In the case of the womens' organization, a core value was found to be that of "distributed" leadership; they are argued to be successful to the degree that this is achieved.

122 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors apply the concept of frame analysis as a procedure for clarifying the moral reasoning associated with athletic aggression and suggest that Haan's theory of interactional morality can be used to provide a framework for social scientific research into moral issues.
Abstract: The designation of an act as aggressive involves an implicit or explicit moral judgment. Consequently, research on aggression must address the value issues involved. The present article suggests that Haan’s theory of interactional morality can be used to provide a framework for social scientific research into moral issues. Haan’s model, however, must be adapted to the unique context of sport. This study applies the concept of frame analysis as a procedure for clarifying the moral reasoning associated with athletic aggression. In contrast to similar acts in everyday life, moral ambiguity characterizes some sport acts intended to deliver minor noxious stimuli. The label of aggression must be used with caution when designating such acts.

102 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Apr 1986-Ethics
TL;DR: In this article, a rationalist account of the goodness of ends is presented, which is based on the theory of G. E. Moore, who argued that most things that are good are good because of the interest human beings have in them, an interest that can be explained in terms of the physiological and psychological constitutions of human beings and the other conditions of human life.
Abstract: In this paper I discuss what I will call a "rationalist" account of the goodness of ends. I begin by contrasting the rationalist account to two others, "subjectivism' and "objectivism.' Subjectivism identifies good ends with or by reference to some psychological state. It includes the various forms of hedonism as well as theories according to which what is good is any object of interest or desire. Objectivism may be represented by the theory of G. E. Moore. According to Moore, to say that something is good as an end is to attribute a property, intrinsic goodness, to it. Intrinsic goodness is an objective, nonrelational property of the object, a value a thing has independently of anyone's desires, interests, or pleasures. The attraction of subjectivist views is that they acknowledge the connection of the good to human interests and desires. Most things that are good are good because of the interest human beings have in them, an interest that can be explained in terms of the physiological and psychological constitutions of human beings and the other conditions of human life. In Kantian language, we may say that just as means are "conditioned" goods because their value depends on the ends to which they are means, most of our ends are conditioned goods because their value depends on the conditions of human existence, and the needs and desires to which those conditions give rise. Objectivism reverses this relation between goodness and human interest. Instead of saying that what we are interested in is therefore good, the objectivist says that the goodness is in the object, and we ought therefore to be interested in it. This divorce of goodness from natural interest can make it seem too accidental that we are able to care about the things that are intrinsically good. The advantage of objectivism is that it explains certain of our beliefs about the good that a subjectivist account cannot readily accommodate. We believe that people sometimes fail to care about what is good and sometimes have interests in or desires for things that are not good. Yet in subjectivist theories it seems as if anything one enjoys or desires is

76 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the acceptability of risk is related to the moral value of risky actions, and a depressed mood was associated with a lenient attitude to risks, which was found to be an important determiner of acceptance of risk.
Abstract: In this article the acceptability of risk is related to the moral value of risky actions. Four widely different groups of subjects (clergy, MBA students, prison inmates and pregnant women) judged 20 individual and 20 collective acts with reference to acceptability of risk, moral value, and value and probability of negative and positive consequences. They also rated their current mood. Acceptability of risks was most strongly related to moral value, which thus was found to be an important determiner of acceptability of risk. A depressed mood was associated with a lenient attitude to risks. Societal acts were more negatively evaluated than individual acts. There was a strong positive correlation between values and probabilities of outcomes, both positive and negative.

Book
01 Jan 1986
TL;DR: In this paper, a critical analysis of the central and also of the more important controversial concepts in educational theory and practice is presented by means of an essay-length analysis, which is intended for the use of students, researchers, teachers and administrators in the field of education.
Abstract: This alphabetic guide offers a critical analysis of the central and also of the more important controversial concepts in educational theory and practice. The authors address each idea or issue by means of an essay-length analysis. Examples of the types of questions considered are: "Can educational needs be assessed and, if so, in what way?"; "Is there any reason to take creativity tests seriously?"; "What is the status of a value judgement?"; "What distinct types of understanding, if any, are there?"; "What is the point of a liberal education?" and, "How do language and thought relate to one another?". This second edition has been enhanced by about 25% with more material on recapitulation, memory and psychological topics. The work is intended for the use of students, researchers, teachers and administrators in the field of education.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article found that respondents either chose a community identity as a city person, suburbanite, small-Town person, or country person or rejected such identification as meaningless, stigmatizing, constraining, or a source of identity conflict.
Abstract: This paper analyzes how people define their relation to different forms of community. Interviews with 77 Californians revealed that respondents either chose a community identity as a city person, suburbanite, small-town person, or country person, or rejected such identification as meaningless, stigmatizing, constraining, or a source of identity conflict. Those who identify express a sense of belonging, based on ties of sentiment, interest, value, or knowledge. They also use community imagery to interpret self: Self-designated city people, for instance, characterize themselves as active, liberal, city-wise; small-town people, as friendly, family-oriented, less materialistic, unpermissive; country people, as easy-going, independent, practical, ordinary, outdoor folk; suburbanites, as people of the middle ground. This rich, complex pattern of community identification suggests the limited value of traditional sociological images of community decline and placelessness.

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the same method of treatment is apparently ap propriate for both types of question, i.e., questions about value and how we ought to act are not regarded as different in kind from questions about the ultimate nature of reality, and since action is concerned with particulars, (j)pbvy)ns must be primarily about particulars rather than universals.
Abstract: -ttLristotle thought his predecessors in general, and Plato in par ticular, made a serious mistake in failing to mark the boundaries separating the different sciences and branches of philosophical in quiry. All of them failed to grasp the fundamental distinction be tween practical and theoretical knowledge. Ethics and politics, the prime examples of practical knowledge, differ from such theoretical sciences as metaphysics and physics not only in their aims but in their methods and subject matter as well. Indeed, Aristotle thinks the differences are such that we cannot regard practical and theo retical knowledge as two species of a single genus, for there is no common definition of knowledge which applies to both. If we look at Plato's middle dialogues, especially the Republic, from Aristotle's vantage point, it will appear that ethics and meta physics have been brought together in an unnatural union, the sci ence of "dialectic." The form of the good serves a double function: it is the first principle of ethics, and also the foundation of meta physics insofar as it is the basis of our understanding of reality as such. Platonic dialectic is a confusing blend of the practical and theoretical. Questions about value and how we ought to act are not regarded as different in kind from questions about the ultimate na ture of reality. The same method of treatment is apparently ap propriate for both types of question. "Wisdom" or

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For instance, the authors argues that toleration is not a derivative value, to be established only when the value of true and reasoned belief and of liberty in self-regarding matters has been established.
Abstract: Liberals often think that diversity of belief and its expression should be tolerated if we are to respect either individuals or reason and truth themselves. Because they are “agnostic about the good for man”, they hold that liberty for each to pursue his or her conception of the good in “self-regarding” matters is required, and that practices of toleration are important aspects of this liberty. They also often advocate practices of toleration as means by which reasoned and true beliefs can come to prevail over false beliefs. Each line of thought justifies practices of toleration as means to something that is seen both as logically independent and as of more fundamental value. These familiar lines of thought are not the only possible liberal vindication of toleration. In Kant's writings toleration is not a derivative value, to be established only when the value of true and reasoned belief and of liberty in self-regarding matters has been established. His arguments for toleration of what he terms “the public use of reason” presuppose neither that there are antecedently given standards of rationality nor that any class of self-regarding individual actions is of special importance. For Kant the importance of (some sorts of) toleration is connected with the very grounding of reason, and so in particular with the grounding of practical reason.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that any ethical framework that might be urged on us depends on a variety of empirical assumptions, such as the assumption that human beings have evolved under the aegis of kin and group selection (or comparably effective mechanisms).
Abstract: A philosopher is often more fortunate in his critics than in his supporters.Though I have not found enough of the latter to test out this bromide, Iam sensible of the value bestowed by colleagues who have taken suchexacting care in analyzing my arguments. While their incisive observationand hard objections threaten to leave an extinct theory, I hope the readerwill rather judge it one strengthened by adversity.Let me initially expose the heart of my argument so as to make obviousthe shocks it must endure. I ask the reader to grant that altruistic behaviorcan be empirically justified, that is, to allow that we have evolved underthe aegis of kin and group selection (or comparably effective mechanisms)to heed the community welfare, to be moved to aid the distressed even atcost to ourselves, and to approve of altruistic behavior in others. Grantedthis empirical account, I then attempt to show how ethical propositions,that is moral 'ought'-propositions and appraisals, can be justified withoutcommitting any fallacy. My strategy is to reveal that any ethical frameworkthat might be urged on us depends on a variety of empirical assumptions. Iattempt to show, for instance, that philosophers who argue for theadoption of any normative framework - even that of modern logic -employ a common strategy, namely to justify the adoption by showing thatthe framework sanctions certain empirical descriptions that are deemedwell confirmed. This leads me to reject the common belief that inferringvalues from facts is ipso facto fallacious.I then mount several justifications, moral justifications, for the conclu-sion that one ought to act altruistically. The first justification, whichWilliam Hughes has correctly isolated, is suggested in my discussion of therole of empirical considerations in ethical reasoning. There I illustrate howindividuals might validly derive moral conclusions from factual premises.That argument can be further elaborated. First, it must be granted thathuman beings have evolved not only to reason theoretically according tocertain logical rules (e.g., modus ponens), but also to reason practicallyaccording to certain moral rules (e.g., "From 'Action x enhances thecommunity good,' conclude 'I ought to perform x' "). If that is so, then nofallacy is committed when someone reasons from the fact that a child isdrowning to the conclusion "I ought to try saving this child." The rule of

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the use of user image to decrease shoplifting and found that if the image of the typical shoplifter is made more negative, individuals anxious to disassociate themselves with the negative image will be less likely to shoplift.
Abstract: Shoplifting has reached epidemic proportions. Traditional approaches to keeping this behavior under control have met with limited success. This article explores the use of user image to decrease shoplifting. The analysis supports the approach. If the image of the “typical shoplifter” is made more negative, individuals anxious to disassociate themselves with the negative image will be less likely to shoplift.

Book
04 Dec 1986
TL;DR: Bennett's view of CA is rooted in a literal reading of Gower's "lessons" but it is also broad and generous and sensitive to the expressive qualities of gower's verse.
Abstract: Virtually all of Bennett's chapter on Gower (pp. 407-29) is devoted to "Confessio Amantis," and it is for the most part an expanded version of the introduction to his "Selections from John Gower" (1968): one will find very much the same characterizations of Gower's relationship with Chaucer, of his narrative style, of his poetic achievement, of his general themes, and of the roles of the various characters in his poem, fleshed out with considerably more explanation and illustration. Bennett's Gower is a skilled poet and storyteller who is underestimated because of the unobtrusiveness of his art and a man of broad sympathy and insight, characteristics that Bennett illustrates with discussions of "Ceix and Alcione" and "Florent" and with brief quotations from other tales. Gower's most important model and predecessor is Ovid, not only for the tales that he borrowed but also for the topical references and philosophical statements with which his poem begins and ends. His confession frame derives from "Roman de la Rose" and "De Planctu Naturae" but it would also have been seen as a literary adaptation of sacramental penance, and the "therapeutic" function of the sacrament provided the "point of contact" to the treatment of love as a sickness in contemporary love-literature. The general theme of the poem is love: Bennett is not persuaded by attempts to see it as an expression of political or social doctrine, nor is he moved by the efforts to construct a precise moral underpinning for all of the various elements that it contains. Gower's "honeste love" links courtesy, charity, and the practical aims of marriage and the begetting of children. Genius does not represent a single point of view or value but carries out a composite and in some ways ambivalent role. And the unity of the poem is provided loosely by a group of five "distinctly Gowerian" concepts or themes: "Love and Charite as opposed to Lust and Will . . . ; Peace and Rest as opposed to War and Discord; Reason and Wit as against 'unreason'--folly and passion; Nature or Kind, and Mortality; Fortune and Necessity (but with Providence guiding them)" (p. 425). Bennett's view of CA is firmly rooted in a literal reading of Gower's "lessons" but it is also broad and generous and sensitive to the expressive qualities of Gower's verse. Review by A.J. Minnis in TLS, 6 February 1987, p. 140. [PN. Copyright The John Gower Society: JGN 6.1]

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that individuals pursue at least two irreducible sources of value or utility, namely, pleasure and morality, and the possibility that some additional utilities may have to be recognized.
Abstract: In recent decades, neoclassical economists have made heroic efforts to accommodate within the confines of the concept of rational utility maximization the fact that individual behavior is significantly affected by moral considerations. This article argues the merits of using an alternative approach: recognizing that individuals pursue at least two irreducible sources of value or “utility”, pleasure and morality. The possibility that some additional utilities may have to be recognized is explored. This raises the concern that conceptual anarchy will break out, which in turn will force a search for a common denominator, and thus a return to one overarching utility. Arguments are presented to show that this concern is unfounded. The main focus of the article is a criticism of the monoutility conception and a brief for separating the sense of discharging one’s moral obligations from all satisfactions. The article first deals with general conceptual points, and then cites both everyday observations and empirical evidence in support of this position.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The modern is the consciousness of the absence of value in many activities as mentioned in this paper and the modern is not knowing how to respond to the problem of meaning, which is the opposite of romanticism and dandyism.
Abstract: involves a change in people's relation to the problem of meaning: simplifying a great deal, I would say that the modern is the consciousness of the absence of value in many activities. If we are interested in what is new in modernity, it is not knowing how to respond to the problem of meaning. Romanticism, as the absence of meaning and the consciousness of that absence, is modern; so is something like dandyism, orwhat Nietzsche calls "active nihilism," which is not only the consciousness of the loss of meaning, but also the activation of that loss. Secondly, modernity sought a philosophical and political response to romanticism and dandyism: in otherwords, it attempted to produce what might be called a "grand narrative," examples of which are the narrative of emancipation beginning with the French Revolution, and

Book
01 Jan 1986
TL;DR: The Princeton Legacy Library as mentioned in this paper uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press.
Abstract: Derek Phillips presents a strong case for the importance of normative theories about the just social organization of society. Most sociologists urge the avoidance of value judgments, but Professor Phillips argues for a notion of a just social order that reflects a twin concern with explanatory and normative thinking.Originally published in 1986.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors trace the case of indicators of aggregate productivity trends in the United States and highlight the problems of locking in place an "objective" social indicator when the reality being measured is in continual flux.
Abstract: The study of social indicators is valuable for understanding the role that the social sciences play in the political arena. One common pattern is for a particular social indicator to become frozen in place once it takes on political significance, and this can result in ironic consequences. This study traces out the case of indicators of aggregate productivity trends in the United States. These measures were initially developed as part of an underconsumptionist argument that was linked to the political left, but there was considerable debate over different measurement schemes. Over time, one particular measure of trends in aggregate productivity became central for wage negotiations and for government policy. This created a context in which the slower rates of growth of this measure of productivity in the 1970s helped to validate the views of those on the political right who saw the need for greater restrictions on wage gains and government civilian spending. The paper raises questions about the value of this particular measure and ends by emphasizing the problems of locking in place an "objective" social indicator when the reality being measured is in continual flux.

Book
01 Jan 1986
TL;DR: The need for alternatives: where we have been, and where we are going an independent education for all? the present absence of accountability some causes for national concern black paper prejudices? as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The need for alternatives: where we have been, and where we are going an independent education for all? the present absence of accountability some causes for national concern black paper prejudices?. Part 2 Examination not attempted: rationality, sincerity and monitoring resource inputs or education outputs? consequences of comprehension publicity and suppression. Part 3 Clarifying crucial concepts: competition and co-operation democracy and equality excellence and elites, comprehension and selection. Part 4 Education vouchers: "... like canned spuds in a supermarket" bureaucratic power or market power? the objects and the objections of officials. Part 5 Three concepts of racism: racism as plain injustice racism as involving disfavoured beliefs race and culture racism as causing disfavoured outcomes when black can be brown or even white, and why. Part 6 Peace, "Peace Studies" and the "Peace Movement": a preliminary skirmish conceptual truths, factual truisms, and some favourite fallacies "Peace Movements" where there is not war the contents of "Peace Studies" programmes.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Her work on value conflicts in science and business represents a combination of the fields of psychology, management science and ethics, and seeks to discover additional alternatives that may lead to more satisfactory solutions.
Abstract: Joan E. Sieber is professor of psychology, California State Univ., Hayward, CA 94542, where she teaches in the areas of social psychology and solving value conflicts in science and business. Her work on value conflicts in science and business represents a combination of the fields of psychology, management science and ethics. Unlike the philosophical field of applied ethics which focuses on the analysis of value conflicts and on a fixed set of alternatives to determine what is the best course of action, her work seeks to discover additional alternatives that may lead to more satisfactory solutions.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jul 1986-Mind
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the merits of claim-rights, i.e. rights that entail correlative duties to assist or forbear with a view to supporting the right-holders' having the objects of their rights.
Abstract: After the copious use of the concept of rights since World War II, a perhaps inevitable reaction has set in. Echoing the criticisms voiced by Bentham, Burke, and Marx, contemporary philosophers, legal theorists, and publicists have been denying the value and even the significance of appeals to rights. Central to these negative views have been two interrelated kinds of objections, the conceptual and the moral, each of which argues that rights-talk can be dispensed with in moral, legal, and political discourse. The conceptual objections hold that the concept of rights is logically redundant or epistemologically ungrounded or both, so that it can be eliminated, with no loss of meaning or cogency, in favour of other, more basic concepts. The moral objections contend that even if the concept of rights has a distinct meaning, the concept in its various uses not only fails to account for some very important moral values but is also a source of moral disvalue. In this paper I examine the merits of these objections. The rights that are primarily at issue here are claim-rights, i.e. rights that entail correlative duties to assist or forbear with a view to supporting the right-holders' having the objects of their rights. At some points the objections are concerned more specifically with moral rights as against legal ones, and at other points with human rights as a sub-class of moral rights. For the most part the context will indicate which of these kinds of claim-rights is in question; where it does not, I shall provide the needed specification.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that much of the criticism of the national interest on normative grounds in fact derives from confusion over the meaning of the concept, and that statesmanship which relies on both definitions of national interest can provide the best guide to ethical state conduct within the "anarchical society" of international politics.
Abstract: “The national interest” is frequently criticized in the contemporary study of international relations as an ambiguous term that lends itself to the support of unethical state policies by justifying single-minded national selfishness. This article argues that much of the criticism of the national interest on normative grounds in fact derives from confusion over the meaning of the concept. It separates two meanings — national interest as the common good of the national society, set off from the international environment, and national interests as the concrete objects of value over which states bargain, within that international setting. It surveys six views of the link among the national interest, the international society that legitimates various state interests, and the demands of ethical action, and concludes that statesmanship which relies on both definitions of national interest can provide the best guide to ethical state conduct within the “anarchical society” of international politics.

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TL;DR: It has become widely accepted in recent years that critical reflection about our practices and their rationales is something various people through acculturation learn to engage in (or to avoid) in various ways, not a simple matter of assuming a culture-neutral standpoint open to all human beings as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: It has become widely accepted in recent years that critical reflection about our practices and their rationales is something various people through acculturation learn to engage in (or to avoid) in various ways, not a simple matter of assuming a culture-neutral standpoint open to all human beings; philosophy is not a presuppositionless superscience. As a result, it seems that all we can do in attempting to justify a practice is appeal to what is normal in some culture (real or ideal) that we admire, and it seems that such appeals are too weak to show that some particular way of doing things must be accepted or rejected by everyone. Either blind enthusiasm or empty rationalism tends to supplant serious critical reflection about what we do. And so philosophical debate about our practices comes to consist in disputes between those who enter appeals to what is normal or traditional (somewhere, if not in one's home culture, then in another, or in the culture of one's imagination) and those who criticize appeals to tradition and undertake searches for culture-neutral ways of formulating and defending principles for the assessment of practices. Thus, for example, Michael Walzer, in Spheres ofJustice, argues that a way of distributing goods in a given society can (and can only) be shown to be just by seeing what would be said about distribution by someone "learned in his own tradition, patient and skillful in studying its history, its underlying philosophy, and its institutional details . . . [who] teases out [our] deepest understanding" of fairness and how we value things.' "The hard task is to find principles latent in the lives of the people [we] live with, principles they can recognize and adopt."2 Ronald Dworkin then

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a method for identifying, collecting, and aggregating corporate social performance data in a manner that explicitly incorporates evaluator value preferences is presented. But, it is argued that this approach improves upon other social audit methodologies by treating value issues more systematically and comprehensively, and that it would be a useful decision making tool for ethical/social investors, other corporate stakeholders, and management.

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01 Nov 1986-Chest
TL;DR: In France, home care services for ventilator-assisted persons are provided by 28 not-for-profit regional associations provided by an organization (ANTADIR) which is a federation of these associations.

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01 Jul 1986-Ethics
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the implications for utilitarianism of the nature of persons, the claim that act utilitarianism is self-defeating, and the solution to the act consequentialist's problem of how to account for moral obligations in situations in which group effects are morally significant but no one act seems to have any relevant consequences of value.
Abstract: In Reasons and Persons' Parfit focuses on several utilitarian issues. In this essay I discuss only three of these: the implications for utilitarianism of his analysis of the nature of persons; his claim that act utilitarianism is self-defeating; and his claimed "solution" to the act consequentialist's problem of how to account for moral obligations in situations in which group effects are morally significant but no one act seems to have any relevant consequences of value.